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1.  Introduction 
In the past decade, much has happened in international criminal law. One development has 
been the establishment of the first, permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). Excitement 
and interest towards the ICC has been widespread. Research done on the ICC has been 
diverse, concentrating, amongst others, on the organizational makeup of the Court, its 
jurisdiction, meaning and significance for the development of international criminal law. 
Much of the research has also concerned the ICC’s effectiveness and its role in international 
relations and particular conflict situations.  Yet, one of the most central questions that have 
puzzled many is why the ICC was established at all; what stands behind the creation of an 
international criminal court that, in theory and practice, does and can encroach on matters 
traditionally  taken  to  be  at  the  core  of  state  sovereignty,  the  judgement  of  criminals.  Most  
crucially, the ICC is situated amidst the conflict between the norms of sovereignty and human 
rights and their protection, where state sovereignty, the guiding principle of international 
relations, has become increasingly threatened by international criminal law and demands of 
bringing to justice perpetrators of international crimes. 
Quite widely, the ICC has been hailed as a great advancement in international criminal law. 
Deitelhoff has characterized the Court as “a profound institutional change in world politics”. 
(Deitelhoff 2009, 33) The ICC has been hailed as an important body in the fight against the 
culture of impunity (Popovski 2000); and by further codifying the idea that individuals are to 
be held responsible for international crimes, has resulted in the erosion of the concept of 
sovereignty, which for Gow represents a “revolution” in international affairs. (Gow 2000) 
Despite the general enthusiasm, not all view the ICC and international criminal law in a 
positive light. Criticism has circled, amongst others, around the meaning and effectiveness of 
the law and the institutions and on the problems posed by the unavoidable relationship to 
politics and state sovereignty. Goldsmith and Posner question the influence, meaning and 
effectiveness of international law in general and argue that its importance has been to a large 
extent overemphasized. (Goldsmith and Posner 2006) Graubart sees that, what he calls global 
criminal law, has been rendered an instrument of power, used by the great powers and that 
international tribunals, ICC included, for the most part reinforce this tendency. (Graubart 
2010) 
These challenges are intensified by the fact that the ICC, though in theory an independent 
institution, depends to a large extent on its creators, the states. The ICC needs states to 
function properly and to fulfil its goals. This is why not only powerful opponents are a 
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problem, but also why supporters are crucial. Therefore, it is no wonder that the hostility of 
the United States (US) towards the ICC has been of such interest. This interest and the 
importance  of  the  subject  have  resulted  in  a  copious  amount  of  research  on  the  US and  the  
ICC. The aim here is not to add to that.  
Instead, the focus here is on one of the ICC’s supporters, the United Kingdom (UK). The UK, 
as a powerful actor in international society and as one of five of the United Nations Security 
Council’s (UNSC) permanent members, offers an interesting and meaningful focus. In the 
aftermath of the Second World War, Prime Minister Winston Churchill saw that the only 
solution fitting for the highest ranking Nazi war criminals was summary execution (Smith 
1981, 45-46); 56 years later, the UK ratified the Rome Treaty of the ICC and since then, the 
UK has been characterized, and has characterized itself1, as one of the staunchest supporters 
of the Court. According to Edlin, “Britain’s support was pivotal to the creation of the ICC”. 
(Edlin 2006, 5) In addition, the UK has historically supported international tribunals, being 
one the main supporters of the International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
Rwanda (ICTR), regarded as the ICC’s precedents.  
The  statement  in  the  title  of  this  thesis  was  given  by  Labour  Member  of  Parliament  (MP)  
Oona King during a 1999 debate in the UK House of Commons and represents well the belief 
the supporters had in the ICC and its abilities to impact change: “What better gift could 
today's politicians bequeath tomorrow's generation?” (House of Commons 1999, vol. 336, col. 
933) It is the support of the UK that is the focus here. More to the point, it is UK 
argumentation that forms the focal point. This thesis analyses debates concerning the ICC in 
the House of Commons 1998-2001. The ICC was widely debated in the UK House of 
Commons during that time, when the UK adopted the ICC Bill with which it ratified the 
Rome Statute and adopted its provisions as part of UK national Law. (UK Parliament 2012) 
How did  the  UK government  representatives  and  other  MPs at  the  time argue  for  the  ICC? 
What can the statements reveal, of not only about the argumentation strategies used but views 
and opinions that inform that argumentation? It is these sorts of questions this thesis sets out 
to answer.  
Before moving on to introducing the research framework, it is important to note what this 
research is not about. First, the purpose is not to answer why states join various international 
organizations in general. Of course the discussion will touch upon the reasons why the UK 
                                               
1 FCO 2012a. 
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would and did join such an institution, but the aim is not to find those reasons from the 
sources; the aim, instead, is to identify what sorts of arguments were used. Second, this thesis 
does not aim to contribute to the wider ‘peace versus justice’ debate that questions whether 
justice mechanisms, such as trials, are more of an impediment to peace in on-going and post-
conflict situations.2 Third,  as  the  focus  here  is  on  the  ICC and  thus  on  criminal  trials,  other  
mechanisms for post-conflict justice are not discussed. These include truth commissions, 
which have been formed in for example South Africa. Furthermore, the emphasis here is on 
international mechanisms and thus national courts and other national bodies are excluded.3 
Lastly, the purpose is not to analyze the ICC’s effectiveness or the extent to which it has 
managed to fulfil its goals.  Such reviews have been advanced lately, as the ICC turns 10 this 
year in 2012.4 Although the subject is touched upon as the ICC and the UK’s relationship to it 
are discussed, an in-depth evaluation of the ICC’s performance is out of the scope here. 
1.1 Research framework 
To analyze  the  UK’s  ICC argumentation,  this  thesis  advances  with  the  research  question  of  
“How did the United Kingdom’s Government representatives and other Members of 
Parliament argue their support for the International Criminal Court?” This question directs 
attention to argumentation and to identifying what kind of arguments can be found in the 
statements. To answer it, statements in the House Commons during the debates concerning 
the passing of the ICC Bill are analyzed. This focus contributes to the overall existing body of 
research done in this area (for example Fehl 2004; Winkelman 2009; and Deitelhoff 2010). 
Focus is put on the UK’s argumentation for the ICC before it came into force. The analysis is 
conducted from a constructivist point of view of, which offers informative insights to the 
matter. To analyze the sources, Chaim Perelman’s and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s methods of 
argumentation analysis are used. 
The over-arching theoretical framework is formed by the discussion of the legalization of 
world politics and the development of the so-called human rights and atrocities regimes and 
the way these structures, once created, influence state actions and behaviour. Thus, the 
research  is  grounded  most  of  all  in  constructivism.  It  is  seen  that  constructivism  offers  the  
best framework for understanding and analyzing the ICC and state support for it, as it directs 
attention to actors’ behaviour, guided and constrained by structure. The surrounding structure 
                                               
2 See: Rodman 2007; Akhavan 2009 
3 See: Teitel 1999; Drumbl 2007 
4 See: Dicker 2012; and Posner 2012 
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formed by the interest in protecting human rights, which has resulted in increased 
legalization of the international realm and the creation of institutions such as the ICC, 
constrains and guides the actions and behaviour of  states. Example of this taken here is then 
the UK’s support of the ICC. The UK’s support of previous international trials and tribunals 
lends credence to the perspective that not only has the UK influenced and taken part in 
creating  the  structure,  the  structure  has  also  influenced  the  policies  of  the  UK;  of  this,  the  
adherence to the idea of an international criminal court functions as an example. The 
theoretical framework is further informed by a discussion of different logics of action; logics 
of consequences, appropriateness and arguing. It is seen that this provides a useful framework 
within which the statements by the UK MPs can be analysed. Furthermore, this research aims 
to provide more a methodological endeavour than an in-depth theoretical research. The 
timeline for analysis is from 1998 to 2001. 1998 forms the natural starting point as the ICC 
was established that year. Within this period, statements by UK MPs are analyzed. Rhetorical 
analysis by the argumentation strategies introduced by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca has 
been chosen, seen to provide a very useful way to analyse the substance of language and 
arguments. 
This thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 takes a closer look at international criminal law and 
its central institutions in the 20th century. In addition, Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical 
framework for this research, the legalization and the development of the human rights and 
atrocities regimes, context in which the ICC is grounded in; and then moves on to discuss the 
three main international relations theories international law and matters related to it are often 
viewed through; realism, liberalism and constructivism. Constructivism is then further 
elaborated as the theoretical foundation for this research.  Chapter 3 turns attention to the 
United  Kingdom.  The  chapter  first  discusses  the  UK  and  human  rights  and  then  the  UK’s  
foreign policy. Part three includes a discussion of the UK’s relationship with international 
tribunals that preceded the ICC and maps the development of international criminal law 
through the establishment of institutions from roughly the First World War onwards. This is 
done to provide a thorough background for the UK’s policies concerning international 
tribunals. Part four discusses the UK’s relationship with the ICC. Chapter 4 starts the analysis 
part. First, rhetorical analysis as a method is introduced, starting with the history and 
definitions of rhetoric. The second part introduces the tools that are used here; the techniques 
for analyzing arguments devised by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. Chapter 5 then moves on 
to the actual analysis of sources, statements made by the United Kingdom Government 
representatives and other MPs in support  of the ICC during the national debate of the UK’s 
ICC Bill. Chapter 6 will conclude the thesis and point to further avenues of research. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
This  chapter  discusses  the  theoretical  framework  of  this  research.  At  the  outset  it  deems  
mentioning that the purpose here is not to be a rigorous theoretical endeavor; rather, the 
emphasis is more on the empirical side of analyzing argumentation. Thus, the aim here is to 
provide a looser, overall theoretical framework. The chapter advances as follows. First, 
previous research done surrounding the themes of this research is introduced. Second, 
international criminal law and its institutions are discussed to provide context. Third, the 
wider framework formed by legalization and the human rights and atrocities regimes is 
introduced. This discussion is further elaborated through the debate over the benefits and 
problems of legalism. The fourth part discusses realist and liberal theories as alternative 
approaches to constructivism. Constructivism forms the central theme of part 5. The chapter 
first illustrates different approaches within the field; part two introduces the basic assumptions 
of constructivism and its relationship to rationalism; thirdly, norm-orientated constructivism 
is  discussed,  followed  by  the  different  logics  of  action.  The  chapter  concludes  with  a  
discussion of realist, liberal and constructivist approaches to international law and the ICC.  
2.1. Previous Research 
Before moving on to introducing the theoretical framework, some previous research done 
concerning the themes of this research is introduced, namely research about international law; 
international criminal law and its institutions; the ICC in general; and why the ICC was 
established and why states have joined it. 
One object of interest has been why states follow international law. In realist terms, 
Goldsmith and Posner contend that the meaning and influence of international law today is 
less than many think and that states follow it to advance their national interest. Thus, 
international law does not create compliance outside the needs of national interests. 
(Goldsmith and Posner 2006) Guzman, on the other hand, explains state obedience of 
international  law  through  a  reputational  model  of  compliance.  Here,  states  as  rational,  self-
interested actors follow international law because not doing so would hurt their reputation in 
the international society and lead to direct sanctions. (Guzman 2002) In an often cited 
research article, Koh argues for a constructivist understanding of following international law. 
For Koh, it is a process of interaction, interpretation and lastly, internalization, of international 
norms, which is crucial to why nations obey international law and not just conform to it when 
it is convenient. (Koh 1997, 2603) Obedience includes moral, normative and legal reasoning. 
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For Koh, an “actor's moral obligation to obey an international norm becomes an internally 
binding domestic legal obligation when that norm has been interpreted and internalized into 
its domestic legal system”. (Koh 1997, 2659) 
Research concerning international criminal law in general and its trials in particular abound5. 
International criminal law, its procedures, principles and development has been the subject of 
many comprehensive works. (Cassese 2008; Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst 2010) 
Similarly, both of the earlier ad hoc tribunals ICTY and ICTR have received much attention 
and been at the centre of well-rounded research. Hazan traces the war in Yugoslavia and 
views critically the process of establishing the ICTY (Hazan 2004); Moghalu’s 
comprehensive work does the same for the Rwandan genocide (Moghalu 2005); and Schabas 
gives an account of the law in relation to both of the above and the Special Tribunal for Sierra 
Leone (Schabas 2006). Robertson’s Crimes Against Humanity tells the detailed story of the 
development of human rights, international criminal law and the various trials and tribunals 
that have been established to try perpetrators of international crimes. (Robertson 2006) The 
ICC, in many ways a unique institution, has attracted wide interest. Various works have been 
published that discuss the ICC and its Rome Statute and its organization, jurisdiction and 
procedures in general. (Lee 1999; Broomhall 2004; McGoldrick, Rowe and Donnelly 2004; 
Politi and Nesi 2004; Schabas 2007; Funk 2010; Jurdi 2011)  Deeper theoretical analysis of 
the ICC is done comprehensively in Governance, Order and the International Criminal Court, 
which compiles articles from US opposition to political evil and cosmopolitanism by leading 
theorists in the field. (Roach 2009a)  
What has attracted wide interest is why the ICC was established in the first place and what 
could explain why states have joined such an institution and other institutions seen as possibly 
costly to states.  As Moravsick has asked in connection to the establishment of human rights 
regimes and bodies to enforce them (such as the European Court of Human Rights) why 
would any state want to join an institution that has the potential to “to constrain its domestic 
sovereignty in such an unprecedentedly invasive and overtly nonmajoritarian manner?” 
(Moravsick 2000, 219) Quite a few explanations have been offered.  
Moravsick himself argues, from a republican liberal, democratic peace theory –grounded 
viewpoint, that states join when international commitment enforces the particular policy 
preferences of a particular government. Through this, governments bind themselves, and 
                                               
5 For other measures, such as truth commissions see Teitel 2000; Hayner 2011. 
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future governments, to certain policies. This is done when benefits of committing outweigh 
sovereignty costs by reducing future political uncertainties. This holds elsewhere than in 
Europe and can be generalized to the ICC. (Moravsick 2000, 220) Simmons and Danner 
advance a similar answer and argue that the ICC ‘binds’ states. Through credible commitment 
theory,  the  authors  argue  that  states  can  rationally  use  the  ICC  as  a  tool  to  tie  their  hands.  
Unaccountable, autocratic states that can credibly foreswear the possibility of resorting to 
violent tactics are most likely to join the Court. The ICC is seen as being able to advance 
conflict reduction and peaceful negotiation. (Simmons and Danner 2010, 225-227) 
For Meernik and Shairick the ICC “presents all states with a fairly novel opportunity to 
demonstrate their commitment to international humanitarian law”. (Meernik and Shairick 
2011, 24)  Ratifying the ICC Treaty gives states an opportunity to externalize and export their 
human rights values they are eager to uphold and to demonstrate attachment to certain moral 
principles.  The authors see that economically powerful states with good human rights records 
are most likely to support the ICC and to have the normative commitment and foreign policy 
interest to do so. Meernik and Shairick also emphasize the role realpolitik plays in the process 
as more powerful states can induce the weaker ones to accept the values of international 
humanitarian law and the ICC. (Meernik and Shairick 2011, 24-26) 
Some have explained the matter through relations to other states. London moves on from 
traditional realist and liberalist accounts and explains joining through a theory of institutional 
learning: interaction with regional human rights courts has transformed state interests and 
political attitudes and those states that have joined regional bodies are more likely to accept a 
supranational institution. The US is skeptic since it has not experienced such interaction and 
thus also has not been influenced by the norms that human rights bodies entail. (London 2006) 
Goodliffe et al. argue that support of the ICC depends on dependence networks. All states 
have their own network which is comprised of states that are partners to the state in question 
through trade, security and international organization membership. Because of their 
partnerships, states care about the way the other states in the dependence network react to a 
state’s actions. States also observe the other states and if need be, adjust their own behaviour 
to fit the behaviour of others. The authors argue that dependence networks of states affect if 
and when a state will join the ICC. (Goodliffe, Hawkins, Horne and Nielson 2010, 1-3) 
Most interesting to this context are the arguments of Hawkins and Deitelhoff. Both move 
forward from a constructivist perspective and draw on ideas concerning argumentation. 
Through what he terms as a ‘political process model’, Hawkins argues that what matters most 
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to agreements and their support are not state power and interests but the content of 
arguments.  Hawkins  emphasizes  the  influence  of  arguments  that  stem  from  the  
understandings that are taken for granted in the international arena, which are the value of 
protection against bodily harm, the role of precedent in decision-making and the importance 
of cooperation to resolve widespread social problems. During the communication and 
persuasion processes of arguing state interests can change. (Hawkins 2004, 780) Hawkins 
takes  the  1984  Convention  against  Torture  as  the  object  of  analysis  and  argues  that  in  that  
case, persuasion played an important role. Arguments which stemmed from the taken-for-
granted understandings made the convention against torture subject of enforcement. (Hawkins 
2004, 799)  
Deitelhoff takes a similar perspective and argues that institutional change, such as the creation 
of the ICC can be best understood by addressing the process of legalization through 
constructivism and discourse theory, with the help of the ideas or argumentation and 
communication. Deitelhoff analyses the negotiation process that led to the establishment of 
the ICC and sees that it cannot be explained by power and initial state interests but by state 
interests that changed during the process. (Deitelhoff 2009, 33-35) Persuasion and discourse 
affected the negotiations in such a way that made the adoption of the Rome Statute possible. 
(Deitelhoff 2009, 60) 
This chapter has introduced some research that has been done in the areas of international law, 
international institutions and the ICC. The next part starts the discussion of the theoretical 
framework this research is grounded in.  
2.2 Context: International Criminal Law and its Institutions 
International criminal law has developed rapidly during the last few decades. This is evident 
in the establishment of different international tribunals and courts and in the development of 
the body and scope of the law itself. This chapter introduces this development. As this thesis 
has a narrower focus, the ICC and the United Kingdom’s policies towards it, this introduction 
is kept on a more general level.  
2.2.1 Definitions: a Narrower Understanding of International Criminal Law 
As with many concepts, there is no clear-cut and universally agreed-upon definition of 
international criminal law and it can be taken to include or exclude different things. As Cryer 
et  al.  note,  “The  meaning  of  the  phrase  ‘international  criminal  law’  depends  on  its  use,  but  
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there is a plethora of definitions, not all of which are consistent”. (Cryer, Friman, Robinson 
and Wilmshurst 2010, 4) Cryer et al. mention different possible understandings arising for 
example from international criminal law understood as transnational law; through a set of 
rules protecting international order; or in connection with the involvement of the State. (Cryer, 
Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst 2010, 4-9) As this thesis pertains specifically to the ICC, a 
narrower definition of the concept is adopted. Cryer and Broomhall have both adopted similar 
understandings of international criminal law where its basis is on individual responsibility. 
According to Cryer, international criminal law can be understood as “that body of 
international law that imposes criminal responsibility directly upon the individual, without the 
necessary interposition of national legal systems”. (Cryer 2005, 1) This sort of understanding 
directs the attention to, as noted by Broomhall, “the ‘core crimes’, derived from the legacy of 
Nuremberg”. (Broomhall 2004, 9-10) It is this narrower definition, as referring to the core 
crimes that invoke individual responsibility, which is adopted here.  
According to Popovski, development of individual responsibility within international criminal 
law is “one of the most significant changes in contemporary world politics”. (Popovski 2000, 
405) Individual responsibility was first acknowledged and codified in the Nuremberg 
Tribunals’ judgement which stated that “crimes against international law are committed by 
men, not abstract entities”. (The Nuremberg Judgement 1946) This liability extends to all; the 
status  of  the  individual,  whether  a  high  official  or  a  common  soldier,  is  of  no  relevance  in  
international tribunals and courts. Following Nuremberg, this has been further codified in the 
Statute  of  the  ICTY,  ICTR and the  ICC.  (The  ICTY Statute  1993;  The  ICTR Statute  1994;  
The Rome Statute 1998)  
These so-called ‘core crimes’ that invoke individual criminal responsibility are crimes of 
aggression; war crimes; crimes against humanity; and genocide.6 These are seen as so heinous 
that they ‘shock the conscience of mankind’ and are thus regarded as an attack against 
everyone. (Broomhall 2004, 19-22) Therefore, they have a certain international element 
which lifts them to the international level and makes them punishable by international courts. 
(Werle 2009, 55-56; also Fischer 2009) These are the crimes that have been codified (with 
slight alterations in substance) within international criminal law, in the Statutes of Nuremberg, 
the  ICTY,  the  ICTR and lastly,  the  ICC.  (The  Nuremberg  Charter;  The  ICTY Statute  1993;  
The ICTR Statute 1994; The Rome Statute 1998) 
                                               
6 An interesting discussion circles around why some acts are regarded as particularly heinous and 
against ‘humanity’. See Luban 2004; Fischer 2009.  
 16
To reiterate, the definition of international criminal law that is adopted here concentrates on 
the narrower understanding of the law; on one that directs attention to the core crimes which 
invoke individual criminal responsibility internationally. 
2.2.2 Development and Institutions 
International criminal law is a mixture with parts from several different bodies of laws. In 
addition to containing elements from public international law, it draws substance from 
international human rights and national criminal law and, especially, from international 
humanitarian law (Cassese 2008, 6; also De Than and Shorts 2003; Provost 2002) Important 
have been the Geneva Conventions (1949) and their Additional Protocols (1977), various 
other international treaties and the Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR and the ICC. (ICRC 2010) 
Much of the laws and conventions codified within international humanitarian law are visible 
in  international  criminal  law.  The  difference  to  human rights  law,  also  closely  connected  to  
the other bodies of law in the international level, is that both international humanitarian and 
criminal law apply in times war and conflict, whereas human rights law is also applicable in 
times of peace. (ICRC 2004)  
From the institutional point of view, the development of international criminal law is usually 
pinpointed to the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, set up in the aftermath of the Second 
World War. Similar attempts were made after the First World War to establish a tribunal to 
try the German Kaiser. These failed, however, mainly because the Netherlands refused to 
extradite the Kaiser. Atrocities of the Second World War, however, reawakened the idea and 
need for an international tribunal. (Sadat 2002, 23-6) Nuremberg especially is regarded as an 
important precedent for the prospective international tribunals and left the legacy of, amongst 
others, of the ‘Nuremberg principles’, which refer to the core principles of international law 
codified in the Nuremberg Charter. (Broomhall 2004, 19-23)  
As mentioned, the idea of an international criminal court is nothing new. The idea surfaced 
regularly after Nuremberg and Tokyo, but never successfully made headway. In connection to 
the 1948 genocide Convention, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) tasked the International 
Law Commission to study the possibility of an international criminal court. Political and legal 
questions, as well as the stalemate created by the Cold War, impeded the efforts and kept the 
establishment of the institution at bay. (Sadat 2002, 32-36) The 1990’s heralded in a new era 
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in international criminal law. Two ad hoc courts were established as answers to atrocities in 
the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.7  
The ICTY was established in 1993 by UNSC Resolution 827 in the aftermath of the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia. (The UNSC 1993) The purpose of the ICTY has been to deal with 
the  chaos  that  engulfed  the  to-be  successor  states  and  turned  in  to  violent  conflict  and  war  
most notably in Bosnia Herzegovina. The ICTY has jurisdiction only over crimes committed 
in the territory of former Yugoslavia from 1991 onwards.  (ICTY 2012) The ICTR was 
established by the UNSC Resolution 955 a year after the ICTY in 1994 following the 
Rwandan genocide. (The UNSC 1994a) The ICTR has jurisdiction over the year 1994 and 
over crimes committed in the Rwandan territory and on the territory of neighboring states by 
Rwandan nationals. (The ICTR Statute 1994) The importance of the ICTY and ICTR to the 
overall development of international criminal law and especially to the establishment of the 
ICC  is  widely  acknowledged.  The  creation  of  the  tribunals  showed  that  an  international  
criminal institution was both feasible and urgently needed. (Sadat 2002, 40) They are further 
discussed in connection to the UK. The next part introduces the ICC. 
2.2.3 International Criminal Court 
In 1994, the International Law Commission (ILC), at the request of the UNGA, compiled a 
Draft  Statute  of  an  international  criminal  court.  The  UNGA  then  established  an  Ad  Hoc  
Committee to review the report. The Committee’s work was taken on by the Preparatory 
Committee (the PrepCom), which continued work on the Statute. The process culminated in 
the Rome Conference held in June – July 1998. (Sadat 2002, 40-2) The negotiations proved 
difficult. A number of states and the vast amount of NGO’s that arrived to Rome to lobby for 
the establishment of a court wanted an independent institution with robust powers and 
universal jurisdiction. This was quite far removed from the ILC’s Draft Statute, which 
envisaged, amongst other features, a part-time institution with opt-in jurisdiction. (Deitelhoff 
2009, 36-7) The end result fits somewhere between these two positions. 
The ICC can be seen to represent the highest advancement in the development of international 
criminal law. The Rome Statute establishing the ICC was adopted in 1998 and in 2002 the 
ICC came in to force after the needed 60 states had ratified the Rome Statute. The ICC is a 
permanent, international court established to punish the perpetrators of the so-called core 
                                               
7 The development and work of the tribunals has been well mapped elsewhere and shall not be 
extensively covered here. See for example: Dallaire 2004; Schabas 2006; Del Ponte 2009. 
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crimes.8 The purpose and aim of the ICC is stated in the preamble of the Rome Statute: to 
“put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the 
prevention of such crimes”. (The Rome Statute 1998, 1)  
The ICC has attracted a lot of interest and the institution, its performance and jurisdiction 
have been the subject of active debates.9 Thus far, there are 17 cases in 7 situations that have 
been brought before the ICC. Two of the most notable cases have been those against Omar al-
Bashir, the incumbent President of Sudan and the arrest warrant of now deceased Muammar 
Gaddafi, former President of Libya, notable due to the Head of State status of both al-Bashir 
and Gaddafi. The Court has gained visibility and stayed in the headlines also in connection to 
such situations as those in Kenya and the Ivory Coast. (The ICC 2012a; Dicker 2012) The 
ICC delivered its first judgment on the Congo case in March 2012, convicting Thomas 
Lubanga for the recruitment child soldiers. (Smith 2012a) In many ways, the ICC has 
established its place in the arena of international law and relations and has become a highly 
relevant institution in conflict situations.  
To date, 121 states have signed and ratified the Rome Statute. (The ICC 2012b) The number 
of State Parties is one testimony to the fact that the ICC enjoys wide support amongst states. It 
is, however, well-known that the ICC also has its staunch opponents, the most prominent one 
being  the  US.  The  US  continues  to  stay  outside  the  Rome  Statute  despite  some  signs  of  
leniency shown towards the Court by the current Obama Administration.10 The Court has also 
been criticized for being selective and an imperialistic tool for the powerful, further discussed 
in chapter 3.  
The ICC has jurisdiction over crimes committed after July 1st 2002, the date the Court itself 
came  into  force.  Article  5  of  the  Rome  Statute  defines  the  crimes  over  which  the  ICC  has  
jurisdiction, noted above, and article 13 the ways in which ICC’s jurisdiction can be invoked: 
a case can be opened by the ICC Prosecutor; referred to the Court by a State Party; or referred 
to the Court by the UNSC. Article 12 stipulates the situations in which the ICC can exercise 
its jurisdiction. ICC has jurisdiction over State Parties and over crimes committed on the 
territory of or by a national of a State Party.  (The Rome Statute 1998, 3-11) One of the most 
important  features  of  the  ICC  is  the  so-called  complementarity  principle.  As  stipulated  in  
                                               
8 As of July 2010 the crime of aggression was added to the crimes over which the ICC can have 
jurisdiction. However, ICC’s jurisdiction over this crime will only come into force 2017 by a separate 
decision. (CICC 2012) 
9 More on the ICC and issues, see: Rabkin 2005; Schiff 2008; Akhavan 2009. 
10 See, for example Kersten 2011.  
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Article 17, the ICC’s jurisdiction will only be invoked if a State in which crimes are seen to 
take place is unwilling or unable to prosecute the case itself in its national courts. (The Rome 
Statute 1998, 12) Therefore, the Court can be regarded as a secondary measure and provides a 
safety  net  for  situations  which  a  state  cannot  or  will  not  prosecute  itself.  The  ICC  is  also  
intended for prosecutions of perpetrators of the highest status. (Schabas 2007, 211)  
The Rome Statute establishes a relationship between the ICC and the UNSC. In addition to its 
Article 13 referral powers, the UNSC has, as stated in Article 16, the power to defer a case for 
12 months at a time. (The Rome Statute 1998, 3-13) The stipulations in articles 13 and 16 
establish a relationship between the ICC and the UNSC in general and the Permanent 5 (P-5) 
members in particular, a relationship that has made many doubt the independence and 
possible hidden purposes of the ICC.11  
2.2.4 Problems: Enforcement and Effectiveness  
International trials and tribunals have faced many problems. Here, a few of the more general, 
fundamental problems are introduced shortly. The following includes also a brief overview of 
US opposition towards the ICC. 
First, and perhaps the most often discussed is the lack of enforcement in international law and 
international criminal law. As Posner notes, there is no enforcement power in the international 
realm akin to that which exists in domestic societies. The only body with some degree of 
enforcement  powers  is  the  UNSC  and  even  it  cannot  send  an  army  anywhere,  only  call  on  
states to send their armies to undertake action sanctioned by the Council. (Posner 2009, 32) 
The problem of enforcement becomes well visible with the ICC, which, though in theory an 
independent institution, is heavily reliant on its creators, the states which it needs to 
investigate cases and arrest individuals. (Posner 2009, 199-200) According to Stephen, the 
main problem of the ICC is that its ambitions are universal but the participation, cooperation 
and application of the ICC powers are national. Moreover, the complementarity principle 
gives  primacy to  states  and  national  jurisdictions.  This  has  led  to  situation  where  the  ICC’s  
perpetual problem is the “schizophrenic role of States as law makers, breakers and 
enforcers”. (Stephen 2012, 89) The dependence on states is also why the US’s opposition to 
the  ICC  has  proven  to  be  a  much  discussed  issue.  Analysis  on  the  matter  abounds  and  has  
                                               
11 See, for example Kirsch and Holmes 1999; UN Security Council 2005 
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been comprehensively done elsewhere. 12  For this context, an overall picture of US 
opposition is sufficient.   
According to Birdsall, the main oppositions the US has towards the ICC are twofold. Firstly, 
the  US  sees  potential  risks  in  the  Article  12  of  the  Rome  Statute,  which  stipulates  on  the  
jurisdiction  of  the  ICC.  Under  Article  12,  a  US  national  could  be  accused  of  committing  a  
crime  on  the  territory  of  a  State  Party.  This  risk  of  prosecution  of  its  own  nationals  is  
something the US is not ready to accept. (Birdsall 2010, 453-454)  Secondly, the US is not 
comfortable with the fact that the ICC is (to a large extent) independent from the UNSC and 
thus remains outside the full control of the US. The US would have wanted recognition of the 
US’s special role that comes from the frequent use of US military forces in operations around 
the world. (Birdsall 2010, 454-455) Schabas argues similarly that the US hostility towards the 
ICC has much to do with the fact that the Rome Statute gave the Court independence from the 
UNSC and did not leave it as a more of an ad hoc institution under UNSC supervision. 
(Schabas 2004) As is discussed later, these same concerns became visible during the debates 
in the UK.  
This does not mean, however, that the ICC would be a fully independent institution free from 
the UNSC’s power and influence. Not only is the ICC’s independence circumscribed by the 
need of states and their resources, Article 16 gives the UNSC deferral powers (as mentioned 
above). This establishes a clear relationship between the ICC and the UNSC and can endanger 
the  work  of  the  Court.  If  the  Security  Council’s  actions  concerning  the  ICC  are  seen  as  
politically motivated, the Courts standing as an independent and legitimate institution 
becomes tarnished. However, the relationship also has its positive aspects in that the UNSC 
can refer case to the ICC; this power extends the ICC’s reach to events in countries that are 
not  State  Parties  to  the  ICC.  (Moss  2012)  This  was  the  case  in  relation  to  the  situations  in  
Darfur and Libya.  
It is the influence of US opposition to the functioning of the ICC and to peace keeping 
missions that has made the issue so important. Goldsmith goes one step further and argues 
that the US opposition does not only mean that the ICC will not be able to reach its goals but 
that the ICC will actually do harm by discouraging the US from taking part in operations. 
This means that the ICC is a self-defeating institution and Goldsmith argues for the “futility 
and perversity” of the ICC’s mechanisms. (Goldsmith 2003, 89) Influence of US opposition 
                                               
12 See: Wedgewood 1999; Casey 2001; Scheffer 2001-2002. 
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became visible in the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1422 in 2002. Resolution 
1422  excluded  UN  mission  personnel  from  non-  state  parties  to  the  Rome  Statute  from  the  
jurisdiction of the ICC for a period of 12 months. (The UNSC 2002) This was done after the 
US threatened to veto the continuation of the UN peace keeping mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina if its personnel did not receive immunity from the ICC’s jurisdiction. The 
exclusion was renewed by a similar resolution a year later. (Jain 2005, 240-1) 
Birdsall notes, however, that the US position towards the ICC has changed from hostility to 
careful and pragmatic support. In 2004, the US attempted to again secure continuance to 
Resolution 1422. Due to fierce opposition towards this attempt, the US dropped the matter. 
Similarly, the American Service-Member’s Protection Act (ASPA) and Article 98 Bi-lateral 
Immunity  Agreements  (BIAs)  have  had  their  affects.  The  ASPA  (also  called  the  Hague  
Invasion Act) , which President Bush signed into law, authorizes the US to take all necessary 
measures to rescue US nationals from the ICC’s custody. By signing BIAs with the US, states 
agree  not  to  arrest  and  send  US  nationals  to  the  ICC.  US  also  cut  military  assistance  to  
countries  that  refused  to  sign  a  BIA.  All  these  measures  together  proved  harmful  to  US  
national interests and affected the US’s image and its military cooperation and training with 
several countries. Thus, it was forced to modify its policy towards the ICC and adopt a more 
pragmatic stance. (Birdsall 2010, 459-462) Under the Obama administration, the US has 
adopted a more positive policy towards the ICC, which has prompted for example Scheffer to 
argue that “the days of Washington seeking to undermine the ICC are over”. (Scheffer 2012) 
In  addition  to  problems  of  enforcement  and  the  ICC’s  dependence  on  states,  another  issue  
concerns  the  Court’s  effectiveness.  The  ICC’s  goal  is  to  fight  impunity  and  to  prevent  and  
deter future crimes. Critics point to the inability of the ICC to deliver on its promises. One 
problem  has  been  the  slowness  of  the  trials.  In  10  years,  the  ICC  has  concluded  one  case,  
where it found guilty Thomas Lubanga in connection to the case of Congo. Although a 
landmark occasion, Lubanga is not a high ranking inductee of the ICC such as Bashir is and 
the completion of the case against him took close to six years. Compared to about $900 
million spent, one conviction seems inadequate. (Smith 2012a; BBC 2012)  
The other problem is the deterrence effect of the ICC13. Many have started to doubt the ICC’s 
deterrence power as new violent situations and conflicts have occurred and old ones have 
                                               
13 The question of deterrence is central in the so-called peace vs. justice debate of whether judicial 
efforts actually do impede peace. This shall not be discussed in great detail in this context. For more, 
see: Akhavan 2001; Akhavan 2009; Sriram and Pillay 2010; CIC 2012. 
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continued even after the ICC indictments. The actions of the ICC have not stopped violence 
from flaring up in Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire or Syria. Similarly, many note that the indictment of 
Sudan’s Bashir may have had more negative than positive effects and point to the worsening 
of the situation on ground in Darfur after Bashir expelled international aid organizations 
following his indictment. (Butler 2009; Flint and de Waal 2009) Based on the ICTY’s actions 
in Bosnia and ICC’s in Darfur, Rodman argues that mounting trials and indictments had no 
apparent effect on violence on ground. The influence was only visible after states took 
coercive action in both of the situations. (Rodman 2009; also Wippmann 1999) Similarly, 
Clark notes that there is “growing scepticism” towards the ICC’s ability to impact conflict on 
the practical level. (Ridgwell 2012) 
As discussed, the ICC is in many ways dependent on states to be able to function effectively 
and reach its stated goals. It is clear not only that the ICC is influenced by the lack of support 
from the powerful players, such as the US, but also that the support of as many states as 
possible is crucial to the Court. Thus, support for the ICC forms an important aspect in the 
issues relating to the Court. One state that has supported the ICC since the Rome Conference 
is the UK and it is the UK’s support towards the Court is the focus here. Next, the wider 
theoretical context is introduced, before moving on to discuss the UK’s policies towards 
international criminal law and its institutions.  
2.3 Legalization and the Atrocities Regime as Starting Points 
The overall framework of this research is one of legalization and legalism, the so-called 
atrocities regime and the human rights regime. These frameworks are the result of the overall 
rise in importance of human rights and the development of international (criminal) law and 
the institutions to uphold it. This also represents norms and values that have come to 
challenge  the  fundamental  principle  of  state  sovereignty  by  emphasizing  the  need  to  protect  
human  rights  even  if  it  constrains  state  sovereignty.  The  first  part  of  this  chapter  illustrates  
and defines these frameworks. These are discussed more as illustrations of the spread of law 
in the international realm rather than as strict, theoretical understandings and explanations. 
Discussion of legalism, part 2 of this chapter, continues from legalization and ties the analysis 
in the wider discussion of international relations theory. Important are the two main 
theoretical frameworks under which international relations and also international law are often 
defined and discussed, realism and liberalism. The next part also discusses the theoretical 
framework in light of which this research is conducted, constructivism.  
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2.3.1 Legalization  
Legalization can in general terms be described as a move to law in world politics. In addition 
to international tribunals, the rise of law has been seen in other issue areas such as 
environment and arms trade. Despite the increase, practice has not been uniform; for example, 
compliance with the judgments of international tribunals remains uneven and states break the 
rules governing the use of force in international law. With legalization, politics and law 
become entwined. Law is affected by power and political interests as well as politics and 
political outcomes are influenced by law. Often, this relationship is mediated by institutions. 
(Goldstein, Kahler, Keohane and Slaughter 2000, 385-387)  Legalization has marked a shift in 
international relations. As Abbott and Snidal have emphasized, “International legalization in 
all its forms must be considered one of the most significant institutional features of 
international relations”. (Abbott and Snidal 2000, 456) 
Abbott et al. define legalization as a particular form of institutionalization. Legalization can 
be analyzed by three sets of characteristics that an institution may have: obligation, precision 
and delegation. Firstly, obligation means that actors, such as states, are legally bound by rules 
and/or commitments and that they come under scrutiny in the framework of those rules and/or 
commitments.  Secondly,  precision  refers  to  the  extent  in  which  a  rule  defines  the  required  
behavior and conduct, the range being from precise and exact to more vague and ambiguous. 
Thirdly,  delegation  refers  to  that  actors  delegate  authority  to  implement  and  apply  the  rules  
the actors have subjected themselves to. These characteristics are not set but vary in degree 
and extent. This then results in what can be termed as hard and soft legalization. (Abbott, 
Keohane, Moravcsik, Slaughter and Snidal 2000, 401-2) Hard law refers to situations where 
the extent of precision and delegation of authority is high. Benefits include such as the 
strengthening of the credibility of commitments and the expansion of political strategies 
available. The price is, however, sometimes significant sovereignty costs in that actors such as 
states have to accept restrictions on their sovereignty. When the law softens, so to speak, the 
legal  arrangements  that  govern  the  certain  subject  are  weakened  in  one  or  more  ways.  The  
weakening happens to varying extent in one or all of the characteristics of obligation, 
precision and delegation. Because softer law entails relaxations of the requirements made on 
actors, arrangements within this framework of law are often easier to achieve. This is often 
true  with  states  which  tend  to  view sovereignty  costs  as  too  much compared  to  the  benefits  
gained. (Abbott and Snidal 2000, 421-3)  
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Within international criminal law, the ICC is the latest major development in terms of 
legalization.  According  to  Deitelhoff,  the  Court  represents  “one  prominent  example  of  a  
legalization process that reflects a profound institutional change in world politics”. (Deitelhoff 
2009, 33) Abbott et al. classify the ICC as a case of near full legalization; in it, the levels of 
obligation, precision and delegation are all high. In comparison, others in the same category 
are the European Community and the European Human Rights Convention. (Abbott, Keohane, 
Moravcsik, Slaughter and Snidal 2000, 406-7) Not all agree that the spread of legalization and 
legalism in world politics are simply positive developments. This is discussed in part 4 of this 
chapter. 
The root of legalization can be placed in rational-based interests and normative considerations. 
It seems reasonable to agree with Abbott and Snidal, who argue that legalization in many 
ways arises from both interests and norms. In addition to being based on norms, legalization 
gives the opportunity to advance and support certain normative values. This does not, 
however, preclude the effect of interests. (Abbott and Snidal 2000, 422) The norms that have 
much affected the legalization of international criminal law are the ones that have been 
advanced and supported within the framework of the so-called human rights and atrocities 
regimes. It is to these this chapter turns to. 
2.3.2 The Human Rights and Atrocities Regimes 
According to Nadelmann, norms that prohibit certain kinds of actions and the processes 
through which they are enforced are institutionalized in so-called global prohibition regimes. 
In these, certain actions, such as human trafficking in Nadelmann’s list of examples, are 
prohibited by powerful global norms. Although Nadelmann concedes that economic and 
political interests, especially those of the powerful states, are often reflected in the regimes, he 
directs attention to the important part played by moral and emotional factors from 
humanitarian  sentiments  to  compassion.  The  case  is  especially  so  with  prohibition  regimes,  
which often involve criminal law and thus bring to play more moral and emotional factors 
than some other  areas. (Nadelmann 1990, 479-480) Global prohibition regime norms usually 
entail two main features; they mirror the criminal laws of powerful states in world politics (to 
date, European nations and the US); and they concern such activities that in some way go 
beyond national borders of states. In the internationalization process of such norms, it is not 
only states that seek to promote them but also other actors who lobby for their support. These 
norms tend to relate to the way individual human beings are treated by states and by each 
other. (Nadelmann 1990, 524) Nadelmann might have had the ICC-to-be in mind, so well 
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does his notion seem to correspond with the current situation. Human rights and their 
promotion are often stipulated as Western-led projects and it is human rights norms that are at 
the root of the core crimes, which are deemed international in that they go beyond the borders 
of states and are against humanity overall. International criminal law and its institutions are 
meant to prohibit actions deemed as crimes and enforce that the law is followed, not by states 
as entities but by individuals. In this, the ICC represents the latest development. 
In Deitelhoff’s view, the ICC represents high legalization of the so-called atrocities regime. 
(Deitelhoff 2009, 40) In turn, the development of an atrocities regime rests on the wish to 
promote  and  strengthen  the  norms  of  human  rights  and  justice.  This  wish  has  been  
increasingly pronounced within the international community since the the Holocaust. 
(Rudolph 2001, 657)  
The  origins  of  the  human  rights  regime  dates  back  to  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  
Rights (1948). Posner sees that there are two theoretical frameworks that can both explain the 
rise of human rights; one based on security and one based on legalism. The security theory of 
human rights points to the destructive effects of Second World War and the aggressive Nazi 
Regime and sees a relationship between security and human rights. States that could be forced 
to respect human rights would not develop in to aggressive ones and could be isolated in the 
event that they did. Thus, the promotion of human rights worldwide would also mean 
promotion of security worldwide. (Posner 2009, 183) For the legalistic theory, human rights 
have value in themselves. Second World War showed that human rights of people in foreign 
countries matter and should prevail over sovereignty and thus could and should be a concern 
beyond state borders. In order to protect human rights and prevent atrocities, this concern 
needed  to  be  institutionalized  and  made  systematic.  It  is  likely  that  both  types  of  the  
considerations above have had an effect on the development of the human rights regime. 
(Posner 2009, 183-4) Explanations for the development of the human rights regime (and 
others, including international criminal law and its institutions as is discussed later) are often 
sought from realism and liberalism. These two theories are visible in the explanations above, 
the security one coalescing with realism and the value-based explanation with liberalism.  
The  importance  of  human rights  has  risen  exponentially  since  the  end  of  the  Second World  
War. Hundreds of human rights treaties have been signed and adopted and regional human 
rights bodies are in place from Africa to Europe.14 Within the framework of legalization and 
                                               
14 For a more detailed review see Freeman 2011. 
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international criminal law, the importance of human rights has become epitomized in the 
so-called atrocities regime.  
Abbott  defines  the  atrocities  regime  as  “the  norms  and  institutions  governing  serious  
violations of human dignity during internal conflicts”. (Abbott 1999, 361) Abbott lists three 
central features that the atrocities regime entails; the distinction between international and 
internal conflicts; norms governing certain abuses outside of an armed conflict; and the 
reliance on criminal responsibility and tribunals. (Abbott 1999, 368) The distinction between 
international and national conflicts arises from the differences in the extent of rules governing 
their conduct. The Geneva Conventions, their Additional Protocols and the grave breaches 
regime15 govern international conflicts. Thus, in state-state conflicts, in which actors tend to 
be relatively symmetrical in their capacity to retaliate, actors can more easily anticipate 
reciprocity in the enforcement of the rules governing conflict and war. Internal conflicts, 
however, often involve at least one non-state actor which cannot ratify the Geneva 
conventions; trust in reciprocity decreases and the conflicting parties are less symmetrical. 
Article  3  of  the  Geneva  Conventions  does  apply  to  internal  conflicts  but  has  less  force.  
(Abbott 1999, 370) Therefore, the ‘old’ instruments are not enough to cover abuses during 
internal conflicts.  
The second feature concerns the norms that govern certain abuses of an armed conflict. The 
question is why some atrocities are classified as crimes also in peacetime. In the Nuremberg 
Charter,  for  example,  crimes  against  humanity  were  tied  to  armed conflict.  The  question  is,  
also, why is the criminalization of crimes as inconsistent as it is. Genocide has more standing 
as an international crime than do crimes against humanity, which are more inconsistently 
defined throughout the spectrum. Abbott sees reasons for this in history, in the existence of 
norm entrepreneurs and in the substance of the crimes in question. The Holocaust and other 
atrocities of the Second World War account for the historical part. Individuals, such as Rafael 
Lemkin, often named as the father of the term genocide, non-governmental organizations 
(NGO) and so-called trans-national advocacy networks (TAN) coalesce around certain abuses, 
frame them and campaign for their prohibition and criminalization. In essence, they work as 
norm entrepreneurs and are important facilitators for the rise of norms (this is further 
discussed in part 5). Finally, the issues and abuses that tend to be taken to the fore are those 
                                               
15 The grave breaches regime refers to the law established by the Geneva Conventions and their 
Additional Protocols and its inclusion in the Rome Statute of the ICC. ‘Grave breaches’ are offences 
grave enough to constitute war crimes, such as willful killing and torture. For more, see Sandoz 2009; 
and ICRC 1998. 
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that are easiest to dramatize and to rally political support for. These usually are the abuses 
that involve bodily harm, such as torture and sexual atrocities. (Abbott 1999, 371-3) 
The final feature relates to the reliance on criminal responsibility and trials. The atrocities 
regime is all about legalization: legal thinking and action where the actions in question are not 
only unacceptable but unlawful. Moreover, the criminalization of certain actions is mainly 
achieved through hard law. In addition to the need to be impartial and professional, Abbott 
emphasizes that the courts and trials that are established to assign responsibility and support 
norms that underlie the crimes need to be politically independent. (Abbott 1999, 373,375)  
To recap, the atrocities regime entails the establishment of institutions to prosecute the 
perpetrators of certain actions that are classified and defined as crimes and the norms that 
underlie them. At the core is the wish and aim to protect and promote human rights and the 
value attached to them and the idea that sovereignty should not stand in the way of this. 
However, as Rudolph notes, even though human rights may be the driver behind the atrocities 
regime, “differentials in power and the interests of the most powerful states clearly shape the 
process of institutionalization.” (Rudolph 2001, 638) States, and more to the point, powerful 
states, are important in the process. 
This part has introduced the general framework that surrounds this thesis: the process of 
legalization and the emergence of the human rights and atrocities regimes. The next part 
moves on to discuss realism, liberalism and legalism.  
2.4 Realism, Liberalism and Legalism 
International relations theory and international law been increasingly discussed together. This 
is no wonder, taken how closely they are connected to each other in many ways. This has 
been no different when it comes to international criminal law and international criminal courts 
and tribunals. Realism, liberalism (or more particularly, neoliberal institutionalism) and 
constructivism are often the theoretical frameworks through which the subject is discussed.16 
This approach is adopted here as well. First, realist and liberalist theories are discussed. This 
is further supplemented by a discussion of legalism, which also ties the discussion with 
legalization  and  the  human  rights  and  atrocities  regimes.  Thirdly,  constructivism  and  the  
logics of action to frame the analysis are discussed. The last part will introduce approaches to 
international law of the different theoretical orientations.  
                                               
16 See, for example: Abbott 1999; Armstrong, Farrell and Lambert 2007; Schiff 2008; Reus-Smit 2009. 
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An increasing amount of interdisciplinary research over a variety of issues has been done 
that bring together international relations theory and international law.17 Slaughter et al., who 
in their 1998 article introduced interdisciplinary research done by then and suggested further 
avenues of research, conclude that many international lawyers and international relations 
scholars “are speaking the same language”. (Slaughter, Tulumello and Wood 1998, 393) 
Armstrong et al. attest that there is “growing appreciation” among the scholars that they can 
learn much from each other’s discipline but that this has mainly represented the liberalist view, 
as realism still tends to overlook the possible importance of international law. (Armstrong, 
Farrell and Lambert 2007, 69) The realist view is discussed next. 
2.4.1 Realism 
The  basic  account  of  realism  usually  starts  with  Thucydides  and  his  analysis  of  the  
Peloponnesian  War,  where  he  emphasized  the  continuous  risk  of  war.  In  addition,  Hobbes’  
accounts of life as short and brutish are often cited when realism is discussed. The more 
modern realist tradition and most cited today dates, however, to the beginning of the 20th 
century and coincides with the founding of international relations as a discipline. To the fore, 
amongst others, have risen the works of Carr, Morgenthau and Waltz. (Armstrong, Farrell and 
Lambert 2007, 72-3)  
Donnelly notes that more than a stringent theory per se, realism is a “general orientation” and 
“an approach” to international relations. (Donnelly 2000, 6) Although viewpoints within the 
realist tradition differ, realists share some common points of thought. For realists, the world is 
mainly about power and interests. In the end, people are primarily egoistic and are driven by 
their interests. Because egoism cannot be eliminated, conflict will always remain an inevitable 
fact. The world and international relations are fundamentally characterized by anarchy; 
international government, subordination and hierarchical order do not exist in international 
relations. Together with egoism, power becomes the main issue and goal in international 
relations. (Donnelly 2000, 10) In this sort of system, sovereign states are the only actors that 
really matter. States’ inherent interest is to survive and since states can truly rely only on self-
help, they are driven to competition with other states. In this, material factors and resources 
are much more important than norms, institutions and international law. (Armstrong, Farrell 
and Lambert 2007, 73-4) Waltz catches the core of realist thinking well when he notes that “If 
                                               
17 The subject will not be discussed in-depth here. For further information, see for example: Roach 
2006; Armstrong, Farrell and Lambert 2007; and Biersteker, Spiro, Sriram and Raffo 2007. 
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might decides, then bloody struggles over right can more easily be avoided”. (Waltz 1979, 
112) Power is crucial and through power, wars can be avoided.  
In the latter part of the 20th century, the approach of neorealism started to gain popularity. 
Neorealism is most often associated with the theorizing of Kenneth Waltz and his famous 
Theory of International Politics (1979). Also called structural realism, the central argument of 
Waltz’s neorealism is that states behave in a particular way not only because states pursue 
their self-interests but also because of the structure of the international system. (Leonard and 
Roach 2009, 57) The way the political situation in international relations is ordered affects the 
way states behave. In international relations, the ordering principle is anarchy, as mentioned 
above, and according to Waltz, this leads to balancing rather than bandwagoning, which often 
is the result in hierarchical structures. Instead of following a stronger actor to increase one’s 
own gains (bandwagoning), states attempt to balance the power of strong actors by allocating 
sources to national security, allying with others and adopting bi- or multilateral agreements. 
The structure of the international system constrains the choices of states and pushes them to 
balancing. (Donnelly 2005, 35-6) It is also the structural condition of anarchy that stands as 
an obstacle to cooperation between states; in an anarchical situation, a state cannot trust the 
other to do what it promises to do and fear of the other’s intentions drives states to 
competition and conflict. Another impediment to cooperation is the idea that power is relative; 
it is not only what sources one has but how those sources compare to those of others. When 
attempting to cooperate, a state needs to asses not only what it gains itself but also the gains 
the other can have and whether they outweigh those of the state’s own gains. (Donnelly 2005, 
37-8) 
The realist view in general can aptly be captured with the term realpolitik. Bassiouni defines 
realpolitik as “the pursuit of political settlements unencumbered by moral and ethical 
limitations”. (Bassiouni 2003, 191) A realpolitik view put focus on political power and on the 
need to preserve it. It is close to an amoralistic view; power matters more than ideas. The term 
is often used as a synonym for political realism. (Roach 2009b, 14) This practice shall be 
adopted here also and the term realpolitik will  be  used  to  refer  to  the  general  realist-based  
outlook on international relations, emphasizing the prevalence of power and interests over 
ideas and norms. 
2.4.2 Liberalism and Idealism 
Liberalism provides the traditional opposing view of the world and international relations to 
realism. The liberalist view of the state of affairs is more optimistic and harmony instead of 
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war and conflict is the natural state. Liberalism’s equivalent to realism’s Hobbes, John 
Locke, saw that humans are born with the natural capacity to reason and cooperate. War was 
the product of militaristic governments that served the states, not the people. People should 
have their liberty and the chance to realize their natural harmony of interests; in this, the 
state’s power to interfere should be limited and the states should be held accountable. 
Although Locke’s theorizing concerned more internal politics, the themes he advocated also 
form the central tenets of liberalist thinking about the international order, where accountable 
states strive for peaceful order and aim to strengthen their ties through trade and contact 
across borders.  (Armstrong, Farrell and Lambert 2007, 83-4) 
Same as realism, liberalism is not one unified theory but rather a broader foundation for 
particular strands of thinking. The different strands differ and emphasize different aspects18, 
but do share some central principles and theoretical starting points, excluding neoliberal 
institutionalism, which is very close to the realist tradition (discussed below).  For liberalism, 
it matters how a state is organized internally and the extent to which a government is held 
accountable affects its foreign policies. Domestic politics matters. Externally, states can be 
and are interdependent through economical and institutional ties. This interdependence in turn 
affects states’ preferences and policies and promotes peace between states. (Armstrong, 
Farrell and Lambert 2007, 86-7) In all this, liberalism emphasizes methodological 
individualism and asserts that individuals and private groups are the most important actors in 
international politics. States matter but their preferences stem from domestic politics, not from 
assumed interests and power. (Abbott 1999, 366)  
According  to  Bass,  if  it  is  accepted  that  domestic  politics  affects  external  behavior  and  that  
liberal states hold liberal principles, the “door to idealism in foreign policy” is opened. (Bass 
2000, 17) Idealism is usually regarded as a precursor to liberalism and the terms are 
sometimes used interchangeably and do share the same philosophical tenets. Idealism is often 
placed to the interwar period, when idealist and realist scholars were debating the ‘right’ way 
to view the world. Sometimes also referred to as utopianism, the primary aim of idealism is to 
prevent war. For idealists in general, war represents an irrational act and is not usually in the 
interest of most of the people. Idealists belief in progress and that a system can be changed so 
as to avoid the (re)occurrence of war. This goal could be achieved with the help of 
international organizations that can provide the organizational structure for cooperation. 
                                               
18 One influential approach has been republican liberalism and the so-called democratic peace theory. 
See for example Barkawi and Laffey 2001. 
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(Leonard 2005, 66-7) In this, law has a role and as Armstrong et al. note, liberalism is 
“predisposed” to seeing the importance of law for successful international cooperation as a 
way to enable governance. (Armstrong, Farrell and Lambert 2007, 83) Liberalism believes 
that a state’s legitimacy depends on whether or not it upholds the rule of law and respects the 
human rights of its citizens. As individuals should strive to uphold the rights of other 
individuals, so should states respect the rights of other states. (Burchill 2005, 66) 
In  Deng’s  words,  the  basic  idealism  can  be  described  as  the  “Wilsonian  worldview,  which  
foresaw progressive perfectability of the social order through increasingly legalized 
relationships between states”. (Deng 2007, 143)  It is against this idealism that the realist 
theorist E.H. Carr, in his famous Twenty Years’ Crisis, attacked, seeing it as naive and totally 
neglecting the issue of power. According to Osiander, it is still “textbook wisdom” to see 
idealism as flawed and having no lasting value. (Osiander 1998, 410) 
Neoliberal institutionalism (the shorter term neoliberalism will be used here) is one approach 
that  has  been  very  influential  in  the  past  few decades.  In  many ways,  it  stands  as  almost  an  
anomaly in the more traditional thinking of liberalistic idealism. Neoliberalism emerged as an 
answer to the realities of the 1980’s when the tensions of the Cold War flared again and 
attention turned to military and security issues. The new neoliberalism took on a more realist 
outlook  and  viewed  the  state  as  the  primary  actor  and  put  less  faith  in  the  capacity  of  
institutions to solve problems in the international arena. Perhaps the main break compared to 
the more traditional liberalist outlook was that neoliberals abandoned the importance of how a 
state is organized internally and took on the realist idea of states as rational actors. With these 
changes in theory,  neoliberalism was able to provide a challenge to neorealism. (Armstrong, 
Farrell and Lambert 2007, 85-6) 
Although neoliberalism also accepts the realist notion of the anarchical system, it still views 
cooperation as a possibility, achieved through institutions, which here refer to looser sets rules 
that  constrain  behavior  over  a  given  issue  (such  as  rule  of  the  atrocities  regime).  For  
neoliberalists, regimes and institutions can bring in predictability and by constraining the 
actions  of  states,  create  the  possibility  of  trust  between  parties.  Moreover,  contrary  to  
neorealists, neoliberalists emphasize not relative but absolute gains, seeing that one’s own 
gains on themselves matter. International relations need not be a zero-sum-game; security can 
be achieved without comparison to the sources and gains of others. Without having to pay 
attention to relative gains, states can concentrate on cooperation. (Burchill 2005, 64-5) 
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The ideas and goals behind both idealism and liberalism are at the foundation of 
legalization and expansion of legalism in international relations. Furthermore, criticism of 
legalism is often very realist in its outlook. Therefore, realist and idealist and liberalist points 
of departure are next discussed through legalism  
2.4.3 Legalism  
Whereas legalization is more a practical, institutional term, legalism can be seen as the 
ideological component behind the move of law to international relations.  Keohane describes 
it as a “belief” in that progress can happen through law. (Keohane 2012, 132) Shklar defines 
legalism as “the ethical conduct that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and 
moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules” and sees it as “a very 
common social ethos…in Western countries”. (Shklar 1986, 1) Accepting Shklar’s ideas, 
West continues by emphasizing that legalism is not “rule fetishism” and that if legalism 
would only be about commitment to the morality of rule following, it would be inappropriate 
in  the  realities  of  the  international  arena.  (West  2003,  127)  If  this  is  what  legalism,  or  what  
West terms as ‘ideological legalism’, is only about, it would have a minimal and uninspiring 
meaning in international politics. Thus, West emphasizes that the wider understanding of 
ideological legalism not only encompasses a commitment to rules, but also a commitment to 
peace through law. West bases this on Hobbes’ thinking that the state and the law a state 
produces are positive goods since they are able to produce peace. To West, this better portrays 
the attitudinal and ideological core of legalism that is actually appealing. (West 2003, 127-131) 
Furthermore, for West what he calls ‘the pinnacle legal moment’ in the international arena is 
not the war crimes trial but the legislative process. If it is accepted that the aim of law is not 
only to punish but also to deter 
future war19, the crucial issue is not the war crimes trial itself but the attempt by international 
bodies to prohibit war’s reoccurrence. (West 2003, 154-5)  
One influential work in bringing together legalism with war crimes tribunals is Gary Bass’s 
Stay the Hand of Vengeance where  Bass,  following  Shklar’s  political  theory,  represents  his  
case for legalism. In Bass’s words, the book is “about idealism in international relations” but 
also about “its sharp limits”. (Bass 2000, 5) For Bass, legalism materializes more as a process, 
                                               
19 This is one central aim and justification for international criminal law and its institutions and is 
mentioned in the preamble of the ICC’s Rome Statute (The Rome Statute 1998, 1). For a discussion on 
deterrence, see also Akhavan 2009.  
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based  on  a  “principled  belief  that  war  criminals  must  be  put  on  trial”  and  that  those  
international trials are to be conducted according to good domestic practice. (Bass 2000, 20) 
Moreover, is not only about rule of law but also about the rights the law is there to protect. 
Therefore, Bass sees political show trials as the antithesis of legalism; they subvert legal 
norms completely and disregard with due process, which should be accorded also to those 
breaking international laws. (Bass 2000, 21-6)  
Bass’s work on legalism centers on the politics of war crimes tribunals and Bass notes that 
international  trials  rely  on  political  will  and  military  force.  In  this,  he  concedes  a  degree  of  
power to realism; very pragmatically, Bass places war crimes policy of liberal states between 
the contradictions of idealism and selfishness. In acknowledging the influence of politics, 
Bass asks why liberal states support trials at all and the reason for this he finds in idealism; he 
sees the main reason behind trials in that “some leaders […] and their countries are in the grip 
of  a  principled  idea”,  not  necessitated  by  any  structure  but  based  on  a  belief  Bass  terms  
legalism. (Bass 2000, 7-8) In reality, the advancement of this idea is tempered by reality. 
According to Bass, only liberal states with legalist views establish tribunals. Despite this, they 
will not do so if it puts their own soldiers at risk; this is the biggest impediment to 
international trials, according to Bass. Moreover, even liberal states are selfish in their outrage. 
The more the state’s own citizens suffer, the more indignation is guaranteed. In this, domestic 
opinion and outrage also determines to some extent the level of support given to a war crimes 
trial. (Bass 2000, 28-9) 
In the end, Bass seems to leave himself sitting on the fence. He concludes that in the story of 
war crimes tribunals, “the selfish impulses have won out” (Bass 2000, 277) but notes in 
hopeful tones that as legalists have proven on occasion to be serious in their intentions to 
punish perpetrators of international crimes, “there is at least some idealistic clay to work with 
here”. (Bass 2000, 281) For Bass, legalism represents not the perfect but the best available 
means to deal with international atrocities. Almost as if yielding to realpolitik, Bass concludes: 
“legalism is all we have now”.  (Bass 2000, 283) This very pragmatic view is further 
discussed below. 
2.4.3.1 Forgetting Realpolitik? Criticism of Legalism 
Especially many in the realist tradition criticize the emphasis given to legalism in 
international relations. Goldstein et al. summarize aptly the realist view of legalism as a 
“comforting and delusional justification for policies that are inconsistent with the realities of 
interest and power. Those policies are likely to collapse under pressure, often with 
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catastrophic consequences.” (Goldstein, Kahler, Keohane and Slaughter 2000, 392) 
Krauthammer spoke of the “curse” of legalism and characterized it as “a naive belief” in the 
ability of law to function as any sort of a guard over international behavior. (Krauthammer 
1989, 44) The idealistic character of legalism attracts criticism and raises doubts of legalism’s 
effectiveness in a world where, in the realist view, power and interests prevail. Following Carr, 
Goldsmith and Krasner argue that we have been witnessing a renewed commitment to 
idealism, evidence of which they take to be the rise of universal jurisdiction, increasing 
demands for humanitarian intervention and the creation of the ICC. In this, they see 
fundamental flaws; that it is founded on a utopian idea of the possibility of some global 
consensus on normative principles and their application: that it assumes that norms of 
behavior  can  replace  material  interests;  and  that  international  idealism  does  not  heed  to  
political prudence. (Goldsmith and Krasner 2003, 1-2) 
Posner makes a comprehensive argument against legalism in his The Perils of Global 
Legalism. What he terms as ‘global legalism’, he sees as an “excessive faith” in the efficacy 
of international law where law becomes an end in itself. (Posner 2009, xii) Posner criticizes 
the legalists he sees are arguing for dispute resolution in legal institutions; for adopting more 
treaties; for wide-ranging international jurisdiction; for customary international law’s 
application in domestic politics; and that the rise of international law is something inevitable. 
All this is one alternative adopted to solve collective action problems in international relations. 
(Posner 2009, 24-25) Posner notes that there are important limits to international law. There is 
no overriding authority, such as a world government, in the international realm that could 
issue binding orders in all situations. Furthermore, there is the lack of enforcement; there is no 
overriding body that has the authority to enforce international law in all situations. The UNSC 
of course has some power over both binding orders and enforcement, but it is not absolute in 
the same way as a sovereign state’s power over individual citizens. To the day-to-day 
practicalities of international law, states matter.  In the end, international law is created and 
enforced by states. Posner notes that the proponents of legalism acknowledge this believe that 
states want to follow and expand international law due to its ability to solve collective action 
problems. (Posner 2009, 28-34) For Posner, international law “rests on and confirms existing 
power imbalances and ugly political realities that exist in most states”. (Posner 2009, 39) 
The ICC in many ways is the legalistic dream and for the legalization of the atrocities regime 
and for the development of international criminal law the Court represents the most important 
and positive improvement. In light of the realist critique, the legalistic-inspired enthusiasm 
over the ICC wavers. For Posner, “the ideal of legalism runs aground on the realities of 
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power” and to him, the likely fate of the ICC is to be a formally legalistic institution that 
will be ignored. (Posner 2009, 203) Others with a realist viewpoint share Posner’s dim view 
of the ICC’s future and role. For Goldsmith, the ICC is a self-defeating institution that most of 
all  suffers  from US animosity;  this  makes  the  ICC an  unrealistic  dream as  the  US might  be  
inclined to curb its involvement in international operations in the face of fears of malicious 
prosecutions against its nationals. This perversity dooms the ICC to the same grave where the 
League of Nations already is. (Goldsmith 2003, 101-104) Rabkin also criticizes the idea of 
global justice and the institutions that have been established in its name as a dream that 
deserves nothing more than to be forgotten. (Rabkin 2005, 756)  
2.4.3.2 The Lure of Pragmatic Legalism 
It is clear that legalism is not a straightforward issue; for some it is the ideal of legalism that 
drives roughshod over power and interests or the dominance of power and interest that leaves 
no room for legalism. However, even the proponents of legalism, such as Bass, compromise 
in that they acknowledge the influence of power on ideas, making legalism not perfect but 
still valuable. Some have taken notice of this ‘middle ground’ and criticize it as a too easy 
solution for the dilemma. Graubart terms the Bass-style, enthusiasm-tempered-by-power over 
legalism and war crimes tribunals as ‘pragmatic legalism’. In essence, he sees that although 
pragmatic legalism “may appear to rescue legalism from idealistic irrelevancy, it actually 
endorses a global legal order crippled by political distortions.” (Graubart 2010, 410) The 
core idea is that pragmatic legalism is divorced from realism in that it sees value in the liberal-
style legal process; at the same time, it acknowledges the necessity of heeding to political 
concerns and influential actors to make the wanted legal order possible. In the attempt to 
achieve justice in the international arena, global tribunals have been a hindrance, not a 
positive development. (Graubart 2010, 410-1)  
Graubart is bewildered by the way the proponents of legalism have regarded the trials of 
Nuremberg and Tokyo that followed the Second World War. Although they were one-sided 
and despite justifications, represent victor’s justice, idealist-inclined legalists see them as 
positive milestones in the development of international criminal law. The common 
rationalization of the flaws is that victor’s justice is that it was the only thing available at the 
time and that the trials were at least conducted in a fair manner. Praise is also given to the way 
the trials advanced accountability after the Second World War and helped to establish a 
reliable record of the atrocities. Graubart argues that the flaw in all this is that there is no 
consideration over the possibility that justice meted by great powers might be worse than no 
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justice at all. Adding insult to injury is the fact all the crimes of the Allies were 
conveniently forgotten. (Graubart 2010, 411-2) 
The  use  of  international  criminal  law  as  a  tool  for  the  powerful  and  its  legitimation  of  
selective justice continued in the 1990’s. Focusing on the ICTR, Graubart sees that the goals 
of individual accountability and reconciliation have been undermined by political 
manipulation  and  one-sidedness  for  example  of  the  ICTR  process  from  which  the  
developmental path leads to the ICC. For Graubart, the progress is one of relocation of justice 
to the global periphery, especially Africa, where all the ICC’s cases-to-date are. Although this 
development at first might seem positive, it is premised on the coincidence that the self-
interest of the powerful happened to coincide with moral aspirations. Despite the lack of US 
support, the ICC has operated similarly to the ICTR and followed the interests of local actors 
in  the  countries  in  question  and  the  strategic  interests  of  the  US  and  other  Western  states.  
(Graubart 2009, 417-420) Graubart does not see the future of the ICC as wholly hopeless but 
stresses that change from the previous path is difficult “given the continued resiliency of the 
structural factors that impede the implementation of a neutral and universal system of global 
justice.” (Graubart 2009, 421) 
It seems that the ICC has to tread in rather muddy waters. The point here is not any ambitious 
attempt of giving an authoritative answer to the problematic relationship between idealism 
and realpolitik but to highlight the many-sided context in the ICC exists. Next, the theoretical 
framework of constructivism is discussed.  
2.5 Constructivism 
Constructivism is one of the three main orientations in international relations theory. 
Constructivism should not be taken as a rigorous theory: as Ruggie notes, constructivism is 
not  a  theory  as  for  example  the  theory  of  the  balance  of  power  is,  but  “a  theoretically  
informed approach to the study of international relations”. (Ruggie 1998, 879-880)  Ruggie 
characterizes constructivism as being “about human consciousness and its role in international 
life.” (Ruggie 1998, 856) For Checkel, constructivism is “concerned with underlying 
conceptions of how the social and political world works”. (Checkel 1998, 325) Reus-Smit 
notes that “At the heart of constructivist thought is a concern for ‘reasons for action’” and 
that these reasons are both a motive and a justificatory claim for action. (Reus-Smit 2009, 22) 
It is this view that mainly frames this research here. 
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Constructivism draws its philosophical foundations from sociological theory and has been 
greatly influenced by the works of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. Durkheim concentrated 
on understanding moral phenomena in society and the way in which different social outcomes 
are influenced by the make-up of social order. Weber was interested in uncovering social 
meanings and their significance in society through what he called ‘understanding’. In general, 
both Durkheim and Weber saw that what brings individuals together in a society are shared 
ideational ties.  (Ruggie 1998, 857-61) In the latter part of the 20th century, the constructivist 
approach started to rise as an alternative to neorealism and neoliberalism. Whereas previously 
neorealists and neoliberals had challenged one another, constructivists now entered the field 
to dispute the rationalist and positivist standpoints of neorealism and neoliberalism. Thus, a 
larger debate between constructivists and rationalists emerged.20 (Reus-Smit 2005, 188) Adler 
places constructivism in the middle ground, between rationalist approaches, such as realism 
and liberalism, and interpretive approaches, such as postmodernism and critical theory. (Adler 
1997) 
2.5.1. The Constructivist Tradition and Different Approaches 
Constructivist research can be categorized according to a variety of classifications. Ruggie 
groups constructivism to three variants. Neo-classical constructivism refers to research which 
has its roots in the more classical tradition of constructivism. The commitment to social 
science and the appeal of pragmatic analytical tools of research characterize this strand. 
Included here are such prominent constructivist as Kratochwil, Adler and Finnemore.  To the 
second variant, postmodernist constructivism, Ruggie includes theorists such as Der Derian 
and Walker. This variant stresses linguistic construction of subjects in its research and uses 
the practices of discursive research. The third strand Ruggie calls naturalistic constructivism, 
which he places somewhere between the two previous ones. The naturalistic stand combines 
features from the more classical, mainstream theorizing and the belief to scientific realism. 
The most prominent theorist here is Wendt and his scientific realism. (Ruggie 1998, 881-2)  
Reus-Smit has characterized the different approaches within constructivism through what he 
calls “axis of difference”, which can be divided to three larger debates of ontological 
questions, levels of analysis and methodology. In the ontological debate, Reus-Smit identifies 
                                               
20 Rationalism is more intimately linked to the theme of this thesis and is thus given some emphasis, 
whereas critical theory is not discussed. Critical theory is often associated with the Frankfurt School. 
The central tenet of critical theory is the critique of modern social and political life and emancipatory 
politics. See Devetak 2005. 
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firstly the approach that proscribes to sociological institutionalism, emphasizing that norms 
constitute state identities and interests. This perspective emphasis so-called ‘logics of 
appropriateness’ (discussed below) and includes Finnemore. The second approach Reus-Smit 
identifies  as  emphasizing  the  ‘logics  of  argument’  (also  discussed  below),  where  the  role  of  
communicative action is stressed; norms do not simply constitute identities and interests but 
are open to interpretation by multiple actors in situations of discourse. The last variant draws 
from Foucault and his ideas over knowledge and power, where norms and their meanings are 
discursively and politically contingent on particular situations. (Reus-Smit 2002, 493-494) 
The levels of analysis -debate concerns the appropriate level on which analysis is undertaken. 
Wendt is  the most prominent proponent of a system-level analysis,  arguing that analysis can 
be concentrated only on the social identity of the states without having to pay attention to the 
domestic realm. Those proposing a unit-level analysis disagree, arguing for the importance of 
the relationship between the domestic realm and the states. Holistic constructivists, on the 
other hand, see the benefit of combining the two perspectives and treating the internal and 
external as different aspects of the same coin. (Reus-Smit 2002, 494-495) Lastly, debates 
have concerned the right methodology for doing constructivist research. Some have argued 
that only interpretative methods provide the appropriate way of analyzing the role of norms 
and ideas, seeing that only in this way can the embedded meanings actors attach to their 
actions be understood. The more conventionalist theorists argue against this and see that no 
particular interpretative method is needed, moving their research away from theoretical 
debating to the empirical realm of research. Lastly is the positivist, scientific realism-
approach most purported by Wendt, supporting positivist social science. (Reus-Smit 2002, 
495-496) 
Burch  makes  the  division  depending  on  what  he  terms  the  ‘ontological  foci’  of  the  
constructivist strand in question and divides between structure-, norm- and rule-oriented 
constructivism. Burch illustrates these divisions by a clear graph classifying the different 
approaches. (Burch 2002, 65)  Firstly, structure-oriented constructivism concentrates on the 
way norms construct actors and interests. States are the most central actors and the aim is to 
identify state interests and see how they are influenced by norms. Burch puts Wendt in this 
category. The second focus is norm-oriented constructivism, which can also be referred to as 
sociological institutionalism (the term used above in Ruggie’s categorization) of which 
Finnemore and Ruggie’s works are the most prominent examples. Here, norms come first and 
then influence interests and ideas. The central aim is to analyze the social construction of a 
norm and see how that norm affects social action. Lastly, Burch identifies rule-oriented 
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constructivism, where social are rules are at the centre of analysis. In essence, actors come 
in to contact with fixed social relations that embody a mix of rules. Social rules play an 
important role in, for example, international law. The most prominent theorists in this 
category are Onuf and Kratochwil. (Burch 2002, 65-68) Importantly, rules are significant 
because “they link the material and ideational aspects of social structures.” (Burch 2002, 69) 
Next, a few of the most influential constructivist theorists are introduced following Burch’s 
categorization. This is not to say that there are not others that have made significant 
contributions to the field but that these works are central to the constructivist approach and to 
the context here.  
One of the most influential theorists in constructivism has been Alexander Wendt. Wendt’s 
Social Theory of International Politics is  widely  considered  to  be  the  most  important  
constructivist work in international relations theory. Wendt’s work functions as an answer to 
Waltz’s neorealist account of the international realm. (Armstrong, Farrell and Lambert 2007, 
98) As mentioned, Wendt takes a scientific approach to social inquiry and identifies himself 
as moderate who concedes points to realist and materialist perspectives. (Wendt 1999, 1) 
Perhaps most famous is Wendt’s notion that “anarchy is what states make of it”, an argument 
put forward already in his 1992 article. According to Wendt, there is no ‘logic’ of anarchy and 
the realist notions of self-help and power do not logically follow from anarchy. Rather, if the 
world is indeed a self-help one, it is so because practices create a particular structure of 
identities and interest. Self-help and power are institutions, not any essential features that flow 
from anarchy. Anarchy is what it is made to be. (Wendt 1992, 394-5)  
Central in the field of rule-oriented constructivism is Friedrich Kratochwil’s work and 
especially his 1989 work Rules, Norms and Decisions. According to Kratochwil, rules and 
norms guide human action. He takes on an interdisciplinary approach and places his research 
in the intersection of international relations, legal theory, jurisprudence and political thought. 
Kratochwil moves on from three assumptions; that the study of norms is useful in the realm of 
public choice where self-interested actors have to make choices; that human action in general 
is governed by rules, where behaviour becomes understandable against the norms embodied 
in rules and conventions; and that rules and norms influence choices through a reasoning 
process and the deliberation and interpretation inherent in this process need more attention. 
(Kratochwil 1989, 1-11) Kratochwil’s research stems from the framework of law and he 
focuses on the structure of legal arguments and examines legal reasoning used and 
conclusions reached by lawyers and courts. (Kratochwil 1989, 19) 
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If in Burch’s categorization Wendt represents the structure-oriented constructivism and 
Kratochwil the rule-oriented approach, Finnemore is perhaps the most central and often cited 
theorist of norm-oriented constructivism. In National Interests in International Society, 
Finnemore  sets  out  to  analyze  how  states  know  what  they  want.  Finnemore’s  aim  is  to  
understand state interests and behaviour by investigating an international structure of social 
value and meaning. She argues that what states want cannot be understood without knowing 
the  social  structure  which  they  are  a  part  of.  The  social  structure  and  network  of  social  
relationships socializes states to want certain things. Finnemore demonstrates the influence 
norms have on state behaviour through case studies of the activities of three international 
organizations; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNESCO, 
The  International  Committee  of  the  Red Cross  ICRC and the  World  Bank WB.  (Finnemore  
1996, 2-5) More of Finnemore’s work is introduced below.  
A whole thesis could be written on the debates within constructivism and the above 
classifications  and  theorists  only  provide  a  short  glance  on  the  different  approaches.  
Comprehensive analyses over constructivist debates have been advanced elsewhere.21 This 
research is mainly grounded in the first category of Reus-Smit’s classification, sociological 
institutionalism, or in the language of Burch’s categorization, norm-oriented constructivism. 
This encompasses best the central theme of this is research as it usually includes the logic of 
appropriateness and the debate between the different logics, discussed below. Next the core 
perspectives of constructivism are introduced. 
2.5.2. Basic perspectives and Relationship to Rationalism 
Despite different strands, Reus-Smit points to three foundational ontological propositions 
about social life that constructivists share and see to explain world politics. Firstly, 
constructivism purports that the structures that influence actors and their behavior are not only 
material but also normative and ideational structures. Systems formed by shared ideas, values 
and beliefs have structural characteristics and these have an effect on actors themselves and 
the actions they take and policies they adopt. Secondly, constructivism sees that these non-
material structures have an influential effect on identities: the structures shape identities and 
identities influence interests and actions. Following this, constructivists argue that it is 
important to understand not only what interests actors hold but also how those interests have 
formed in the first place. This helps in explaining and understanding political events and 
                                               
21 See, for example Fierke and Jorgensen 2001; Zehfuss 2002; Guzzini and Leander 2006 
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phenomena. Lastly, constructivists see that structures and actors, or agents, are mutually 
constituted. This means that even though structures influence the identities and interests of 
actors, those structures would not have formed without the actors themselves. (Reus-Smit 
2005, 196-7; See also Hopf 1998; Adler 2002) In this context, then, this constructivist 
premise is accepted; that actors, including the UK, have created a structure which 
encompasses the legalized international society, the atrocities regime and the ICC; and in turn, 
those structures influence the way states can and should behave. Thus, the UK’s push for the 
ICC was guided by the structure surrounding the issue; the appropriateness of and value 
placed in human rights and their protection, individual criminal responsibility and 
international trials.  
In their theoretical underpinnings, constructivist make a break from the rationalist viewpoints 
of (neo)realism and (neo)liberalism. The main arguments of constructivism go against the 
rationalist-based argumentation in international relations theory. Reus-Smit identifies three 
main  assumptions  that  underlie  rationalist  theory  and  are  common  to  neorealists  and  
neoliberals. Actors are firstly assumed to be unitary, self-interested and rational. Rational here 
refers to the capability of realizing the best, that being most effective, way of achieving ones 
goals. Moreover, actors’ interests are thought of as pre-existing, meaning that actors’ interests 
are already formed when they come to have relations to other actors. Finally, actors meet each 
other in a strategic realm, meaning that actors come in with the aim of pursuing their goals, 
defined by interests. (Reus-Smit 2005, 192) 
Contrasted to these main assumptions of rationalist theory, the basic thinking can be 
summarized as follows: rather than being unitary and egoistic, actors are social; rather than 
having ready-formed interests, actors’ interests form through social interaction; and rather 
than functioning in a strategic realm, actors come together in a constitutive realm, which 
influences actors and their actions. (Reus-Smit 2005, 199) 
This is not to say that constructivism and rationalist theory would be or are treated only as 
opposites and mutually exclusive. Hurd notes that constructivists too see actors, for example 
states, as pursuing their interests and are similarly concerned with interests and power as 
realists and liberalists are. The difference is in the source and content of those interests; where 
they come from and what they are made up from. (Hurd 2008, 310) Quite a few theorists have 
sought to bring together rationalist and constructivist theories. One research in this vein has 
been by Fehl, who explains the establishment of the ICC and its institutional design by 
converging rationalist and constructivist explanations. According to Fehl, two rationalist 
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arguments  explain  why  the  Court  was  established;  the  ICC  solves  the  problem  of  states’  
unwillingness to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes in their national courts (the so-
called public good problem); and it lowers the transaction costs that are included in the 
establishment of ad hoc tribunals. However, these are not enough and the explanations can be 
deepened by a constructivist perspective. Constructivism helps to explain how such a public 
good problem came to be in the first place; why is it viewed as a common problem whether or 
not perpetrators of international crimes are prosecuted? Here, explanatory power is derived 
from the constitutive effects of human rights norms, which have influenced the demand for 
prosecutions. Secondly, a constructivist approach gives another explanation for the 
transactions costs; more than the expectation of lesser costs, the ICC was believed to be more 
legitimate than the previous ad hoc tribunals. As for the institutional design, rationalism is in 
trouble  trying  to  explain  why  the  supporters  of  the  ICC  were  not  willing  to  concede  to  the  
demands  of  the  more  powerful  states,  such  as  the  US,  support  of  which  is  essential  to  the  
Court’s functioning. Constructivism can help rationalism by pointing to the lobbying 
activities  of  various  NGOs  in  Rome  that  functioned  as  norm  entrepreneurs  and  had  vast  
influence on the structure of the Rome Statute. (Fehl 2004, 382-383) Fehl concludes by noting 
that  the  result  of  what  she  calls  a  ‘practice  test’  of  combining  rationalist  and  constructivist  
explanations “is positive for both […] approaches”. (Fehl 2004, 383) 
Rationalist theory and constructivism do not need to be treated as automatically excluding 
each other: explanations and understandings derived from both can complement to each other 
and be used to build fuller arguments. However, a basic division between the two viewpoints 
can function as starting point for analysis. This is further visited below. Before that, one 
central aspect of constructivist research, norms, is discussed.  
2.5.3. Norms: Definitions and Meaning  
Much about constructivist research centers on norms. Finnemore has defined norms as 
“shared expectations about appropriate behavior held by a community of actors”. (Finnemore 
1996, 22) Several notions emerge. First, norms are intersubjective, in that they are social and 
shared by actors. Second, norms by default concern behaviour: a norm can be violated or 
obeyed by acting in a certain way that is accepted by the actors. Here the term often used is 
internalization; some norms can be so deeply internalized that behaviour according to the 
norm is taken for granted. Norms can create patterns of behaviour and they are often used in 
discourse between actors. Actors can use norms to either justify some of their own actions or 
they can invoke norms and normative arguments to persuade others. (Finnemore 1996, 22-23) 
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A variety of different norms have been advanced and taken hold in the international real. 
One such category and relevant to this context are human rights norms, already discussed in 
part 2 of this chapter.22 Finnemore  and  Sikkink  also  point  to  the  laws  of  war  as  norms  that  
have managed to influence the traditional security field and the way wars are waged.  
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 894) 
Katzenstein defines norms as “collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given 
identity”. (Katzenstein 1996, 5; also Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891) Referring to identity 
here  means  that  norms  sometimes  function  as  rules  that  constitute  identity.  Norms  can  also  
regulate behaviour, for example that a person identified as a university professor is expected 
to act in a certain way. (Katzenstein 1996, 5) Indeed, norms can be defined as constitutive and 
regulative, as is often done across disciplines; in short, constitutive norms create or constitute 
new actors, interest or categories of action and regulative norms order and constrain 
behaviour. Finnemore and Sikkink also point to a category of evaluative or prescriptive norms 
and are puzzled by the lack of attention they have received in research as it is “the prescriptive 
quality of oughtness” that divides norms from other rules. Norms imply an appropriate way of 
behaving and this appropriateness can only be identified through the way in which a 
community or a society judges behaviour. (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891-892) 
One area of interest has been the way in which norms come to be. Used here is the influential 
work of Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink on the emergence of international norms. 
International norms point to appropriate behaviour of states but often have their foundation in 
domestic norms: many norms have started as domestic ones and have then become 
international through the efforts of various persons and groups. (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 
893) 
According to Finnemore and Sikkink, norms come to affect the behaviour of actors through a 
three-stage process. First is norm emergence, when norm entrepreneurs attempt to promote 
the acceptance and embracing of certain norms. Norms are not ready made but built by actors 
who wish to see certain behaviour as appropriate in a given society or community. For this, 
norm entrepreneurs are important: they point to and promote issues by naming, interpreting 
and dramatizing them. In this process, so-called organizational platforms are crucial as norm 
entrepreneurs need a platform from which to promote the norm. (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 
896-899) Moreover, international organizations come to function as the structure that can 
                                               
22 See also research conducted by Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999. 
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constitute actors in the mutually constitutive agent-structure relationship. According to 
Finnemore, international organizations can teach the normative views it has adopted to the 
agents, in this case states. (Finnemore 1996, 24-25) In the language of constructivism, the 
states that created the ICC are influenced by the institution they themselves created.  
Secondly, norms become cascaded. If the norm entrepreneurs are successful in promoting the 
norm,  a  tipping  point  is  reached  when  a  ‘critical  mass’  of  states  have  adopted  the  norm.  A  
critical  mass  refers  to  the  amount  of  states  that  have  accepted  the  norm and  to  which  states  
have done so: states are not equal and the acceptance of some states is more important than 
the acceptance of others. When the tipping point is reached, more and more states will adopt 
the norm without significant domestic pressure and the process of socialization will begin 
with the aim of turning all to followers of the certain norms. (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 
901-902) According to Finnemore and Sikkink, socialization works because when enough 
states,  and critical  states,  adopt a norm, the substance of what is  perceived to be appropriate 
behaviour becomes redefined. States comply with norms because their behaviour is linked to 
their identity as a member of international society and they want to retain this identity. 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 902) 
In the last stage, norms become internalized: a norm is taken for granted and norm-following 
is automatic. Following this, the norm can be very powerful in that it is not questioned and it 
is hard to identify because whether or not to follow the norm is not really widely discussed. 
Problematizing an internalized norm can create a very heated debate, as has happened with 
the current discussion concerning the norm of sovereignty. (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 904) 
Finnemore and Sikkink also point to the distinction made between rationalist theory and 
constructivism and argue that the fault line between the two is untenable. Norms are a concern 
also to realists and liberals. Rationality and strategic interaction between actors plays a big 
role in the politicized social construction of norms. Social construction and strategic 
behaviour are intertwined and rationality comes to play when norms are researched. The 
issues of contention are thus not about rationality versus norms but about the way in which 
rationality and norm-based behaviour are linked. One issue revolves around materialism and 
whether behaviour and adherence to norms is explained by material interests. Utilitarianism is 
another issue: whether actors behave according to a norm because they see that it will help 
them get what they want or because they see the behaviour as good and appropriate. 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 909-912; also Ruggie 1998, Hurd 2008, 310)  This issue is 
further discussed next through the logics of consequences and appropriateness. 
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2.5.4 The Different Logics of Action 
It  is  also  in  the  framework  of  a  debate  between different  logics  of  action  where  rationalism 
and constructivism, and realism, liberalism and constructivism can be discussed. The issue 
between the logics of appropriateness and of consequences has been quite widely discussed.  
One influential work has been that of March and Olsen concerning the logic of 
appropriateness and the relationship between the two logics (March and Olsen 1989; 1998). 
Finnemore and Sikkink touch upon the issue in their article of norms, already discussed above 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Risse adds to the debate by introducing his case for logic of 
argumentation, where the process of argumentation forms a distinct mode of social interaction. 
(Risse 2001) Shannon the two logics in an interactionist perspective and argues from political 
psychology that choices made stem from agents pursuing their goals whilst heeding to what is 
considered to be acceptable in a given social structure. (Shannon 2000) Müller discusses the 
two logics and bargaining in international negotiations (Müller 2004). Snyder’s and 
Vinjamuri’s research on international trials and tribunals as the strategy to prevent and deter 
mass crimes argues for policies based on the logic of consequences as the most suitably way 
to prevent future crimes. (Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003)  
The logic of expected consequences is “The idea that action by individuals, organizations, or 
states is driven by calculation of its consequences as measured against prior preferences”. 
(March and Olsen 1998, 950) Within the logic of consequences, political order arises from 
negotiations between rational actors that pursue their interests if coordinated action is seen to 
provide an opportunity of gaining something. As a frame, this is the most conventional one 
when interpreting international political life. (March and Olsen 1998, 950-951) In relations to 
others,  the  actors’  aim  is  to  achieve  their  objectives  by  using  the  full  range  of  material,  
institutional and persuasive resources they have. Actors’ will follow rules and standards of 
behaviour defined by norms only if the norms are seen to be effective for achieving the goals 
the actors are interested in achieving. (Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003, 13) Shannon notes that 
this logic is inherently individualist: it is rational, cost-benefit calculations that help actors to 
reach their goals. If compliance with a norm happens to coincide with the achieving of goals, 
the norm can be followed. (Shannon 2000, 295) Graubart’s argument, discussed above, that 
the ICTR was established because it happened to coincide with the interests of the powerful 
states at the time can be taken as an illustration of this. 
As Finnemore and Sikkink note, the logic of consequences is inherently a utilitarian and 
instrumental  approach  that  is  driven  by  agents.  It  corresponds  best  with  rationalist  and  
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methodological individualist –orientated thinking and thus traditionally coincides with 
realism and liberalism, or neoliberal institutionalism.  (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 912-913) 
Realists concede only minimal importance to norms. Norms will be followed if it is 
compatible with interests and as long as they do not go against raison d’état. National 
interests trump norms. Neoliberal institutionalists do argue that norms have power and that 
they can constrain actors’ behaviour and facilitate commitment and cooperation. However, 
following norms is a result of similar cost-benefit calculations as within realism. Compliance 
with norms is seen to help with attaining long-term goals and benefits based on self-interested 
calculations. Norms have power in certain situations and institutions, not in an overarching 
way per se. Rationalist, self-interest –based calculations underlie neoliberal institutionalism. 
Following Shannon, despite their differences, realist and neoliberalist approaches are grouped 
under the same heading of the logic of consequences for the purposes here. (Shannon 2000, 
295-297) 
Where the logic of consequences is associated with realist and liberalist approaches, 
constructivism underlies the logic of appropriateness. As Checkel notes, “implicit in many 
constructivist  accounts  is  a  model  of  human  and  state  behavior  where  rule-governed  action  
and logics of appropriateness prevail.” (Checkel 1998, 326)  
According to March and Olsen, within this logic actions are rule-based and “human actors are 
imagined  to  follow  rules  that  associate  particular  identities  to  particular  situations.”  (March  
and Olsen 1998, 951) Where the logic of consequences is agent-driven, logic of 
appropriateness is driven by social structure. Social structures formed and defined by norms 
and rules inform the sort of actions that are available to and taken by actors. Moreover, norms 
and rules point to actor’s responsibilities and to who will act. (Finnemore 1996, 29) The 
choices available are constrained by the surrounding structure, or as Shannon has eloquently 
put it, “states take cues from the social environment to determine how to behave and what 
interests and identity to claim”. (Shannon 2000, 297)  
Therefore, where the logic of consequences points to rational and self-interested cost-benefit 
calculations, the logic of appropriateness points to the power of norms. It is components of 
social structure, norms and social institutions, and the values, roles and rule they represent 
which guide behaviour. Under this logic, behaviour is directed by considerations of what is 
good, desirable and appropriate. (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 912-3) To sum up, as March 
and Olsen have put it, from the viewpoint of the logic of consequences, it is “an international 
system of interacting autonomous, egoistic, self-interested maximizers”; from the point of 
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view of the logic of appropriateness, it is “political actors as acting in accordance with rules 
and practices that are socially constructed, publicly known, anticipated, and accepted”. 
(March and Olsen 1998, 952)  
It is important to remember that the two should not be strictly separated from each other but 
come entangled in many ways. As Finnemore notes, following the logic of appropriateness 
does  not  mean irrationality.  Careful  thinking  underlies  decisions  to  follow rules  and  norms.  
(Finnemore 1996, 29) Furthermore, drawing a division between the two is not to say that 
adhering to one logic will exclude the other. Finnemore notes that “Ultimately, like structures 
and agents, the two logics are intimately connected”. (Finnemore 1996, 30) March and Olsen 
agree and note that a particular action taken will most likely involve parts from both logics 
and that action cannot be explained by exclusively drawing from only one approach. (March 
and Olsen 1998, 952; also Shannon 2000, 298) Others contend that the logics of consequences 
and appropriateness are not enough or that their substance is ambiguous. Snyder and 
Vinjamuri discuss a logic of emotions as a way to deal with past atrocities, where attention is 
directed to achieving an emotional catharsis and to reconciliation as a way to reduce post-
conflict tensions. (Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003, 15-17) Sending argues that the logic of 
appropriateness is untenable as a theory of individual action (Sending 2002) and Goldmann 
discusses in length the divisions drawn between the two logics. (Goldmann 2005)  Most 
interesting for the context here, however, is the logic of argumentation and it is introduced as 
the third logic surrounding the theme of the research.   
Perhaps on of the most well-rounded case for the logic of argumentation has been made by 
Thomas Risse (see also Hawkins 2004; and Deitelhoff 2010). In his 2001 article Let’s Argue! 
Risse contends that constructivism encompasses not only the logic of appropriateness but also 
what could be termed as a logic of truth seeking or arguing; the question is not what the right 
thing to do is but how actors decide which norm applies. Through a process of collective 
communication, actors seek to find out either if their assumptions about the world are correct 
(theoretical discourses) or whether norms of appropriate behaviour can be justified and what 
norms apply in which situations. By arguing over an issue, actors challenge the validity 
claims inherent in statements; and seek a communicative consensus both about their 
understanding of a situation and about the justifications for the norms that are guiding the 
actors’ behaviour. Arguing is also goal-oriented but the goal is more about reaching a 
reasoned consensus than about fixed preferences. Central to argumentative rationality is also 
that those participating in the discourse are open to being persuaded by the argument of the 
other and thus ready to change their views and interests. (Risse 2000, 6-7)  
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Risse bases his conceptualization of the logic of argumentation on Jürgen Habermaas’ 
critical theory of communicative action. (Risse 2000, 2) Habermaas based his theory on the 
idea of rational individuals who through speaking to each other moved towards agreement and 
action; this is the foundation for a rational society. To achieve it, communication was central. 
Argumentative dialogue in turn, is at the heart of rationality; it offers the possibility of testing 
propositions and through that, reaching intersubjective agreements. Disagreement over the 
truth or appropriateness of statements is what results in argumentation. (Herrick 2005, 236-9)  
As Habermaas defined, "We use the term argumentation for that type of speech in which 
participants thematize contested validity claims and attempt to vindicate or criticize them 
through argumentation.” (Habermaas 1984, 18) According to Habermaas, the strength of a 
particular argument can be measured through the soundness of the argument’s reasoning. One 
way to perceive this is the extent to which it can motivate others to accept the reasonings 
within and the validity of the claims made. (Habermaas 1984, 18) 
By drawing on Habermaas’ theory of communicative action, Risse develops his notion of 
truth-seeking arguing, the third form of communication in addition to bargaining and 
rhetorical action. The success of rhetoric is based on the logic of argumentative rationality, 
oriented towards reaching a common understanding. Thus, rhetorical statements and 
exchanges tend to move more towards the logic of argumentation as actors engaged in the 
discourse need to come up with increasingly well-rounded justifications to convince their 
audience of their opinion. (Risse 2000, 8-9) 
Argumentative rationality needs to be preceded by what Risse in Habermasian terms calls a 
common lifeworld. The term refers to “a supply of collective interpretations of the world” and 
consists of “a shared culture, a common system of norms and rules perceived as legitimate”; 
in essence, the common lifeworld provides actors “a repertoire of collective understandings” 
to which actors can refer to when making claims. (Risse 2000, 10-11) Security communities 
that share values and norms to a high extent can constitute a common lifeworld (the European 
Union and the so-called transatlantic community for example); and, following the ideas of 
democratic peace theory, the collective identity shared by democratic states can form a 
common lifeworld. Moreover, Risse argues, some issue areas can be institutionalized to such 
a high extent as to constitute a common lifeworld,  the issue of human rights being one such 
possibility. Here, international institutions create a normative framework which structures 
interaction in a particular issue area. A common lifeworld does not, however, imply common 
knowledge, lack of which then leads to arguing. (Risse 2000, 15) 
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Risse also points to certain features present in discussions in the public sphere as opposed 
to diplomatic negotiations between two or more parties. First, the public sphere is open to 
other actors than states (nonstate actors and advocacy groups). Second, public debates often 
concern identity-related issues, which also concern normative debates linked to the social 
identities of actors. Of such issues Risse mentions the debates over humanitarian intervention 
and human rights questions. Third, debates in the public sphere tend to have a civilizing effect 
on actors. Actors become forced to justify their actions based on shared values and notion of 
‘good’. Fourth, lack of material power does not preclude the possibility of influencing the 
discourse. The authority and knowledge of many NGO’s is proof of this. (Risse 2000, 22)  
Despite the divisions drawn, Risse notes that “we rarely observe pure argumentative 
rationality prevailing in world politics” but instead see various combinations of all three. 
(Risse, 2000, 24) Strategic behaviour, norm-guided behaviour and argumentative behaviour 
are ideal types and often become intertwined. Risse notes that we often seek to argue to 
somebody that our opinions are justified and in this process we follow norms that enable the 
communication (language rules). Thus, the question is not about the way in which actors 
behave but the mode of behaviour that best captures action in a give situation. (Risse 2000, 18) 
Adding the logic of argumentation to the debate allows for a deeper understanding of the 
issues between rational choice and constructivism. It challenges the rationalist notion of fixed 
interest and breaks some of the structural bias of the logic of appropriateness. (Risse 2000, 34) 
As Reus-Smit notes, when constructivism centers on reasons for action, the focus is not just 
on the logic of appropriateness but also on the logic of argumentation, on the “way in which 
norms provide the communicative framework in which actors debate issues of legitimate 
agency, purpose and strategy”. (Reus-Smit 2009, 23) 
So far, the parts in this chapter have introduced the theoretical framework that surrounds this 
research. The legalization that the international realm has undergone in many aspects and the 
human rights and atrocities regimes that have developed provide the wider context for the 
discussion. This context is further elaborated by arguments for and against legalism. Realism, 
liberalism and constructivism provide alternative theoretically-orientated approaches to 
international relations and state behaviour within it. The discussion of the three logics of 
action is intended to provide a more in-depth framework. A discussion of realist, liberalist and 
constructivist approaches to international law concludes this chapter.  
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2.5.5 International Law through the Theoretical Approaches 
A different picture of international law and its institutions materializes when it is approached 
through the different theoretical starting points. For realists, the picture is rather bleak. 
Surrounded by conditions of anarchy, possibilities for cooperation are dim and this does not 
bode well for agreements in international law. Realists do not deny the existence of 
international law altogether but disparage its meaning. Even Morgenthau, the staunch critic of 
international law, conceded that “"to deny that international law exists as a system of binding 
legal rules flies in the face of all the evidence”. (Morgenthau 1965, 277) States will cooperate 
within international law and institutions but only if it is in their interests to do so. The 
commitments states are willing to make are based on their perceived political realities and 
cooperation is guided by the interests of the most powerful states in the system. (Abbott 1999, 
365)  
In the realist view, international trials and tribunals are established winners of the conflict and 
inflicted on the losers; it is about punishment and revenge but nothing more. It is also often 
feared that trials will stand in the way of maintaining or re-establishing international order and 
should thus be avoided. (Bass 2000, 10-11) For realists, the creation of the ICC represents an 
anomaly. Why should states cooperate in such a way? The most powerful states, US in the 
forefront and also Russia and China, do not support the Court. Moreover, a myriad of other 
countries, including many of the US’s allies and NATO members, support the Court despite 
US opposition. This leads to the conclusion that realism cannot really account for the 
establishment of the ICC. (London 2006, 9-11; Schiff 2008; 5-6; Wippman 2009, 152)  
To sum up, in the realist view, states do not and should not have any desire to concede to an 
institution that could potentially curb their choices in securing survival. Much of the criticism 
towards the ICC and legalism can be seen to be realist-inspired.  
Neoliberalism, with its belief in the ability of cooperation trough institutions, takes a more 
positive view of international law. The neoliberalist position of strategic action through which 
actors seek the best way to achieve their goals and interests opens up the possibility for 
international law. Working together through institutions can do away with the traditional 
obstacles of cooperation, such as cheating and transaction costs. The arguments for 
legalization, already discussed above, quite well coincide with the neoliberalist understanding 
of the capabilities of international law. (Reus-Smit 2009, 18-19) Reus-Smit, however, points 
to limitations in neoliberalist understanding of international law. First, neoliberalism does not 
account for the historical uniqueness of the modern institution of international law. If 
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institutions would only simply be functional solutions, recurring cooperation problems 
should also generate recurring institutional practices. This however has not been the case and 
different solutions have been developed throughout history. Second, neoliberalism does not 
account for the ways in which international law can function as a focal point for discursive 
struggles. The creation of the laws of war was not just the establishment of a set of rules but 
enacted and asserted a definition of legitimate statehood and appropriate action. Third, 
neoliberalism cannot fully account for the obligatory force of international law and why some 
rules are considered to be binding in and of themselves. The argument that states obey the law 
because they have consented to it fails when confronted with customary international law, 
which binds states without their formal consent. Fourth, neoliberalism has problems 
accounting for the way international law has come to be increasingly enmeshed in the rights 
of individuals and groups. The neoliberalist approach with states in the centre becomes 
questioned when normative impulses and nonstate actors capture more authority. (Reus-Smit 
2009, 19-21) 
In their answer to the legalization discussion, Finnemore and Toope call for a fuller 
understanding of law and criticize the neoliberalist approach to legalization as too narrow. 
Finnemore and Toope point to three features of international law neglected by neoliberalism. 
First is the already briefly mentioned failure to account for customary international law, 
which influences state behaviour through norms in areas such as the legitimate use of force 
and human rights. Second, they question obligation, precision and delegation as the defining 
characteristics of law. In many well-established areas of international law, norms are rather 
imprecise and much of international law functions outside a system of extensive delegation of 
decision-making authority (excluding the EU, human rights law affects states quite largely 
without compulsory adjudication). Obligation is seen as the most problematic and the authors 
call for a discussion of how obligation becomes generated. Finnemore and Toope point to 
legitimacy as a source of obligation. Third, law should be treated as a process, not as an 
artifact that has a strict form. (Finnemore and Toope 2001, 743-750) 
As an approach that gives space to institutions, neoliberalism can to some extent account for 
the establishment of the ICC. As Schiff notes, states will support the ICC if they see that the 
support will help in achieving their goals. If the Court supports the interests of the states, it 
will gain more legitimacy. Some aspects of the ICC’s form, survival and growth can be 
explained through neoliberalism. (Schiff 2008, 7) Wippman agrees and notes that to some 
extent  the  creation  of  the  ICC  is  motivated  by  the  states’  wish  to  reduce  the  problems  and  
costs of creating international tribunals on an ad hoc basis. When the issue is taken further, 
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problems arise. Behind the ICC were also wishes, shared by many, to develop and stabilize 
the  norms  that  inform  what  legitimate  behaviour  by  states  and  nonstate  actors  is.  
Neoliberalism cannot account that well for normative impulses. (Wippman 2009, 152-3) 
Schiff notes that neoliberalism “doesn’t explain why the anti-impunity norm and international 
criminal law grew in the first place.” (Schiff 2008, 7) 
Constructivism offers a different view of international law. Finnemore and Toope characterize 
law as “a broad social phenomenon deeply embedded in the practices, beliefs, and traditions 
of societies, and shaped by interaction among societies.” (Finnemore and Toope, 2001, 743) 
Brunnee and Toope argue for an interactional view of international law where “law is 
constructed through rhetorical activity producing increasingly influential mutual expectations 
or shared understandings of actors.” (Brunnee and Toope 2000, 65) Armstrong et al. argue 
that constructivism has made four central contributions to understanding international law. 
First, constructivists emphasize norms and seek to recover the meanings those norms have for 
those who practice and adhere to them. Second is constructivism’s adherence to structure, of 
which the already mentioned customary international law provides a ready example. 
(Armstrong, Farrell and Lambert 2007, 102-3) When discussing structure, Armstrong et al. 
draw on Reus-Smit’s conceptions of so-called fundamental institutions, which are deep 
institutional practices that structure international society. Fundamental institutions are generic 
in nature and differ from society to society. As the institutions of modern international society 
Reus-Smit mentions multilateralism and international law and sees them as grounded in the 
normative foundations of international society. (Reus-Smit 1997, 555-6)  
Thirdly, Armstrong et al. point to the concept of agency. Constructivists have highlighted the 
way in which states achieve their powers through the norm of sovereignty, which legitimates 
many state activities. Moreover, constructivism highlights the role of nonstate actors. Fourthly, 
constructivists point to the constitutive effect of international law. Politics and international 
law affect each other in many different ways; the construction of norms involves politics and 
norms, such as state sovereignty, are defined and validated by international law. (Armstrong, 
Farrell and Lambert 2007, 102-5) Thus, in the language of Finnemore and Toope a 
constructivist view of international law can provide a fuller picture of that law. They point to 
the way the spread of law and legalization encompass features and effects of legitimacy. 
Attention is directed to how law is purposively constructed and how taking part in that 
construction contributes to the ideas of legitimacy and obligation. A fuller understanding also 
points to the procedures, institutions and process that generate legitimacy. Moreover, law not 
 53
only constitutes relationships; it also defines what is deemed acceptable behaviour in the 
international arena. (Finnemore and Toope 2001, 744-5) 
Reus-Smit highlights international law as a central feature in the framework that rules and 
norms form and within which international politics also takes place. Social and legal norms 
both play a role and constitute actor’s identities, interests and actions. The international 
society viewed through constructivism is a constitutive one in which legitimacy, purposes and 
appropriate strategies are debated. Lately, politics has given international law form and 
content and in turn, international law has influenced politics. (Reus-Smit 2009, 3-5) In 
relation to institutions, Reus-Smit notes: “states create institutions not only as functional 
solutions to co-operation problems, but also as expressions of prevailing conceptions of 
legitimate agency and action that serve, in turn, as structuring frameworks for the 
communicative politics of legitimation.” (Reus-Smit 2009, 5)  
Constructivists  too  have  sought  to  explain  the  creation  of  the  ICC.  As  with  realism  and  
neoliberalism, this discussion remains short as the subject here is not the creation of the ICC. 
As introduced above (p. 43), Fehl finds answers in constructivism for why the ICC was 
established, and for its institutional design. Ralph combines English School (Bull) and 
constructivist (Wendt)  approaches and argues that the ICC was created as an answer to the 
demands of holding individuals responsible for atrocities and to the instability in international 
relations created by the ability of the great powers to decide whether or not international trials 
will be compiled. (Ralph 2009, 135) 
Wippman considers the reasons for action in relation to the creation of the ICC through 
analyzing arguments by the US and other states during the Rome negotiations over the key 
issues of the Rome Statute. Wippman notes that in many ways, in Rome law was inseparable 
from politics and vice versa. He separates legal and political arguments and sees that both 
were used in Rome, the negotiations as a whole being encompassed by the larger context of 
existing international law and its institutions. Whereas the legal arguments of actors 
concerned what international law does or should require as a legal system, political arguments 
were claims about what would advance the interests of actors. (Wippman 2009, 153-154) 
Wippman asserts that the views expressed in the Rome negotiations were founded on material, 
identity-based and normative concerns. The different emphasis on these concerns led to 
different views as to the role of international law and its institutions in international relations 
with supporters emphasizing law’s ability to constrain and advance human rights –orientated 
views of the international society. (Wippman 2009, 155-6) 
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This Chapter has discussed the theoretical framework of this thesis. The ICC is a result of 
the increasing importance and value put on human rights and their protections especially since 
the Second World War. This has lead to the establishment of international institutions and 
trials to bring perpetrators of heinous international crimes to justice and to the creation of the 
so-called atrocities regime. This has come into conflict with the principle of state sovereignty 
and challenged the more realist-inspired views of international relations.  
Before moving on to discuss the United Kingdom, a short step back is in order. As Finnemore 
and Toope have noted law should be treated as a process. Reus-Smit agrees23 and argues that 
even  though actors  assume the  existence  of  social  rules,  they  argue  as  to  the  forms  of  those  
rules, what new rules should be established, what the rules proscribe and what is their reach. 
Through this, international relations and law remains a dynamic and changing framework 
under constant change and debate. The reasonings actors give in the debate are rhetorical in 
nature. (Reus-Smit 2009, 41) Thus, rhetorical analysis as a research method is useful here, as 
the aim is to uncover the ways in which actors in the international arena argue and reason. 
The method in turn is complemented by a constructivist framework, which points towards the 
idea that reasons and motivations behind actions are not simply based on self-interested 
calculations, but are constructed through interaction between actors and the structure that 
forms  the  framework  within  which  the  actors  act  and  argue.  It  is  these  arguments  and  
reasonings that are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
23 For a lengthier discussion on the matter see Wheeler’s discussion on international law and NATO’s 
Kosovo bombings in 1999. (Wheeler 2009) 
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3. The United Kingdom: Foreign Policy and International Trials 
This  thesis  circles  around  the  UK’s  foreign  policy  towards  the  ICC.  In  order  to  offer  a  
comprehensive analysis, it is important to put the subject in context. Therefore, this chapter 
offers a more in-depth discussion of the UK’s foreign policy and its  policies and viewpoints 
towards international criminal law and its institutions. In addition, this gives a practical 
illustration  of  the  theoretical  framework.  Viewed  through  the  theoretical  points,  the  UK’s  
support for the international tribunals can be seen to be influenced by the overall legalization 
of international relations and by a belief in legalism as a way to solve problems, such as how 
to  deal  with  post-conflict  calls  for  justice.  The  influence  of  the  atrocities  and  human  rights  
regimes can be seen in the Blair government’s formulation of an ethical foreign policy. 
Viewed through a constructivist lens, these structures are seen to have an influence on the 
way the UK has acted in relation to these issues.  
The main developments in international criminal law have taken place in the 20th century. 
Owing to that and to the subject of the thesis, the discussion concentrates on UK policies 
concerning institutions of international criminal law and themes closely related to it, such as 
human rights from the 20th century onwards. This chapter advances as follows. First, the UK’s 
current foreign policy is discussed. The main focus is from the latter part of the 1990’s 
onwards and corresponds to the time frame of the analysis. Secondly, focus is put on the UK’s 
policies towards international criminal law and its institutions before the establishment of the 
ICC. The UK’s relationship with the ICC is discussed next. The concluding part deals with 
the main criticisms of the ICC and the UK’s relationship with it.  
3.1 The UK and Human Rights 
The UK’s human rights policies need to be viewed in the larger context of the human rights 
regime, discussed in Chapter 2. Traditionally, the UK has been viewed as a strong proponent 
of human rights. The UK is a signatory to the central human rights treaties and covenants, 
including but not limited to (the year represents the time of UK ratification/accession to the 
treaty):  The  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights  UDHR  (1948);  The  Convention  of  the  
Rights of the Child (1991); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (1951); The Genocide Convention (1970); International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976); 
Convention Relating to the Statues of Refugees (1954); Convention of the Abolition of 
Slavery (1957); and the Convention against Torture (1988). (FCO 2012b)  
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Successive UK governments have sought to bring human rights in to foreign policy. This 
was not only so in the case of the Blair government from 1997 onwards (further discussed 
below) but also previous governments under Callaghan and Hurd attempted to bring human 
rights in the diplomatic agenda. (Wheeler and Dunne 1998, 852) When the Blair Government 
came to power, human rights were emphasized as a central theme in UK foreign policy. The 
support of international criminal law and its institutions has been one way in which this has 
been done in practice. The next section analyzes the UK’s foreign policy overall, before 
moving to discuss international trials. 
3.2 The UK Foreign Policy  
The 20th century saw the decline of the British Empire.24 Starting roughly from the end of the 
Second World War, the UK’s foreign policy has revolved around the so-called US-UK 
‘special relationship’. In addition, the UK has balanced with its relationship to the EU. When 
the Blair Labour Government took power 1997, the UK’s foreign policy was characterized by 
interventionism and promises of an ‘ethical foreign policy’.  
Since the start of the Cold War, much of the UK’s foreign policy was characterized by UK’s 
relationship to the US. Both economic and national security issues have been at the root of the 
US-UK special relationship. From the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization to the many nuclear power related debacles of the Cold War, this relationship of 
shared economic and national security issues continued well into to the 21st century. (Gamble 
and Kearns 2007, 117-119; Dumbrell 2001) According to Gamble and Kearns, “Support for 
the US has been the default setting of UK foreign policy”. (Gamble and Kearns 2007, 119) 
The early 1990’s saw one major upheaval after the other: the First Gulf War was quickly 
followed by the disastrous dissolution of Yugoslavia and the genocide in Rwanda. 25 
According to Gamble and Kearns, the 1990’s also saw both the “climax as well as a breaking 
point” in US-UK relations, which under the Blair leadership became very tight. (Gamble and 
Kearns 2007, 120)  
Blair’s New Labour took power in the 1997 elections. UK foreign policy under the first Blair 
Government  (1997-2001)  can  in  general  terms  be  characterized  with  three  main  themes:  
continued  close  relationship  with  the  US;  placing  the  UK  in  the  center  of  the  EU;  and  
interventionism, central to which was the idea that intervening in grave humanitarian 
                                               
24 See Brendon 2007. 
25 This subject is further discussed in second part of this chapter.  
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situations was a moral obligation. The interventionist policy was epitomized in 1999 with 
the Kosovo intervention and continued with the UK’s role in bringing an end to the conflict in 
Sierra Leone. (Lunn, Miller and Smith 2008, 9-10)  
Central to the Blair era was the advancement of a “Third Way” in politics. As a political 
strategy and in economic terms, the aim was to go beyond the divisions between the old left 
and the new right and balance the free market and public ownership.  In foreign policy terms, 
references were made to the need to bring human rights in foreign policy. (Wheeler and 
Dunne 1998, 847-8) This was to be done by building a framework of an ‘ethical foreign 
policy’. The idea was put forward by Blair’s Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, who proclaimed 
that Labour’s foreign policy “must have an ethical dimension”. This new ‘ethical foreign 
policy’ as it became to be called had in its centre the promise that “the Labour Government 
will put human rights at the heart of our foreign policy”. (The Guardian 1997) The wish was 
to bring ethics and idealism into the world of foreign policy, traditionally ruled by realism. In 
essence, the aim was “mapping out a third way which tames the element of brute power” and 
look to “the reconciliation of order and justice in world politics.” (Wheeler and Dunne 1998, 
856) From this, followed the policy of ‘liberal interventionism’, the foundation of which was 
the idea of bringing ethics to the foreign policy arena. Overall, it can be seen that the UK’s 
foreign policy at the time echoes the structure formed by the human rights and atrocities 
regimes.  
The main tenets of the ethical foreign policy can be pinned to the ideas of humanitarian 
intervention and of an ‘international community’. In humanitarian intervention, the main 
impetus is human suffering, the prevention and stopping of which provides the moral right to 
intervene. The international community referred to the shared rights and responsibilities of 
those belonging to the community. As a member of the community, a state should live up to 
its  responsibilities,  of  which  the  most  stressed  in  the  beginning  was  the  protection  of  core  
human rights. Should a state not respect its responsibilities, intervention became a possibility. 
(Bulley 2010, 445-447)26 Chandler points to the benefits of framing the issue of intervention 
with ethics. When an intervention is conducted under ethical motivations, the final policy 
outcome of the intervention diminishes in importance; often, it can be emphasized as being at 
least better than doing nothing. A positive framework for Western intervention is created and 
the framework of ethical foreign policy becomes ‘rhetoric without responsibility’. (Chandler 
                                               
26 Similar ideas are now coined in the responsibility to protect –doctrine, illustrated in the 2001 Report 
“Responsibility to protect” by The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS). (ICISS 2001) 
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2003, 305-9) Blair’s interventionism was tested in the late 1990’s and early 21st century. 
According  to  Bulley,  the  UK  took  part  in  “an  unprecedented  number  of  military  
interventions” from 1997 to 2003. Included are the bombing of Iraq in 1998, Kosovo 1999, 
Sierra Leone 2000, Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq in 2003 and smaller actions in East Timor 
1999 and the Republic of Congo. (Bulley 2010, 447)27  
In addition to the above, the other important context for the UK’s policies is the EU. The UK-
EU relations have throughout history been strenuous. Although pre-Labour Conservative 
governments have kept the slogan of putting the UK ‘in the heart of Europe’, a promise of 
Blair’s too as he assumed office, this has been more about placing the UK in a position where 
it could slow down attempts of closer integration than about making the EU the UK’s main 
priority. With France and Germany historically being the forerunner’s of tighter EU 
integration, the UK has preferred cooperation on the intergovernmental level. The UK’s 
stance towards the EU has been one of ‘a la carte’ picking and choosing, the UK for example 
opting out of the Social Chapter of the EU, the Schengen Agreement and the Euro (Lunn, 
Miller and Smith 2008, 28-30) This remained so even though Blair’s policies towards the EU 
have been regarded as more constructive than the marginalization of the UK practiced by the 
predecessor Conservative governments. (Grant 2007, 132)  
The UK’s role in the development of the EU’s common security and defence policy has been 
more constructive. What started with the UK-France St Malo declaration in 1998 has resulted 
in a European Security and Defence Policy and the creation of European Rapid Reaction 
Forces.  The  UK  under  Blair  was  also  more  involved  in  the  Common  Foreign  and  Security  
Policy of the Union. (Lunn, Miller and Smith 2008, 32-33) Under the framework, British 
troops have been deployed as part of EU operations in for example DRC and Macedonia. 
(White 2009, 133)28  
The UK has in many ways had to balance with its aims of keeping the ‘special relationship’ 
with  the  US  and  maintaining  a  role  in  the  European  Union.  The  UK  government’s  need  to  
heed to its US-relationship has affected its policies towards the EU and the ‘pro-Atlanticist’ 
stance has been maintained through the development of the EU. One result has been the UK’s 
policy of acting as ‘bridge’ between the US and EU. Here, however, Iraq has proved to be a 
point of contention, which made the ‘bridging’ increasingly difficult. The development of a 
                                               
27 For more on UK military actions, see White 2009. 
28 EU operations and development will not be further discussed here. For more detailed information, 
see Howorth 2007. 
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European  defence  policy  and  foreign  policy  also  stained  UK  allegiance  to  NATO  and  
through that, the US. (Lunn, Miller and Smith 2008, 20-38) Next, the discussion is moved to 
the context of international law. 
3.3 The UK and International Criminal Law 
This part discusses the UK’s relationship with international law since the turn of the 20th 
century. UK has been involved in the establishment of all international tribunals and trials 
sine  the  First  World  War.  The  purpose  of  this  part  is  to  provide  a  historical  context  for  the  
UK’s support of the ICC. First, the international trials envisaged and established in 
connection to the World Wars are introduced. Second, the UK’s involvement in the tribunals 
for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are analyzed. 
3.3.1 Germany on Trial: From Leipzig to Nuremberg 
The  first  attempts  to  form  an  international  trial  were  made  following  the  First  World  War.   
Already in the early stages of the war, trials became one of Britain’s war aims. Prime Minister 
Lloyd George demanded punishment for war criminals and this was echoed strongly by the 
British public and after fierce debates, also by the Cabinet. (Bass 2000, 60-61; 73) This was 
however to no avail: the German Kaiser had sought and been granted asylum in Holland, 
which refused to extradite him despite calls from the Allies to do so. (Cryer 2005, 34) There 
are many similarities between the situations of the late 1910’s and the early 1940’s. Britain 
had suffered in the hands of Nazi Germany and the British public wanted to see the war 
criminals of Germany punished. According to a poll in 1944, 97 % of Britons thought that the 
top Nazi leaders should be punished. (Bass 2000, 182-183) The difference between the 
situations was the British insistence of summary executions for the main Nazi war criminals. 
Whereas Lloyd George called for trials, Prime Minister Winston Churchill supported 
executions. (Smith 1981, 45-46) In the end, the Americans changed the UK’s mind, President 
Truman being a fervent believer in the justice system. (Smith 1981, 195) After negotiations in 
London in 1945 Britain yielded to the American and Soviet Union positions and the London 
Agreement establishing the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal was signed by the four 
Allies. (Cryer 2010, 111) 
The British were not initially supporters of a trial following the events of the Second World 
War. According to Bass, the British were aware of “the risks of legalism” (Bass 2000, 181) 
and consequently sided with idea of summary executions. Bass concedes that although liberal 
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states are usually legalist, they are not always so and in the case of Britain and Nuremberg, 
the initial non-legalist position was, fortunately, “only a partial lapse”. (Bass 2000, 181-2)  
3.3.2 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
The 1990’s presented as a new opportunity for international criminal law and trials. The Cold 
War era hiatus ended and the crises in both Yugoslavia and Rwanda29 demanded the attention 
of the world and became to be the test cases for post-Nuremberg trials. They also show well 
the tensions that exist between realpolitik and idealism that underlies international criminal 
law. 
In the UNSC meeting when the ICTY was established, UK representative David Hannay 
attested  UK’s  strong  support  for  the  resolution  and  warned  the  parties  of  the  conflict  that  
“they must stop immediately violations of international humanitarian law or face the 
consequences”. (Bethlehem and Weller 1997, 278) Although it supported the Tribunal in 
principle, in reality, the UK’s belief in the Tribunal and support for it was and has been 
somewhat ambiguous.  
The  UK,  together  with  France,  was  the  leading  troop  contributor  country  to  the  United  
Nations Protection Force, a UN peacekeeping mission on ground in Bosnia tasked primarily 
to secure the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In order to keep the troops safe, the UK had 
in its interest to settle the Bosnia conflict as quickly as possible; a war crimes trial would in 
all likelihood indict key Serb leaders, which might result in reprisals against British troops on 
ground.30 (Bass 2000, 216) The UK was also concerned judicial proceedings would impede 
diplomatic efforts to end the fighting and make it more difficult to find a solution. (Forsythe 
1994, 403) Both the UK and France became “prisoners of their own contradictions” in 
wanting to at the same time achieve peace as soon as possible and create a court they saw 
might be an obstacle to that achievement. (Hazan 2004, 24) The early years of the ICTY 
proved difficult in many ways. The Commission of Experts tasked to document and 
investigate the crimes was under-resourced, not having enough founds or staff. (Hazan 2004, 
26-29) Electing the judges was difficult, as was the protracted selection of a Prosecutor. (Bass 
2000, 217-219) The nascent Tribunal also had to deal with technical problems. There were no 
                                               
29 For detailed information on events, see Silber and Little 1996; Power 2002; Moghalu 2005. 
30 The mission itself has been widely criticized for having an ineffective mandate and failing to protect 
civilians on ground. Moreover, the British and French fears were not unfounded; the Serbs did take 
UN personnel hostage to stop Western assaults. See White 2009, 140-142; Silber and Little 1996, 328-
9. 
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offices, proper equipment or money. The creators of the ICTY were not eager to financially 
support the Tribunals work; the UK gave $30, 500 and one staffer. (Bass 2000, 222) The UK 
was also criticized for lacking enthusiasm to gather witness statements and testimonials. 
(Block and Castle 1993) To Hazan, all this was evidence of particularly Britain’s “shameful 
realpolitik” and “pragmatic, realist raison d’etat that carries them ever farther away from 
democratic ideals”. (Hazan 2004, 45) This continued as the Tribunal got underway in its 
work. Especially difficult was the arresting of war criminals, a task which the IFOR, NATO’s 
International Protection Force on ground in Bosnia, did not want to undertake. (Bass 2000, 
239-249)  
The Blair Government, however, changed the UK’s policy towards the ICTY which was 
marked in foreign policy by “major innovations” which amounted to “a very significant 
change” among other things in UK commitments in the Balkans and Kosovo. (Hill 2001, 331) 
The new line was epitomized in the new ethical foreign policy, discussed above. As 
Robertson notes, the election of the Blair Government was “an important event in the 
transformation of the Tribunal’s fortune”. (Robertson 2006, 406) This change became 
evident for example by the support the UK gave to the NATO’s bombing campaign in 
Kosovo in 1999. (Wheeler 2000, 257-265) 
3.3.3 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
Rwanda is remembered as an uncomfortable failure for the international community as a 
whole and for the UN in particular. During the 100 -day killing spree that started in April 
1994, the UNSC managed a few half-hearted resolutions and actually reduced the size of the 
UN mission already deployed in Rwanda. (The UNSC 1994b; Melvern 2000, 172) France 
received the main criticism and has been accused of having knowledge of the impending 
genocide and of supplying arms to Rwanda both before and during the atrocities. The US has 
been similarly criticized (Dallaire, Manocha, Degnarain 2005, 863-866; Power 2002, 335-348) 
The UK, although less so that the US and France, has gotten its share of criticism. According 
to Melvern, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (the FCO) attempted to underplay the 
events in Rwanda and claimed that it did not know what was going on.  Rwanda was low on 
the  list  of  British  interests  and  attention  was  directed  to  Bosnia.  Furthermore,  UK’s  UN  
representative Hannay was convinced that there really was nothing the UN could have done to 
stop the genocide. Rwanda was also not high on the list of debates in the House of Commons. 
(Melvern 2000, 230-232) In addition to France, UK has been found to have supplied arms to 
Rwanda as a UK company brokered an arms deal to Rwanda before and during the genocide. 
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(McNulty 2000, 120) As a whole, the Rwandan genocide stands as an embarrassing failure 
for  the  international  community  and  for  the  UNSC.  There  were  no  strategic  or  national  
interests in Rwanda; as Bass has illustrated the issue with both Rwanda and Bosnia, “It was 
the great misfortune of Rwandans and Bosnians to be able to make appeals to the West only 
in moral terms”. (Bass 2000, 278)  
Although the UNSC failed to intervene in Rwanda to prevent or stop the genocide31, it did set 
up the ICTR, establishment of which followed closely the path of the ICTY. On July 1st 1994, 
the UNSC established a Commission of experts to investigate the grave violations of 
humanitarian law. (The UNSC 1994c) In connection to this (Resolution 935), the UK’s UN 
representative Hannay expressed the UK government’s strong support for the establishment of 
the Commission and emphasized the international community’s duty to ensure that 
perpetrators are brought to justice. (Hannay 1994a) 
Cooper argues that the international community rather established an international tribunal to 
persecute a few for the massacre of close to a million than take a look in the mirror. (Cooper 
2009, 83) This sort of fig-leaf criticism – that a tribunal is established to mask the fact that 
there is no willingness to do anything more robust 32  – speaks volumes of the way 
humanitarian motives and calls for international justice are often tempered by realpolitik. The 
UK was ready to support a tribunal for Rwanda, but it rings hollow in the light of what was 
not done. This is not to say that the benefits of the ICTR would be eliminated because of the 
reasons it was established, but to emphasize the influence of power and interests.  
The aim was to illustrate the UK’s relationship with earlier international tribunals to provide 
context for its policies regarding the ICC. It is clear that support for international criminal law 
has heeded to national interests and realpolitik. Next, UK’s policies towards the ICC are 
discussed.  
3.4 The UK and the International Criminal Court 
The last part concentrated on the UK’s relationship with international criminal law and some 
of its central institutions. This part focuses of the ICC. First, the reasons for joining an 
institution such as the ICC are discussed briefly. As this is not the main focus here, the matter 
                                               
31 A UN Report found that “The failure of the United Nations to prevent, and subsequently, to stop the 
genocide in Rwanda was a failure by the United Nations system as a whole”. (UN 1999, 3;Barnett 
1997, 559) 
32 Rabkin 2005, 261-263 
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is introduced only on a general level. Secondly, the UK’s relationship with the ICC is 
discussed.  Endorsing  the  ICC  corresponds  well  with  the  UK’s  foreign  policy  at  the  time,  
which in turn reflects the interests in human rights and international trials. 
3.4.1 Joining the ICC 
By signing and ratifying the Rome Statute of the ICC, a state becomes a party and accepts the 
jurisdiction of the Court. The potential risks involved have deterred some states from joining 
the Court, most notably the US, China and Russia. (The ICC 2012b) The question is why so 
many states have joined an institution that can (in principle) interfere in matters traditionally 
taken to belong to the internal matters of a sovereign state (the punishment of nationals). 
States accept the possibility of incurring so-called sovereignty costs when they ratify a statute 
such as that of the ICC’s. As Abbott and Snidal point out, the acceptance of binding legal 
obligations and delegating authority to a supranational body is possibly costly to states. The 
costs  may  be  lower,  such  as  loss  of  decision-making  power  but  also  higher,  such  as  the  
punishment of one’s own nationals. (Abbott and Snidal 2000, 436) Legalization makes trade-
offs a necessity. Especially with hard legalization, which the ICC represents in many ways as 
discussed in Chapter 2, states need to balance between the benefits it brings and the 
sovereignty costs it entails. (Abbot and Snidal 2000, 455) 
Practice has shown that the UK has not been particularly concerned about the ICC’s 
sovereignty costs. For one, the complementarity principle stands as a barrier for the 
prosecution of UK nationals in the ICC. It seems likely that should a UK national be accused 
of crimes that fall under the ICC’s jurisdiction, the UK would deal with the matter itself. As 
Foreign Secretary Cook has noted, it “remains inconceivable that British service personnel 
could ever end up in The Hague” due to the UK’s readiness to initiate prosecutions in its own 
legal system. (Cook 2005) The UK has, in fact, initiated a prosecution under its 2001 ICC Act 
in the case of Corporal Payne and others, who were accused of ill-treatment of prisoners 
during the Iraq war in 2003. Payne became the first British soldier convicted of a war crime 
under international law. However, the case would in all likelihood be very different should the 
alleged criminal be a high ranking British official or statesman. In many ways, as the 
importance of the person increases, the likelihood of prosecution decreases. (Rasiah 2009) 
Moreover, the UK’s possible sovereignty costs in this vein are also lowered by its status as a 
permanent  member  of  the  UNSC,  which  can  defer  ICC  cases  as  discussed  previously.  It  is  
highly unlikely that a British national will ever stand accused in the ICC, and not only due to 
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the complementarity principle. As will be seen, this matter became one central theme in the 
ICC debates in the House of Commons. 
Secondly, the acceptance of the ICC corresponds well with the ethical foreign policy of the 
Blair government and it is cited as one of the achievements of a policy more concentrated on 
human rights. (Lunn, Miller and Smith 2008, 9) Williams agrees and states that the ICC was a 
“key part of the British Government ethical foreign policy.” (Williams 2005, 18) The Blair 
Government took a more supportive stance towards international trials than the previous 
Major Government.  As Betti  argues,  the rise of the New Labour and the support  it  received 
created the favourable conditions for the adoption of the Rome Statute and its integration to 
the UK’s domestic law. With the parliamentary system in the UK and the large victory 
secured by the Labour in 1997, the Blair government could rely on a large majority 
ideologically  favourable  to  the  ICC.  Betti  points  especially  to  Foreign  Secretary  Cook,  who 
framed the adoption of the Rome Statute as a necessary step in the attempt to spread respect 
for human rights. The conditions at the time rendered the UK supportive for the prosecution 
of international crimes. (Betti 2001, 33)  
The UK’s staunch support  of the ICC is also interesting in the light of the so-called US-UK 
‘special relationship’, discussed above. With the ICC, the UK made a clear break from the US 
position. As stated, the domestic situation in the UK, with the Labour party and the ICC-
enthusiast Cook in power, was conducive to the ICC’s endorsement. As Edlin notes, it is more 
surprising that the US did not support the ICC than that the UK did. The US position stands as 
an anomaly compared to its traditional Western allies. From the UNSC permanent members 
France and UK support the Court, as do all NATO countries, Turkey excluded. (Edlin 2006, 6) 
When it comes to the ICC, Edlin sees the differences of opinion as rising from the different 
experiences of the US and UK with the UN and the EU, respectively. The UK is used to 
relinquishing some of its sovereignty to the EU but the US tends to be more wary of possible 
UN effects on US actions. The US, not being used to sovereignty costs, views the ICC and its 
possible effects as more of a threat than the UK does. (Edlin 2006, 18-19) Moreover, the EU-
framework has been conducive to UK support to the ICC. EU-states have collectively 
proclaimed their support for human rights and the rule of law and that the principles of the 
Rome Statute coincide with those of the EU itself. (Aoun 2012, 22) This can in part explain 
the UK’s support for the ICC. 
On the whole, the UK’s support for the ICC corresponds with the UK’s convictions to uphold 
and advance human rights as part of the Blair Government’s ethical foreign policy. Given the 
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overall human rights framework, the EU’s influence and the context at the time, created by 
the Blair Government, the UK’s support of the ICC does not strike very surprising.  
3.4.2 The UK: Adopting the Rome Statute and After 
Pre-1997, the Conservative Party remained cautiously supportive of the ICC. In the spirit of 
the announced ethical foreign policy, discussed above, the Labour Party took a more positive 
stance and made the ICC part of their election campaign, promising to work for its creation. 
Prime  Minister  Blair  and  then  Chancellor  Gordon  Brown  echoed  Cook’s  views  for  a  moral  
component in foreign policy. (Busby 2010, 241-242) Cook emphasized that the Government 
fully supports the ICTY and ICTR and continued by expressing the Government’s support for 
an international criminal court since “it is also our position that a prosecution for a war crime 
or genocide should not depend on an ad hoc resolution of the Security Council”. (House of 
Commons 1997, Vol. 301, col. 769)  
Cook’s statement became to characterize a definite shift in UK policy towards the ICC. In 
December 1997 during the fifth PrepCom session the UK opposed a provision demanding that 
ICC proceedings should always depend on prior UNSC approval. This change of opinion 
altered the course of the negotiations and proved a definite break from the US-position. This 
paved the way for UK joining the so-called Like-Minded group which advocated for a strong 
and independent Court. It continued in the Like-Minded Group until and through the Rome 
Conference. (Edlin 2006, 5) Wippman argues that the shift was an attempt to give effect to the 
ethical  foreign policy and responded to pressure from EU states to adhere to a common EU 
foreign and security policy point of view. In Rome, the UK’s human rights image and the pull 
of Europe trumped the UNSC and its ties with the US. (Wippman 2009, 167-8) 
UK’s support of the ICC started in practice in November 199833 when the UK signed the 
Rome Statute and ratified it in October 2001. Upon ratification, Foreign Secretary Jack 
Straw34 characterized the ICC as one of the boldest steps in achieving humanitarian justice 
and emphasized the UK as “an enthusiastic supporter” of the Court. (Government News 2001) 
Betti analyses that the UK invoked the norm of international criminal responsibility when it 
adopted the Rome Statute to its national legislation and sees reasons for invoking the norm in 
                                               
33 Another example of support was the case General Pinochet, Chile’s former military leader. The UK 
House of Lords ruled that Pinochet could not claim immunity from the jurisdiction of UK. The 
Pinochet case has become a landmark case. (Sands 2003) 
34 Jack Straw succeeded Robin Cook as  the Foreign Secretary at  the start  of  the Blair  Government’s  
second term in the summer of 2001. (BBC 2001) 
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British party politics at the time. (Betti 2001, 3) However, during the past decade the UK’s 
conviction  to  the  ICC has  been  suspected.  One  reason  has  to  do  with  the  already  discussed  
US-UK ‘special’ relationship and so-called Article 98 Agreements. In 2002, the UK, together 
with Italy and Spain secured a deal that allowed EU member states to enter in to Article 98 
Agreements with the US 35 . (McGoldrick, Rowe and Donnelly 2004, 424-429) Amnesty 
International accused the UK of betraying its commitment to the ICC. Human Rights Watch 
similarly named the deal as a “betrayal by the Blair Government of its earlier support” and as 
“ill-considered and damagingly effective”. (Black 2002) The UK justified its actions with 
realpolitik practicalities: the failure of reaching agreements with the US could endanger the 
UN’s peacekeeping operations, as the US could veto them in the Security Council if it saw 
that its soldiers were put in risk. (Black 2002)  
The UK has also been criticized due to financial reasons. The ICC’s proposed budget increase 
of over 13 percent for 2012 was met with reluctance by the largest donor countries, UK 
included. The Court is in need for more funds to take on the cases of Libya and Cote d’Ivoire. 
CICC’s William Pace accused the UK of political hypocrisy, since it supported ICC’s 
involvement  in  Libya  but  then  was  reluctant  to  increase  the  Court’s  budget  so  that  it  could  
actually do its work. (Corey-Boulet 2011) In 2006, an official who took part in the 1998 
Rome negotiations described the UK position as one that has moved from support to 
“somewhere between neutral and buyer’s remorse”. (Waugaman 2006, 4) One reason for this 
might in the changes in government: whereas Cook was personally an enthusiastic supporter 
of the ICC, Straw and others who followed have expressed less zeal towards the Court. 
(Waugaman 2006, 4)   
Other reasons for criticism stem from the general problems associated with international 
criminal law, its institutions and states. With the ICC, a substantive amount of money has 
been spent but it does not show in the results. The ICC’s credibility as a strong enforcement 
institution has suffered as Sudan’s President al-Bashir continues to travel despite an ICC 
indictment. (The Economist 2011; McCormick 2012) The most crucial criticisms for this 
context, however, are the intertwined accusations of imperialism and selectivity. Although 
they do not strictly pertain to the focus of this thesis, they provide for a more thorough 
understanding of the issues surrounding the debates in the House of Commons. 
                                               
35 A US-UK Bilateral Immunity Agreement is under consideration. The UK has signed a “Side Letter” 
in which it confirms that it will not extradite US citizens to the ICC. (CICC 2009)  
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Fundamentally, these problems arise from the influence of politics on international law. 
Christie notes that since Nuremberg, political influence and the issue of victor’s justice that 
flows from that poses one of the greatest threats to international criminal trials and institutions. 
(Christie 2010-2011, 382) Both the ICC and the exercise of universal jurisdiction need to be 
viewed in the context of an international society where states belong to different classes and 
vary in power and influence. Such a divide cannot simply be solved by creating an 
international criminal court. (Stephen 2012, 57) Griffiths (the chief defence counsel for 
Charles Taylor36) illustrates this point well: “The requirement of international justice is not 
the raison d’ etre of the International Criminal Court at all. Instead, the court acts as a 
vehicle for its primarily European funders, of which the UK is one of the largest, to exert their 
power and influence, particularly in Africa”. (Griffiths 2012a)  
This aptly captures one of the chief dilemmas of the ICC. Despite having 121 State Parties to 
date, 33 being African nations, the ICC has suffered legitimacy problems and has been 
viewed as anything but universal. The ICC’s legitimacy and standing in the eyes of African 
nations has declined especially after the indictment of President al-Bashir in 2009. (Mills 
2012, 423-5)  Monbiot, one of the starkest critics of the West’s record with international law, 
states bluntly: “International law remains an imperial project, in which only the crimes 
committed by vassal states are punished”. (Monbiot  2012)  When  it  comes  to  international  
trials, the ICC and the Western states are often accused of being selective. Stephen notes that 
the ICC too needs to be assessed not only by the cases it handles, but also by the cases that it 
does not. The ICC remains pervaded by partiality and selectivity. (Stephen 2012, 88-9) The 
selectivity criticism looks even more somber in light of a statement by Foreign Secretary 
Cook in BBC’s Newsnight in 2000: “If I may say so, this is not a court set up to bring to book 
prime ministers of the United Kingdom  or presidents of the United States”. (Griffiths 2012b)  
The  dissatisfaction  in  the  ICC  becomes  evident  for  example  by  the  demands  of  bringing  to  
justice Prime Minister Blair and President Bush for the 2003 war in Iraq. Responsible for the 
most recent and well publicized reproach is Desmond Tutu, who demanded that Blair and 
Bush should face the consequences of their actions in The Hague. (Tutu 2012; see also The 
Herald 2011; Grundy 2012; Arrest Blair 2012; Bush to the Hague 2012) Furthermore, the fact 
that the crime of aggression is missing from the ICC’s jurisdiction has caused skepticism. As 
Griffiths points out,  the awkward truth is  that  this crime, that  is  now supposedly difficult  to 
                                               
36Charles Taylor was convicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone for crimes against humanity and 
other violations of international humanitarian law for his involvement in Sierra Leone’s civil war. See 
SCSL 2012.  
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define, is the one that provided the foundation for the Nuremberg trials. More to the point, 
it certainly has not been Africans who have benefited from the inability to find a definition for 
the crime of aggression. (Griffiths 2012b) In light of Afghanistan and Iraq, it does not surprise 
that aggression as a crime was missing from the ICC’s jurisdiction. 
Proponents of the ICC point to the Court’s achievements and ideals. Fatou Bensouda, the 
ICC’s Chief Prosecutor since 2012, has criticized the focus on the words of the few powerful, 
when the real emphasis should be on the millions of victims in Africa. Bensouda has stressed 
the Court as a shield for the powerless, not a club for the powerful. (Smith 2012b) Sands, (in 
quite a pragmatic legalist way at that), commends the ICC and international courts for doing a 
good job in difficult circumstances. Although not able to eradicate crime altogether, they 
make  a  difference.  More  time should  be  given  for  further  development:  the  hope  is  that  the  
current difficulties will prove to be only “teething problems”. (Sands 2012) 
Selectivity and accusations of imperialism of the ICC stand as obstacles to the Court’s success 
now and in the future. The impartiality and fairness of international criminal law is the goal 
that is often trumped by the realities of power and politics. As Megret argues, there is more to 
the reluctance of proceeding with international trials; in the background there are “deeper 
misgivings” over the concept of international criminal justice and the potential risks seeking 
justice can have on fragile situations and peace processes. (Megret 2002, 1272)  
This part has provided a deeper understanding of the context in which the ICC exists and 
which surrounds the UK’s relationship with it. The UK’s actions concerning international 
trials can be seen to reflect the values of the human rights and atrocities regimes and legalism 
that have taken hold in international relations. The UK’s aim to promote human rights 
through an ethical foreign policy and its support for the international trials point to an 
influence the structure that surrounds policy- and decision-making has had on the UK’s 
actions  and  behaviour.  The  turn  is  now  made  to  the  analysis  of  the  UK’s  statements  to  
identify and illustrate arguments and argumentation strategies. 
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4. Rhetorical Analysis  
As stated in the end of chapter 2, rhetorical analysis is useful when the aim is to uncover the 
reasoning behind actions. By adopting a constructivist view, it is accepted that actor’s actions 
and behaviour are influenced by the structures that surround them. At the foundation of 
actions and particular behaviour are reasons for acting in that certain way. The analysis of 
arguments and their substance can help to identify the reasons that underlie actions.  
Rhetorical analysis is a qualitative method of research. According to Foss, it is “designed for 
the systematic investigation and explanation of symbolic acts and artifacts for the purpose of 
understanding rhetorical processes”. (Foss 2004, 6) Rhetorical analysis does not form one, 
coherent method for analysis. Charland notes that rhetoric is “not a discipline”; instead, it 
“”hangs together” as a domain of knowledge even though it does not cohere conceptually”. 
(Charland 2003, 116) Thus, definitions of what rhetoric is also abound, as is discussed below. 
Rhetorical analysis can help to uncover how actors argue; in this case, what kind of arguments 
the UK has put forward in the ICC’s support. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce 
rhetorical analysis as a research method. The first part concentrates on introducing rhetoric 
and its definitions; its historical origins; and the last part is devoted to the review of some 
previous research. A discussion of argumentation analysis by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
follows this.  
4.1 Rhetoric: Definitions, History and Approaches 
There is no one, agreed upon definition of rhetoric and definitions can include or exclude 
different things. Since there is no acceptance on the concept, there is also no one accepted 
definition of rhetorical analysis. (Selzer 2004, 279-280) Consequently, there are various ways 
of conducting rhetorical analysis depending on one’s views on rhetoric, its meaning, its use 
and the purpose and the focus of the research itself. This part introduces some understandings 
of rhetoric and its analysis. 
4.1.1 Definitions of Rhetoric 
Language has traditionally taken to be at the heart of rhetoric and rhetorical analysis. Whereas 
the focus used to be more on how to speak or write effectively and persuasively, recently 
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rhetoric has been used as a means to interpret objects. Therefore, it can be both the study of 
language and the study of how language is used. (Selzer 2004, 280)37  
The word rhetoric has its origins in the Greek word rh?toric?, which means the “art of 
oratory”. (Oxford English Dictionary 2010) Rhetoric is often thought of as an art in the way 
of using and deploying language. Plato38 referred to rhetoric as “the art of winning the soul by 
discourse”. (Stanford University 2011) According to Aristotle’s well-known definition, 
rhetoric refers to “the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of 
persuasion”. (Aristotle 1992, 2155) In Aristotle’s view, everyone needs rhetoric when dealing 
with a public audience especially as the topics that are usually discussed in the public forum 
are not matters of precise knowledge, but ones that are uncertain. The ability to have an effect 
on somebody is not so much a matter of knowledge as it is of persuasiveness. (Rapp 2010) 
Thus, the purpose of using rhetoric is usually taken to be the persuasion of one’s listeners. 
Many definitions of rhetoric emphasize both the role of language and the aim of influencing 
on someone in some way. For Herrick, rhetoric has been seen as a way “for gaining 
compliance”. (Herrick 2005, 3) Selzer speaks of the use of rhetoric when “people within 
specific social situations attempt to influence others through language”. (Selzer 2004 281) 
One of the grand rhetorical theorists, Kenneth Burke, sees persuasion and language as integral 
parts of rhetoric when he defines it as “the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing 
cooperation”. (Burke 1950, 43)  
Perhaps in some part due to its inherent aim to persuade, for some rhetoric entails negative 
connotations. People often refer to something being “just” rhetoric and many see that when 
someone uses rhetoric, nothing concrete or truthful is really said at all. 39 John Locke has 
expressed a rather explicit distaste towards rhetoric:“[…] all the artificial and figurative 
application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong 
ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment; and so indeed are perfect 
cheats...”. (Locke 1690, Book 3, Chapter X, paragraph 34)  
For Locke, the widespread use of rhetoric, the expansion of professors who teach it and its 
reputation were testaments to the fact that men “love to deceive and be deceived”. (Locke 
                                               
37 This is not to say that other objects than texts cannot be used as sources.  For rhetorical analysis of 
for example videos, movies and songs, see Foss 1994; Herrick 2005, 6-7. 
38 Plato was rather critical towards rhetoric; see for example Griswold 2009.  
39 Politicians are often seen as using rhetoric in a negative way. See for example Barnett 2009. 
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1690, Book 3, Chapter X, paragraph 34) Locke’s perceptions on rhetoric and the negative 
attributes he saw it to entail are still visible in the way rhetoric is commonly viewed nowadays.  
To recap, behind rhetoric is the attempt to persuade the other(s) of the rightness of one’s own 
arguments. Herrick distinguishes between four resources with which persuasion can be sought; 
arrangement (the planned ordering of a message); aesthetics (elements that add form and 
beauty to expression); and arguments and appeals. (Herrick 2005, 13-14) The emphasis here 
is on arguments. An argument takes place when a conclusion is supported by reasons and can 
be defined as “reasoning made public with the goal of influencing an audience”. (Herrick 
2005, 13) Rhetorical analysis thus is a useful tool to analyse argumentation, in this case that in 
the UK House of Commons. Next, history of rhetoric is shortly introduced. 
4.1.2 Historical Origins  
The interest in the study of rhetoric dates back to ancient Greece and Rome. When rhetoric 
developed in Greece around 450 B.C it was used as a practical art in the civic discussions of 
Athens.  The  origins  were  similar  in  Rome  but  by  the  first  century  B.C  rhetoric  became  the  
dominant discipline in the Roman educational system. According to Vickers, rhetoric gained 
success in Rome and Greece because of its power over human minds and its ability to affect 
one’s beliefs. (Vickers 1993, 101-102) The classical thinkers took great interest in the study 
of rhetoric. Aristotle’s Rhetoric is still regarded as one of the most influential works done on 
rhetoric and the “Aristotelian doctrine” had its effect on teachers of rhetoric such as Cicero 
and Quintilian. (Rapp 2010) The teachers of rhetoric became known as the Sophists and 
offered the Greeks education in the “arts of verbal discourse”. (Herrick 2005, 33) The 
Sophists as a group consisted of teachers, speechwriters and professional speakers, whose 
principal aim was the teaching of persuasive discourse. The idea was that by mastering 
persuasion, one can rise above others. This was mainly seen to be achieved through teaching 
dialectic, where one was able to argue for either side of the case. (Herrick 2005, 34-39) 
Fascination towards rhetoric continued through the eras of Christian Europe, the Renaissance 
and Enlightment. (Herrick 2005, 122-197) After that interest in subject, however, started to 
wane. Luciates and Condit note that the study of rhetoric by no means disappeared altogether 
in the post-Enlightment and modernist eras but that its “”significance was related to the 
margins” in Western intellectual thought and it was often termed as the “Harlot of the Arts”. 
(Luciates and Condit 1999, 6) Towards the end of the 19th century the status of rhetoric as an 
interesting and worthy object of study continued its steady deterioration and by the 20th 
century interest in the topic had reached an all-time low. (Herrick 2005, 198) At that time, it 
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was the scientific methods of research that gained premise as the most suitable and valued 
ways to conduct research. Attention soon turned, however, towards the rising need to 
understand and investigate human motivation, or how people or politicians rise to power, for 
which science and scientific standards did not provide tools. It was acknowledged that science 
itself had in many ways something to do with rhetoric; the dominant theory was usually the 
one presented in the most persuasive way. (Herrick 2005, 198-199) From approximately the 
1950’s onwards many works now regarded as classics were published and rhetoric gained 
back some of its lost popularity. Hauser started his 1986 book on rhetorical theory by noting 
that “The study of rhetoric is currently enjoying a renaissance”. (Hauser 1986, ix) The next 
part gives an overview of some of the central approaches to the study of rhetoric.  
4.1.3 Approaches to Rhetoric 
Rhetorical analysis is not a strict method but comprises of various different ways with which 
to  conduct  analysis.  It  thus  offers  a  rich  array  from  which  to  choose  the  tools  for  analysis.  
(Foss 2004; Luciates, Condit and Caudill 1999) For example, Ritter’s and Medhurst’s edited 
volume analyses the rhetoric of political speeches of US presidents. (Ritter and Medhurst 
2003) Schimmelfennig explains and analyses EU enlargement through rhetoric action, the 
strategic use of arguments to persuade others. (Schimmelfennig 2003) In a more particular 
treatment, Krebs and Jackson problematize the concept of persuasion. The authors contend 
that mechanisms of persuasion rest on a strong specification of the subjective motivations of 
individuals and this makes persuasion mechanisms difficult to trace methodologically. As an 
alternative, Krebs and Jackson propose a model of rhetorical coercion. When arguing, actors 
have to attempt to argue in a way that leaves no rhetorical material for their opponents to use, 
needed for an effective counterargument. If an actor succeeds in this, rhetorical coercion has 
taken place. The model is tested on one case, the efforts of Druze Arabs in Israel to gain 
greater citizenship rights. (Krebs and Jackson 2007, 37) 
Herrick notes Kenneth Burke as one of the most influential rhetorical theorists in the 20th 
century and points to his rhetorical work in philosophy, religion, political science and 
literature as being crucially influential and fundamental. (Herrick 2005, 223) Burke’s 
methodology can in general be termed as dramatism and he studies all symbolic action as a 
play, even if the discourse in question has no explicit narratives of fictionalities; the metaphor 
of drama roots Burkean study. (Brummet 1999, 480) Burke is famous for his treatment of 
identification. Burke saw that one of the central problems in society is alienation and 
separation of people, to which rhetoric could provide the answer. The aim was to bring people 
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together with symbolic means. For example, a politician could claim to be a farm boy him 
or herself when talking to farmers. Another central contribution of Burke’s is his dramatistic 
pentad, which refers to rhetorical situations according to five elements. (Herrick 2005, 223-8) 
Herrick notes that the “use of strategic language” was for Burke the very essence of human 
social existence and in this, rhetoric formed the “a kind of verbal magic that created meaning 
and reality out of the immateriality of the world”. (Herrick 2005, 230) 
Another  influential  work  has  been  that  of  Lloyd  Bitzer.  In  his  1986  article  The  Rhetorical  
Situation, Bitzer argued that rhetorical discourse becomes rhetorical through the context it is 
in. For Bitzer it is clear that rhetoric is situational; rhetorical discourse “does obtain its 
character-as-rhetorical from the situation which generates it.” (Bitzer 1968, 3) Three 
elements define a rhetorical situation. The exigence is an “imperfection marked by urgency”; 
an obstacle and something that needs to be modified and modified through discourse. (Bitzer 
1968, 6) Audience is the second element and Bitzer emphasized that not all persons are part of 
the audience of a rhetorical situation. To be part of the audience, the ability to persuade the 
person listening needs to be present. Lastly, there are in constraints rhetorical situations; 
persons,  events,  objects  and  relations  that  have  the  ability  to  constrain  the  actions  that  are  
taken to modify the exigence. (Bitzer 1968, 8) Herrick notes that Bitzer’s theorizing proved a 
very useful tool for assessing different rhetorical events and has been widely used and cited 
since40. (Herrick 2005, 232) 
Other influential works were conducted concerning argumentation. Herrick notes that “One of 
the important accomplishments of the twentieth-century rhetorical studies has been to 
examine and provide a means of discussing the structure of everyday argumentations”. 
(Herrick 2005, 1999) In addition to the work of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Stephen 
Toulmin’s work has been influential in this area. 
Toulmin’s still much used The Uses of Argument was first published in 1958. Although 
Toulmin notes that not all arguments are made in defence, it is such arguments that the most 
interesting: justificatory arguments that are brought forward to support assertions. The 
structures of these arguments, the merits they claim and also the ways arguments are graded, 
assesses and criticized could then be analyzed. This, Toulmin argued, is the primary function 
of arguments. (Toulmin 2003, 12) For analysis, Toulmin introduced the concept of argument 
fields and saw that arguments belong to the same field when they can be compared and 
                                               
40 Not all agree. Vatz for example has criticized Bitzer’s understanding of the rhetorical situation. See 
Vatz 1973; Vatz 2009. 
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judged by similar criteria. To this, Toulmin added modal qualifiers, referring to words that 
indicate confidence in a conclusion (such as must). These were brought together in Toulmin’s 
famous argumentation model; an argumentation consists of a claim or conclusion, data 
(evidence), a warrant (generalization), backing for the warrant, rebuttals (potential conditions) 
and modal qualifiers. (Herrick 2005, 205-207; Toulmin 2003, 97) Toulmin’s model has 
attracted such wide interests because it allowed the analysis of everyday arguments and their 
components and the model made it possible to evaluate the rationality of everyday arguments. 
(Herrick 2005, 207) 
Rhetoric is an interesting and versatile object of study. Theorists have identified different 
things one is to look for when conducting a rhetorical analysis. Depending on one’s views, 
focus and goals, a rhetorical analysis can concentrate on finding and identifying different 
themes. The review offered here has represented only a small glance in to the ways in which 
rhetoric has been treated.41 The next part introduces the mechanism used here.  
4.2 Argumentation and Arguments: Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
Finlayson points to a puzzling lack of interest towards rhetoric within political science and its 
use in analyses of government. (Finlayson 2004; Finlayson 2009) Krebs and Jackson note the 
same and wonder why rhetoric has not been at the centre of international relations studies. 
(Krebs and Jackson 2007, 36) Finlayson makes the case for the centrality of arguments; 
according to him, focus “ought to be not ideas but arguments: their formation, effects and 
fate in the activity known as persuading.” (Finlayson 2007, 552) Indeed, speeches and 
statements made in politics make an ideal case for the study of rhetoric. As Perelman notes, in 
political debates “orators defend opposing theses and seek, by their speech, to win the support 
of the audience to which they address themselves”. (Perelman 1984, 129-130) Next, the 
argumentation techniques put forth by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca are introduced.  
4.2.1. The Foundations of New Rhetoric 
Frank has characterized Perelman’s and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s new rhetoric as “perhaps the most 
influential system of rhetoric of the twentieth century”. (Frank 2003, 253) The new rhetoric 
project, which includes articles, books and conferences, culminated in the 1958 publishing of 
The New Rhetoric: Treatise in Argumentation. Behind the project was the authors’ wish to in 
a  way  heal  the  wounds  that  the  horrors  of  the  Second  World  War  left  on  Europe.  Through  
                                               
41 For more, see Herrick 2004; Johnstone and Eisenhart 2008. 
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fostering ‘contact of minds’, they hoped to reconstruct civil society and show the utility of 
reasoning over violence to settle disagreements. (Frank 2004, 267)  
The  founding  assumption  of  Perelman’s  and  Olbrechts-Tyteca’s  is  that  no  claim  is  self-
evidently true, meaning that resorting to absolutes such as God will not be enough to sustain 
arguments about important issues. Propositions of value could only be tested and established 
as reasonable or lacking merit through a process of public argumentation. Thus, they 
concentrate on categorizing the different types of arguments that can be found in everyday 
discourse and how those arguments achieve their effects. (Herrick 2005, 200)  
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca place great emphasis on the audience. According to them, all 
argumentation in essence “aims at gaining the adherence of minds” and thus in turn means 
that argumentation also assumes that there exists an “intellectual contact”. (Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 14) This they link to the wish of the ‘contact of minds’ and note that 
“It is not enough for a man to speak or write; he must also be listened to or read”. (Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 17) Thus, argumentation needs the audience as an object. They 
distinguish between two types of audiences; universal and particular. The universal audience 
is comprised of the whole mankind, or at least of all ‘normal’ adults. Of particular audiences, 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca mention two different types. The second audience consists of 
one  person,  an  interlocutor,  who  takes  part  in  the  given  dialogue.  The  third  audience  is  the  
speaker himself, when he deliberates and explains for himself the reasons for his actions. 
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 30) The particular audience is particular in that its 
composition is known to the speaker and thus, appeals can be made to its particular interests. 
The point of dividing between universal and particular audiences is to differentiate between 
logic-based  argumentation  and  argumentation  which  appeals  to  emotions.  To  persuade  a  
particular audience, the speaker argues by appealing to the audience’s interests and tendencies. 
(Herrick 2005, 201)  
The universal audience is defined by an individual himself. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
state: “Everyone constitutes the universal audience from what he knows of his fellow men, in 
such a way as to transcend the few oppositions he is aware of”. (Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca 1969, 33) In order to compose sound arguments, a speaker should look beyond 
persuading only the immediate audience and instead consider how a wider, imagined audience 
of rational individuals would respond to the argument. The imagined, universal audience is 
also not subject to the limitations and biases particular audiences are limited to. A rational 
speaker will seek to conform to principles of action that are acceptable to everyone, thus 
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seeking to find common basis that transcends differences. Reasoning to a universal 
audience should be rationally compelling, self-evident and timeless. (Herrick 2005, 202) 
For  a  successful  argument,  the  speaker  and  the  audience  need  to  share  some  common  
understandings (similar to this is Habermaas’ ‘common lifeworld, discussed in Chapter 2) 
Perelman  and  Olbrechts-Tyteca  term  these  as  the  starting  points  of  arguments,  which  are  
points of agreement shared by the speaker and the audience. There are two points; those that 
concern the real (facts, truths and presumptions); and those that concern the preferable (values, 
hierarchies and arguments relating to the preferable). (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 
65-67) Perelman notes that the aim of argumentation is “to transfer to the conclusion the 
adherence accorded to the premises”, which can be accomplished through “the establishment 
of  a  bond  between  the  premises  and  the  theses  whose  acceptance  the  speaker  wants  to  
achieve”. (Perelman 1984, 21) If the conclusion runs, he continues, totally counter to the 
audience’s convictions and ideas the audience will in all likelihood reject the speaker’s 
argument. (Perelman 1984, 21) 
Winkelman uses Perelman’s and Olbrecht-Tyteca’s concept of the universal audience to study 
US opposition to the ICC through speeches and statements made in the US Congress in 2000 
and argues that international justice presents a collective value. Winkelman argues that 
international justice was much used in the Congressional debates and continues by asserting 
that international justice is a value collectively held by a universal audience. Moreover, 
debates that are embedded in human rights rhetoric acknowledge the concept of international 
justice and thus create the momentum for institutions such as the ICC. (Winkelman 2009, 18-
26) Embedding arguments in such a context is important, since “In order for specific courts 
to be legitimized collectively […] they must adhere to transnational metanarratives that 
communicate universal norms, value systems and international justice”. (Winkelman 2009, 
25) The ICC has “rhetorical precedent” in the ICTY, ICTR and other international trials, 
which provide references the collective of people can consider and apply and create an 
imagined community that transcends the differences between states and their publics. 
(Winkelman 2009, 27) Concerning the ICC, the starting point for the argumentation could be 
seen to be international justice and within it, the hope of breaking the culture of impunity; the 
increasing number of the trials and tribunals established to reach such an end can be seen as 
testament to this aim. Whether the ICC is the most suitable for advancing this is then 
contested.  
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Overall, Perelman’s and Olbrecht-Tyteca’s New Rhetoric introduces techniques which one 
making an argument can use to argue his or her point. Of this, Summa notes that the authors 
emphasize the availability of different techniques. Whereas logic- based argumentation 
concentrates on identifying the premises, conclusions and the reasoning between the two, 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca point to myriad of ways with which an argument can be made, 
ranging from metaphors and analogies to examples. Thus, the assertiveness and force of an 
argument depends not on the logical structure of the argument, but on the extent to which the 
techniques used by the speaker seem compelling to the audience. (Summa 1998, 71)42 These 
techniques are discussed next. 
4.2.2 Argumentation Techniques by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
Perelman’s and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s argument can be divided first to two main groups; 
associative and dissociative arguments.  Associative arguments can then be further divided to 
three main categories; quasi-logical arguments; arguments based on the structure of reality; 
and arguments establishing the structure of reality. Furthermore, within these categories 
different techniques of arguing can then be identified43. (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 
185-459) 
Quasi-logical arguments are such that “claim to be similar to the formal reasoning of logics or 
mathematics” and they are characterized by their “nonformal character and the effort of 
thought which is required to formalize” them. (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 193) 
Arguments are quasi-logical when they seem to partake in formal or mathematical reasoning; 
and  they  are  quasi-logical  in  that  they  are  nonformal  reasonings  of  everyday  affairs.  
Arguments of formal reasoning point to formal relationships between pieces of information 
and that makes them compelling. These can be based on contradictions; identity or difference; 
reciprocity; or transitivity. (Hauser 1986, 182-3) Arguments of mathematical reasoning are 
based on mathematical relations and include arguments that are based on inclusion of the part 
in the whole; division of the whole into its parts; comparison; sacrifice; and probabilities. 
(Hauser 1986, 183) 
Of the second category, arguments based on the structure of reality, Perelman notes: “As soon 
as elements of reality are associated with each other in a recognized liaison, it is possible to 
use  this  liaison  as  the  basis  for  an  argumentation  which  allows  us  to  pass  from  what  is  
                                               
42 Free translation from Finnish by author.  
43 The discussion here is informed by the illustrative tables by Hauser. (Hauser 1986, 183-185) 
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accepted to what we wish to have accepted.” (Perelman 1984, 81) These arguments use 
what people take to be real to build a bridge to a new assertion one wants to support. (Hauser 
1986, 185) The central characteristic here is thus that they have such a firm basis in reality 
that it is not challenged. These can be divided to two categories; those basing on sequential 
relations  and  those  basing  on  relations  of  coexistence.  Their  difference  is  on  the  level;  in  
sequential relations the terms that are brought together are “on the same phenomenal plane”, 
whereas those of coexistence bring together two realities not on the same level, “one of them 
being more basic and more explanatory than the other”. (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 
293) Arguments of sequential relations can be based on causal links; pragmatic arguments; 
waste; direction; or unlimited development. Here, attention is directed to the order of events. 
Arguments of coexistence can be a relationship of a person and act; group and its members; 
act and essence; symbolic relation; or degree and order. (Hauser 1986, 185-6) 
The third category of arguments establishes the structure of reality. These arguments are often 
used  in  situations  where  there  is  a  disagreement  over  the  rules  that  describe  the  world.  The  
effectiveness of these arguments is based on the premise that persons engaged in an argument 
are willing to solve their differences. Arguments of this kind can be examples; illustrations; 
models; or analogies. (Hauser 1986, 185-6) These are used to make generalizations or already 
established generalizations are highlighted by particular cases. As Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca describe, a particular case “as an example, it makes generalization possible; as an 
illustration, it provides support for an already established regularity; as a model, it encourages 
imitation”. (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 350) Analogies, on the other hand, draw 
relationships between two separate things, most commonly characterized as A is to B as C is 
to D. Analogies bring in a fifth technique: the metaphor. According to Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, metaphors are condensed analogies, which take a word or a phrase from its 
original meaning to describe something else. (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 372- 398) 
Lastly, there are dissociative arguments. Dissociation aims at “separating elements which 
language or a recognized tradition have previously tied together”. (Perelman 1984, 47) 
Whereas in associative arguments links are forged and elements are made interdependent, 
dissociative arguments oppose such interdependence and this opposition will be made by 
refusing to recognize that a link considered to have been accepted or one that was hoped for 
exists between elements. (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 411) The prototype of such a 
dissociation, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca argue, is the pairing appearance (term I) – reality 
(term  II).  Term  I  corresponds  to  what  occurs  in  the  first  instance  and  to  what  is  actual,  
immediate and known directly. Term II can then be understood through comparing it to term I; 
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it is both normative and explanatory. Because these are central in the field of philosophy, 
they are termed “philosophical pairs”. These pairings can also be distinguished, amongst 
others, between relative – absolute; theory – practice; or particular – general. (Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 415-420) 
Rhetorical analysis is a useful tool for studying language (and other objects as well). As there 
is no one, agreed upon way to conduct a rhetorical analysis, one can choose from a variety of 
tools method. One such a way is identified by Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca in 
their New Rhetoric. They identified four categories of argumentation that can be used to argue 
one’s point and within these, various techniques with which an argument can be made. These 
argumentation techniques are used to analyze the sources here, debates concerning the ICC in 
the UK House of Commons.  
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5. Sources and Analysis 
In this chapter, debates in the UK House of Commons are analysed to answer the research 
question set in Chapter 1: “How did the United Kingdom’s Government representatives and 
other Members of Parliament argue their support for the International Criminal Court?” 
Analyzed are the debates in the House of Commons 1998 – 2001 concerning the UK’s ICC 
Bill and arguments made in support of the ICC. The division of stand points during the 
debates is quite clear; the Labour, Labour Co-operative and Liberal Democrats being in favor 
of the ICC and the Conservative members forming the Opposition. The focus is on the UK’s 
arguments in support of the ICC before it was actually established. The arguments are 
considered within the theoretical framework of legalization, the atrocities and human rights 
regimes and constructivism and the different logics of action. To identify different 
argumentation strategies and to analyze how the ICC was supported, Perelman’s and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s methods for analyzing arguments are used.  
Finlayson and Martin note that “British political leaders spend much of their time doing 
something else: talking.” (Finlayson and Martin 2008, 445)  They make the argument for 
wider use of the study of speech and rhetoric in UK politics. To highlight the possibilities 
such an analysis can offer, the authors take on a speech by Tony Blair and point to the 
usefulness of analyzing political rhetoric. (Finlayson and Martin 2008, 445-446) In a similar 
vein, Smith and Smith argue for the use of rhetorical strategies to analyze the manifestos of 
UK  Conservative,  Labour  and  Liberal  Democrat  Parties.  The  authors  emphasize  that  the  
manifestos should be analyzed as rhetorical texts, so reliant the parties are on manifestos. 
Through analyzing the texts’ iconic structure and narratives the authors found that all parties 
focused on economical and historical issues. (Smith and Smith, 2000, 457-459) Thus, it seems 
that debates in the British parliament can offer a suitable and rich source for analysis.  
This Chapter proceeds as follows. First, the sources are introduced. The second part identifies 
the Opposition’s main arguments.  Part  3 discusses five main themes of argumentation in the 
ICC’s support identified from the debates. Part 4 concludes this Chapter by discussing the 
argumentation in light of the theoretical framework.  
5.1. Overview on Sources 
The ICC Bill was passed in the UK in 2001 and incorporated the Rome Statute’s provision to 
UK national law. The matter was debated in both the House of Commons and Lords. 
Legislation was needed so that the UK could ratify the Rome Statute and its provisions could 
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become part of UK national law. A Draft ICC Bill was issued by the Blair government in 
August 2000. It was introduced to the Parliament in December 2000 and then debated in the 
spring of 2001. The Bill was passed by the House of Commons on April 3rd and came into 
force in September 2001.  (Betti 2001, 4; The National Archives 2012)  
The arguments analyzed here are those made during the debates in the House of Commons 
between July 1998 and May 2001. The issue was mainly discussed in spring 2001 and thus 
this period provides the most sources for analysis. Considered here are the debates in the 
House of Commons and Standing Committee sittings (hereinafter Committee), a Public Bill 
Committee comprised of representatives of the main parties, which was set to debate the ICC 
Bill in detail. This Committee held its last sitting on May 10th 2001. Including only House of 
Commons debates was done to form a coherent group of sources and limit the amount of 
material. Statements made in support of the ICC, by Labour, Liberal Democrat and Labour 
Co-operative MPs are analyzed by using the techniques of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. 
Opposing arguments by the Conservative Party are provided to identify the other side of the 
argumentation  process  and  to  give  a  fuller  understanding  of  the  debate  but  do  not  form  the  
data for the actual analysis.  Only debates where the ICC Bill was the main issue under 
consideration and thus debated in length are included: where the ICC Bill is mentioned in 
written statements or only shortly referred to when discussing other matters are not considered 
in this analysis.44  
Through these criteria, five points of debates are identified. First is the instance when Foreign 
Secretary Robin Cook announced to the House the results of the Rome Conference of on July 
20th 1998. Second, the Bill was under debate in October 1999, in connection to a debate 
concerning  the  Government’s  foreign  policy.  Third,  the  ICC  Bill  was  debated  in  length  on  
April 3rd 2001 when it was read for the second time in the House of Commons45. After that, 
the Bill was debated in detail by the Committee which held 10 sitting on five day between 
April 10th and May 10th. The fifth debate was held in the House of Commons when the debate 
in and results of the Committee was introduced to the whole House.  A list  of the sources is  
presented in Appendix 1.46  
                                               
44 A list of instances where the ICC Bill was mentioned can be found in: UK Parliament 2012a. 
45 When passing a Bill, it is first introduced (1st reading); then put to debate (2nd reading); debated in 
Committee; and then the amended version is introduced and reported (3rd reading). See UK Parliament 
2012b. 
46 All  sources  are  freely  available  from  the  UK  Parliament’s  website  and  have  been  obtained  from  
http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/commons/ 
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During the first three sittings of the whole of the House of Commons in 1998, 1999 and 
2001 the ICC and the UK’s ICC Bill were discussed in general terms and MPs expressed, on 
the main, their support for the ICC.47  The Committee sittings concentrated more on detailed 
scrutiny of the Bill and its provisions.48 The Committee dealt with both more substantial parts 
of  the  Bill  and  also  smaller  procedural  matters,  such  as  whether  arrest  warrants  can  be  
transmitted through e-mail (Standing Committee 2001e, 2.45 pm) and the proper language 
used when informing a person of his or her rights. (Standing Committee 2001g) During the 
last  debate,  which  were  held  in  the  whole  of  the  House  of  Commons  in  May 2001,  the  Bill  
was  read  for  the  Third  time,  the  work  done  in  the  Committee  was  reported  and  some  
amendments the Opposition wanted to bring before the whole House were discussed and 
voted on.49  
The ICC Bill was extensively debated in the House of Commons, both during sittings of the 
whole House and during sittings of the Committee. The debates in the House were more 
general in nature, whereas discussions in the Committee concentrated on particular parts of 
the proposed Bill. There can, however, be identified a number of overall, central themes that 
rise from all the debates. Two of those themes pertained more to the procedural traditions of 
the Parliament and its role in the legislative process than the ICC itself. Especially during the 
Committee  sittings,  Conservative  MP’s  expressed  frustration  of  not  being  able  to  affect  the  
Rome treaty itself and called for a wider role for the Parliament. (Standing Committee 2001d) 
Furthermore, the Conservative MPs criticized the hurried process with which the Bill was 
being pushed through the Parliament and accused the Government for wanting to pass the Bill 
before the general election which was to be held in May 2001. (Standing Committee 2001a, 
9.55-10.15 am) During the Report stage, Conservative MP Cheryl Gillan pointed to the long 
period of time between the Rome Treaty’s adoption and the ICC Bill’s introduction and 
argued that the Government should have given the Parliament more time to debate the Bill; 
now, the Government’s disregard to the legislation process was only reprehensible. (House of 
Common 2001b, vol. 368, col. 307-310) 
As these two themes do not pertain to the ICC per se but to the legislative process and 
traditions of the UK parliamentary system, they are not further discussed here. From the 
                                               
47 House of Commons 1998; House of Commons 1999; and House of Commons 2001a 
48  Standing Committee 2001a; Standing Committee 2001b; Standing Committee 2001c; Standing 
Committee 2001d; Standing Committee 2001e; Standing Committee 2001f; Standing Committee 
2001g; Standing Committee 2001h; Standing Committee 2001i; Standing Committee 2001j. 
49 House of Commons 2001b. 
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debates, 5 central themes of supportive arguments for the ICC and for ratifying the ICC Bill 
can be identified: 1) breaking the culture of impunity; 2) that the UK should be among the 
first 60 states to ratify the Rome Statute; 3) that the UK should lead by example; 4) that the 
ICC and the ICC Bill are a continuance to existing law: and 5) and that the ICC does not limit 
the UK’s sovereignty. These themes and argumentation techniques are each identified and 
analyzed in turn. First, however, the main arguments of the Opposition are introduced. 
5.2. Common Ground and Opposition’s Main Arguments 
As stated by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, the achievement of a ‘contact of minds’ requires 
both a speaker and a listener. In order to fully understand and follow the arguments put 
forward in support of the ICC, it is important to know what those arguments are an answer to. 
In addition, the parties also need to share some common understanding, starting points from 
which  the  arguments  can  be  advanced.  This  part  identifies  the  parties  to  the  debate,  their  
shared understandings and introduces the main arguments of the Opposition. 
5.2.1 Parties to the Debate and Common Ground 
The parties of to the debate can be divided to two: the supporters of the ICC Bill, which in 
general included Government representatives, Labour MPs, Labour Co-operative MPs and 
Liberal Democrats; and the Opposition, which consisted of the Conservative MPs.  Although 
the supporters of the ICC Bill and the Opposition disagreed on many issues, a common 
understanding as a starting point can be identified. As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca termed 
it, a starting point can concern either that what is real or that which is preferable. In the case 
of the ICC, the common understanding was the preferable: that the ICC and the ICC Bill are 
‘good things’ in principle.  It  was  the  practical  issues  that  were  disputed.  This  common  
understanding can be also characterized as what Risse referred to as a ‘common lifeworld’, 
which is a pre-requisite for argumentative rationality; that the parties to the debate have a 
shared culture, norms and rules that provide them with collective understandings, discussed in 
Chapter 2. The Opposition shared with the Government the premise that the ICC in itself is 
something that is good and preferred. This point was emphasized by the Opposition all 
through the debate. The central focus was that the ICC is a ‘good thing’ because its aim is to 
ensure that perpetrators of heinous crimes do not go unpunished. This comes across well in 
Conservative MP Gillan’s statement during the 1998 debate: “By creating an International 
Criminal Court, we hope that we can move towards a more humane and peaceful world in 
which there is no sanctuary for the despot, the dictator or the depraved.” (House of 
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Commons 1998, vol. 316, col. 806) In the debate on April 3rd 2001, the Shadow Foreign 
Secretary Francis Maude stated the premise as an imperative, as something that is and should 
be a shared by all: “We support the Bill in principle […] We welcome, as everybody must, 
measures that will allow those who have committed crimes against humanity to be brought to 
book. That is clearly common ground.” (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 224) 
Thus, the debate moved onwards from the shared premise that the ICC, in principle, is a good 
thing.  It  was  in  the  practical  effects  the  ICC  Bill  the  Opposition  saw  problems.  These  are  
identified next.  
5.2.2. “Do not trust the horse, Trojans”: Opposition’s Main Arguments 
All the oppositions main concerns relate to the possible ways in which the ICC and adopting 
the ICC Bill could affect the UK’s sovereignty and its actions on the international arena. To a 
large extent, these correspond to the concerns the US has over the ICC. Overall, the 
Opposition viewed the ICC with suspicion. Telling of this is the reference to the ICC as the 
Trojan  horse,  above,  which  was  quoted  by  Conservative  MP  Edward  Garnier.  (Standing  
Committee 2001g, 6.30 pm) In general, the Opposition saw dangers in ratifying the ICC’s 
Rome Statute and thus subjecting the UK to its jurisdiction. The core of the fear is in the 
sovereignty costs joining the ICC entails, referred to in previous chapters: by joining the ICC 
and  other  international  institutions,  states  run  the  risk  and  often  the  reality  of  curbing  their  
sovereignty over certain matters. MP Garnier put it bluntly when the Rome Statute’s 
complementarity principle was discussed in Committee “The statute and the Bill amount to a 
complete denial of our national sovereignty”. (Standing Committee 2001g, 10.45 am) 
 This underlies all of the three main lines of argument, closely connected but slightly different 
in emphasis: 1) lack of control over the ICC; 2) UK personnel and operations abroad are 
negatively affected; and 3) the UK should shield its personnel from the ICC’s jurisdiction 
over war crimes. 
First, The Opposition viewed the ICC with suspicion because the way in which the ICC will 
function and behave in the future is unknown; and should the ICC behave in way not expected 
by the UK, the UK does not have enough control over the Court. This became clear from the 
Opposition’s arguments all through the debates about the ICC in general and in the more 
particular arguments concerning one, the ICC’s prosecutor, and second, the other state parties 
to the ICC.  
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Conservative MP Nicholas Lyell expressed his serious concerns in the House of Commons 
in 2001 over the fact that the ICC Bill “hands international jurisdiction to the world at large” 
and results in the UK’s loss of control. (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 250) 
Conservative  MP Crispin  Blunt  warned  of  the  ICC:  “We cannot  just  have  blind  faith  that  it  
will work in the way that we hope […] e must bear the burden of responsibility to the citizens 
of the United Kingdom if the institution goes wrong”. (Standing Committee 2001d, 4.30 pm) 
In  a  later  sitting,  MP  Blunt  expressed  concern  that  the  ICC  could  go  “sour  very  quickly”.  
(Standing Committee 2001h, 5.30 pm)  
The Opposition’s central point was that since the ICC does not yet exists, the UK cannot 
know how the ICC will behave once it starts its work. Closely connected to this was the ICC’s 
structure. The Opposition was concerned about the ICC’s procedural matters and about the 
prosecutor and the judges of the Court,  seen as a possible threat to the UK. Central  was the 
danger of a misbehaving prosecutor who would target the UK over actions it itself deems 
justified.  Blunt  envisaged  a  scenario  of  a  “prosecutor  who had,  in  effect,  gone  bad  and  was  
bringing prosecutions against countries which should not be brought.” (House of Commons 
2001a, vol. 366, col. 320)  
Overall, the Opposition saw it as unacceptable that the UK as a major power in international 
relations would not have overriding control of the ICC and its personnel. Conservative MPs 
referred to the fact that the ICC prosecutor and judges will be elected by secret ballot from 
various  countries  and  with  the  principle  of  one  country,  one  vote.  Similarly,  the  smaller  
countries could drive through amendments that everybody would then have to adopt. 
(Standing Committee 2001b, 11.15 am; Standing Committee 2001c, 11.30 am) Moreover, the 
fear was that the judges chosen in this way and outside the UK’s control could be pressured to 
bring politically motivated cases against the UK. (Standing Committee 2001b, 4.30 pm) To 
emphasize its arguments, the Opposition relied on numbers and pointed to the voting system, 
through which the smaller countries could influence the actions and behaviour of the larger 
states. The most popular reference here was San Marino, at the time the smallest state 
signatory to the ICC with a population of less than 30 000. (Standing Committee 2001c, 11.30 
am; Standing Committee 2001a, 11.15 am) So much was San Marino used as an example by 
the Opposition that when MP Blunt talked in general about the majority being outvoted by the 
minority, Minister of State John Battle interrupted by asking sarcastically “San Marino?”. 
(Standing Committee 2001i, 10.30 am)  
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In essence, the fear was that the ICC would act contrary to what the UK views as justified 
and reasonable and that through the Court, the minority could dictate what the majority can do. 
These fears were closely connected to the second theme of the Opposition’s arguments: that 
the ICC could affect negatively the UK’s operations and its personnel abroad. The main 
concern was that the ICC would view a certain action by the UK as a crime under the ICC’s 
jurisdiction. Main examples used to advance this argumentation were the Belgrade television 
station bombing by American forces during the 1999 Kosovo war and actions in Iraq in the 
1990’s. (Standing Committee 2001e, 10.30 am; 12.15 pm) Thus, the Opposition saw the ICC 
as a possible impediment to UK operations abroad and was bothered by the idea of an 
international court second-guessing UK decisions. (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 
247; col. 260) Again, in a rather realist fashion, the Opposition pointed that the UK might 
well be faced with a situation where it had to defend itself and in situations of war, “all 
manner of nasty things happen” and in such instances, the UK should not have to worry about 
the ICC. (Standing Committee 2001h, 4.30 pm; Standing Committee 2001b, 2.45 pm) It was 
both the higher levels of government and the army personnel on ground the Opposition was 
worried about. The danger of the ICC impeding UK military actions and exposing the UK’s 
government and personnel to the ICC’s jurisdiction is well visible in MP Gerald Howarth’s 
statement:  
“If the Bill is enacted, might not a sword hang over a future British Prime Minister? Might not 
that Prime Minister hesitate before deploying weapons that could protect British troops' lives? 
Surely  the  first  responsibility  of  Members  of  Parliament  is  to  protect  our  troops,  whom  we  
send into battle on our behalf. (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 248)  
The Opposition argued vehemently that the UK should take steps to protect its personnel 
abroad.  MP Gillan  argued  that  the  Government  should  take  steps  to  ease  the  worries  of  the  
armed forces about the possible effects of the ICC. By appealing to emotion, she stated that 
“Their minds must be set at rest, not least the minds of those who put their lives on the line 
every day for this country and its interests”.  (Standing Committee 2001h, 12.15 pm) Most 
clearly the case for protecting the army was made within the third theme of arguments,  that  
the UK should shield its personnel from the ICC jurisdiction over war crimes. 
Under Article 124 of the Rome Statute, a state party could choose to opt out from the ICC’s 
jurisdiction concerning war crimes for the next 7 years, starting from the point in time when 
the ICC became active. (The Rome Statute 1998) The Opposition argued strongly that the UK 
should adopt such an opt-out and give as much protection to its armed forces as possible. The 
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fears of losing control, of a sword hanging over the Prime Minister, of unaccountable 
judges and of a prosecutor who might “go bad” and second-guess actions of the UK are all 
connected to the UK’s military actions abroad and the way they might be affected by the ICC. 
The seven year opt-out would give the UK, the Opposition argued, a chance to see how the 
ICC develops and whether it will work as the UK would like it to work. The danger was, as 
Conservative MP Julian Lewis characterized it: “whether normal military action or honest 
mistakes made during normal military action could end up being defined as war crimes […] 
the definition of a war crime could be stretched too far”. (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, 
col. 265) 
The implicit premise in the Opposition’s arguments concerning the armed forces (and the 
supporters’ too, discussed below) is that should the UK’s military action lead to an incident 
during war or should a case arise when the UK had to, to attain its military objectives, use 
substantive power, it would be an unfortunate mistake or a necessity, not really a crime in the 
sense crimes are defined in the Rome Statute. The danger was that such an incident could be 
judged very differently by the UK and by the ICC. Howarth pondered on the situation during 
the last Committee sitting through the examples of the Allied area bombing of Dresden and 
the use of atom bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the Second World War. Howarth 
contended that “as human beings they [the armed forces] could, if faced with a difficult 
situation, be guilty of some atrocity” but that an action such as Hiroshima, although horrible, 
“was necessary to destroy a great evil”: the question then is whether adopting the Rome 
Statute inhibits the ability to prevent greater evil. (Standing Committee 2001j, 3-3.15 pm) 
To prevent the impediment of UK military actions and to shield its armed forces from the ICC, 
the Opposition argued that the UK should opt out from the ICC’s jurisdiction over war crimes. 
To argue their point, the Opposition relied on comparisons to France, which did take the opt-
out.  The  issue  was  mainly  debated  in  the  Standing  Committee  sitting  on  May  1st 2001. 
(Standing Committee 2001g; Standing Committee 2001h) MP Gillan thought it peculiar that 
the UK would let one of its closest European allies, France, to take the opt-out and not do so 
itself.  (Standing  Committee  2001h,  12.15  pm)  Reference  was  also  made  to  the  US.  MP  
Howarth wondered why would the Government, especially when the UK’s closest ally US 
had reservations over the ICC, “want to rush headlong into ratifying the statute, failing to take 
advantage of the breathing space afforded by article 124?” (House of Commons 2001b, vol. 
368, col. 344) None put it more clearly, however, than Shadow Foreign Secretary Maude 
during the Report stage in the House of Commons on May 10th 2001. He first expressed 
amazement as to why “members of the British armed services should be subject to a lesser 
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degree of protection than members of the French armed services” (House of Commons 
2001b, vol. 368, col. 328) and when pushed on the matter, declared that “I believe that the 
British  armed  forces  should  be  exempt”  because  “In  the  absence  of  genuine  immunity,  the  
armed forces will find their military efficiency, morale and ability to be operationally 
effective seriously inhibited.” (House of Commons 2001b, Vol. 368, col. 333) 
Thus, the Opposition supported the ICC and the ICC Bill in principle, but had serious 
reservations about how it would work in practice. The Conservative MPs thought problematic 
that the UK could not control the ICC and its personnel and that the ICC would impede the 
UK’s military operations and expose its armed forces to ICC prosecution in cases the UK 
might not view as crimes. The Government should have used its opportunity to opt out from 
the ICC’s jurisdiction over war crimes, the Opposition contended, and through that protect 
UK forces and allow time to see how the ICC develops.  
It is to these arguments the Government and other MPs supporting the ICC had to answer and 
the five supportive themes identified in the supporters argumentation reflect, naturally, the 
concerns raised by the Opposition. The supporter’ arguments are analyzed next.  
5.3 “A weapon against wickedness”: In Defence of the ICC 
The last part introduced the main themes of the Oppositions argumentation in the debates 
concerning the ICC and the ICC Bill. In this part, the arguments of the supporters of ICC are 
analyzed. As mentioned in the beginning of the last chapter, five main themes of supportive 
arguments can be identified from the debates: 1) breaking the culture of impunity; 2) that the 
UK should be among the first  60 states to ratify the Rome Statute;  3) that  the ICC does not 
limit the UK’s sovereignty; 4) that the ICC and the ICC Bill are a continuance of existing law: 
and 5) that the UK should lead by example. These themes and the argumentation techniques 
used to argue them as characterized by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca are each introduced 
and discussed in turn.  
5.3.1 Breaking the Culture of Impunity: The Need for an ICC 
Within the first theme, arguments concentrate on supporting the ICC and the idea of it in 
general. The ICC was generally regarded as a very important achievement by supporters of 
the Court. As quoted in the headline of this part, the ICC was characterized for example as “a 
weapon against wickedness”. (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 239) The main 
positive impact the ICC was envisaged to have was bringing perpetrators of international 
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crimes to responsibility and thus help to break the culture of impunity. Foreign Minister 
Cook pointed to the culture of impunity right after the Rome Conference in 1998: “It has been 
a paradox of our century that those who murder one person are more likely to be brought to 
justice than those who plot genocide against  millions” and saw the ICC as an answer to this 
problem. (House of Commons 1998, vol. 316, col. 803) In the general debate in October 1999, 
various MPs referred to the ICC’s role in tackling the culture of impunity. (House of 
Commons 1999, Vol. 336, col. 931; 940; 941) Labour MP Oona King perhaps put it most 
eloquently, charactering the ICC as “another hurdle in the path of criminals who have all too 
often felt that they can act with impunity despite—and sometimes because of—the magnitude 
of their crimes.” (House of Commons 1999, vol. 336, col. 931) In the May 2001 debate, 
Labour MP Jeremy Corbyn reminded that behind the ICC and the UK’s ICC Bill is “the 
revulsion of many people around the world at abuses of human rights and the unbridled power 
of dictatorships. They see the need to bring such dictators to heel”. (House of Commons 
2001b, vol. 368, col. 345) It is evident that the MPs saw in the ICC the possibility of, if not 
ending, at least eroding the culture of impunity.   
MPs pointed often to the positive consequences the ICC will have in the future. Foreign 
Secretary Cook argued that the ICC will put an end to the ad hocery of international criminal 
law: “Until now…we have had to invent an entirely new tribunal with its own procedures and 
institutions. Now, we will have the advantage that the International Criminal Court will be 
ready to act”. (House of Commons 1998, vol. 316, col. 811) Labour MP Desmond Browne 
saw benefits in the ICC and international trials in general for conflict resolution: “Without 
justice, many countries have no hope of lasting peace”. (House of Commons 1999, vol. 336, 
col. 940) Cook pointed out that the ICC Bill, by incorporating the crimes identified in the 
Rome  Statute  to  the  UK’s  domestic  law,  “removes  any  concern  that  the  absence  of  such  a  
provision could leave Britain a safe haven for war criminals”. (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 
366, col. 220)  
The above arguments illustrate arguments that are based on the structure of reality, the second 
category of arguments in Perelman’s and Olbrecht-Tyteca’s classification. These rely on what 
people accept as real  and use that reality as a basis from which to form bridges to the point 
one wants to make. Within these, pragmatic arguments evaluate an act or an event through the 
favourable or unfavourable consequences it might have. (Hauser 1986, 186)  Here, MPs 
pointed to the favourable consequences establishing the ICC will have, such as ending the ad 
hocery of international law, and to the negative costs that would be incurred should it not.  
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Labour MP Tony Worthington argument for the ICC was straightforward: “If we do not 
embrace  the  Bill,  we  will  not  get  an  ICC”.  (House  of  Commons  2001a,  vol.  366,  col.  238)  
Labour MP Andrew MacKinlay argued that “we must have the international court as a safety 
net in case of failure so that despots and people who fail to recognize wrongdoing can be 
arraigned before the international community”. (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 246)  
Here, MPs MacKinlay and Worthington use two other arguments based on the structure of 
reality. MacKinlay draws a direct causal link, argument which points to a causal connection 
that is seen to exist between events, process, objects etc (Hauser 1986, 184), between the ICC 
and the UK’s actions: if there is no Bill, there is no court. Worthington’s argument is an 
example of direction, seeking to criticize events and things by pointing to something which 
causes alarm in listeners (Hauser 1986, 1984); here, that is the idea of a “despot” escaping 
justice what is hoped to persuade the listeners to support the ICC.  
Concerning the UK and the ICC, MPs pointed to what the UK was able to accomplish during 
the  negotiations  to  highlight  the  UK as  a  positive  and  important  actor  in  the  process.  When 
reporting back to the House of Commons right after the Rome Conference, Foreign Secretary 
Cook not only highlighted the ICC as a way to end impunity (above) but also the UK’s role in 
bringing that about: “I am pleased to report to the House that […] Britain was part of the 
overwhelming majority” that agreed to set up and international criminal court. (House of 
Commons 1998, vol. 316, col. 803) In the 1999 debate in the House of Commons Minister of 
State  Keith  Vaz  declared  that  “We  are  proud  of  our  achievements  during  the  Rome  
negotiations.The United Kingdom took the lead in introducing important elements” ranging 
from the inclusion of internal conflicts to the question of the appropriate selection of judges. 
(House of Commons 1999, vol. 336, col. 946) In 2001, Cook emphasized similarly that in 
Rome,  the  UK  “delegation  played  an  important  role”  and  was  able  to  “secure  a  number  of  
improvements to the Rome Statute” by, for example, widening the remit of the court and 
getting crimes of sexual violence included in the crimes. (House of Commons, vol. 366, col. 
217) These sorts of statements point to the importance of the UK during the negotiating 
process and seek to emphasize the UK as proponent of international law in general and the 
ICC in particular. This was likely very important to the Government, when and if it wanted to 
promote its idea of an ethical foreign policy. This is discussed in more detail later.  
In the above, reality structure –arguments of person and act were used to highlight the UK’s 
role. This technique evaluates a person (or in this case, the UK) through the person’s acts and 
thus characterizes that person through his deeds. (Hauser 1986, 185) This sort of emphasizing 
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of the UK’s positive role in making the ICC a reality was done in parallel to emphasizing 
the positive influence of the ICC. 
The importance of breaking the culture of impunity was emphasized by references to 
individuals and past events. Individuals used as examples were persons from history that are 
widely familiar and in general regarded as dictators and perpetrators of international crimes. 
In the ICC debate, most often used were Idi Amin, Pol Pot and Saddam Hussein. The cases of 
Pinochet and Milosevic were also popular references. Concerning events, the Second World 
War, Sierra Leone, Bosnia and Rwanda were often used to highlight the need of an ICC.  
Familiar individuals were often used either as particular examples or more in an abstract sense 
to refer to the perpetrators of heinous crimes in general. Foreign Secretary Cook used Pol Pot 
and Saddam Hussein to construct an idea of an abstract group of future criminals, catching of 
which will be helped by an ICC: “The International Criminal Court will put on notice the Pol 
Pots and Saddam Husseins of the future”. (House of Commons 1998, vol. 316, col. 803) The 
Conservatives used the technique too and for example during the same 1998 debate, 
Conservative MP Michael Fabricant referred to “the court's practical work in deterring the Pol 
Pots and Saddam Husseins of this world”. (House of Commons 1998, vol. 316, col. 811) 
During the 2001 House of Commons debate Liberal Democrat MP Robert Adam Ross 
MacLennan and Minister of State John Battle made similar references, respectively: “…to 
bring to justice the Pol Pots, the Idi Amins, the Saddam Husseins and the others whose names 
will reverberate throughout history for the monstrosities that they have been guilty of 
perpetrating” (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 215) and “Hitherto, there has been 
nowhere to bring to justice the Idi Amins, Pol Pots and Saddam Husseins”. (House of 
Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 279) 
Pinochet  and  Milosevic  were  used  more  as  particular  examples  than  as  examples  aiming  to  
construct the idea of an abstract group. As it happened, Milosevic was arrested just before the 
April 2001 House of Commons debate and Foreign Secretary Cook made use of it, and also 
the ICTY and the ICTR, when he opened the debate. Cook referred to Milosevic’s crimes and 
highlighted the fact that the case of Milosevic in unusual because there is a tribunal to charge 
him, thus indirectly referring to the need of a permanent solution:  
“There could be no clearer case for the need to achieve international justice than that of 
Milosevic. What makes the case of Milosevic unusual is the fact that there is an international 
tribunal to pursue justice throughout the former Yugoslavia. Apart from Rwanda, no other 
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part of the globe has an international mechanism to call dictators to account.” (House of 
Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 214-215) 
Pinochet was used by MP King as a positive example of an individual caught despite his 
standing (House of Commons 1999, vol. 336, col. 930); and MP Worthington argued that an 
ICC  would  have  helped  with  “the  problems  that  General  Pinochet  posed”  (House  of  
Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 240). MP Corbyn reminded that “thousands of people died in 
Chile at the hands of Pinochet” and although Pinochet could not de tried in the ICC, others 
can be. (House of Commons 2001b, vol. 368, col. 345) 
In addition to these, references were made to the Holocaust, Sierra Leone and East Timor, the 
genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda and to crimes in Kosovo to highlight the need for a court. 
(House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 239; 254; 258-259) Liberal Democrat MP Jenny 
Tonge emphasized her argument in support of a court by referring to “the blood-curdling and 
heart-rending stories from Rwanda, southern Sudan and Kosovo”. (House of Commons 1999, 
vol. 316, col. 941) 
Quite commonly, the ICC was characterized as “a step”. Contrasting the ICC in such a way 
highlights it as a move forward and as a change to the current situation characterized by 
impunity.   This was especially done during the 2001 House of Commons debate, where the 
ICC and its establishment were characterized as “a historic step”; “an important step”; a 
“great step forward that has been denied to other generations”; “a major step forward for 
humanity”;  and  as  a  “giant  step  forward  for  universal  human  rights  and  the  rule  of  
international law”. (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 214; 238; 250; 256; 276) In this 
process the UK was characterized as “an architect of legal innovations”. (House of Commons 
2001a, vol. 366, col. 217) 
The above arguments rely on the techniques of establishing the structure of reality, where 
particular cases are used as examples to make generalizations, to illustrate regularities and to 
draw analogies. (Hauser 1986, 186) In addition, as stated in chapter 4, metaphors represent 
condensed analogies that use a word or a phrase taken from its original meaning to describe 
something  else.  The  most  prominent  metaphor  used  was  of  the  ICC as  a  step,  as  illustrated  
above. By drawing as examples on individuals and past events, the case and need for the ICC 
was further emphasized. The arguments draw persuasion from the likely assumption that the 
individuals are regarded as criminals and despots and the events as horrendous by the 
audience; they therefore awaken the thought that something needs to be done to stop such 
people from creating such horrendous events in the future. The aim is to then generalize the 
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idea that what is needed to prevent the occurrence of such events and bring to justice such 
criminals is the ICC.  
All these arguments rely on the suggestion that the ICC, once established, will either have a 
positive influence on ending the culture of impunity or will prevent an alarming consequence 
that  would  reinforce  impunity.  In  addition,  references  were  made  to  the  UK’s  positive  role  
and  to  what  it  had  accomplished  during  the  Rome  negotiations.  Arguments  in  this  vein  are  
easily acceptable by both parties, as the Opposition too supported the ICC in principle and 
regarded it as valuable in bringing perpetrators of heinous crimes to justice. Thus, they were 
ready to accept the idea of the ICC‘s positive influence. Next, the second theme of arguments 
is discussed. 
5.3.2 Among the First 60: Importance of Passing the Bill 
The  UK  Government  eagerly  wished  to  be  one  of  the  first  60  states  to  ratify  the  ICC.  All  
through the debates it was underlined that the UK should ratify the Rome Statute as quickly as 
possible. The point behind this was that if the UK ratifies as one of the first 60 states, it can 
influence the ICC’s structure and procedures. It was also stressed that the Statute in general 
should be ratified quickly. This was highlighted by MP Browne when he argued that if the 
Rome Statute is not ratified quickly, interest in the matter could wane: “We must build on the 
enthusiasm and momentum generated in Rome before it is dissipated. To do that, it is 
essential that countries in favour of the court, such as the United Kingdom, proceed with 
ratifications immediately”. (House of Commons 1999, vol. 336, col. 940) In the final debate 
on  the  matter  in  May 10th 2001, Labour Co-operative MP Mike Gapes reminded that if the 
Bill is not passed now, all the previous efforts to pass it would be lost: “If the Bill falls, it will 
not be easy to reintroduce it quickly. It would again have to go through all its stages in both 
Houses of Parliament”. (House of Commons 2001b, vol. 368, col. 315) Similar strategy was 
used by Minister of State Battle. Through pointing out what had been accomplished so far 
Battle indirectly hinted at what might be lost when he reminded others in the first Committee 
sitting that “There is urgency also because we have been heavily engaged in the formative 
stages of the court and in negotiating the details to get it established. We want to be one of the 
early signatories – among the first 60”. (Standing Committee 2001a, 9.55 am) 
The main point was that the UK should be one of the first 60 to ratify so that it would be able 
to influence how the ICC and its procedures are developed. In the April 2001 debate in the 
House of Commons Foreign Secretary Cook put it in very practical terms when he stated that 
by passing the Bill, the UK will be among the first 60 and that it is important 
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“not just because we will have helped to bring the court into existence, but because those 
that have ratified are the only countries with a say in setting up its procedure and 
appointments […] Britain could nominate candidates, vote in the elections of the prosecutor 
and judges and have a say in the adoption of the procedural rules.” (House of Commons 
2001a, vol. 366, col. 216-217) 
Minister of Battle appealed to the MPs in a similar vein and reminded all that the point of the 
debate and discussion on the Bill in Committee “is that we are seeking to be one of the first 
60 signatories to help to shape the court […] we must be at the table.” (House of Commons 
2001a, vol. 366, col. 278) Later in Committee, Battle struck on the Opposition’s fears of not 
being  able  to  control  the  ICC by  stating  that  “The  Government  believe  that  the  best  way to  
exercise control over the ICC's future development is to be part of it.[…] If we are engaged 
we will be best placed to solve any problems that may emerge.” (Standing Committee 2001d, 
4.30 pm) 
It was hoped that the Opposition members would alarmed by the prospect of negative 
consequence delaying could result in, and alarmed enough to support the Bill. Battle warned 
that “If we are not one of the 60, we will not have a say at all”. (House of Commons 2001a, 
vol. 366, col. 278) Similarly, during the last debate in May MP MacLennan answered 
Conservative MP Gillan’s criticism over the lack of time to debate the Bill by asking “Would 
she  regard  it  as  the  right  time for  us  to  do  so  [adopt  the  Bill]  when 60  other  countries  have  
already set the processes in concrete?” and MP Gapes reminded that should the Bill fall now, 
“We would not be one of the most influential countries in the International Criminal Court”. 
(House of Commons 2001b, vol. 368, col. 313; 315)  
Arguments here were most often based on the structure of reality and more specifically, 
arguments of waste, pragmatic arguments and arguments of direction. Arguments of waste 
seek to argue that something which has been achieved is lost if a particular activity is stopped. 
(Hauser 1986, 184) By pointing to the possibility of losing all achieved thus far concerning 
the ICC should the Bill fall now, the aim was to persuade the Opposition to back up the Bill 
so  that  progress  gained  would  not  be  lost.  Pragmatic  arguments  within  this  theme  either  
pointed to the positive consequences of ratifying quickly or to the negative ones that delay in 
the matter would incur, illustrated above for example in the statements referring to the ability 
to influence the ICC’s procedures, seen as a favourable consequence. In a similar vein, 
arguments of direction were used to alarm that should the Parliament delay the matter, the UK 
could lose all its influence.  
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It was clearly important for the UK government at the time to be amongst the first 60 states 
to ratify the ICC’s Rome Statute. However, it was not only the pragmatic matter that the 
Government wanted to be at the ICC table deciding on procedures and electing personnel but 
also that when it came to the ICC, it strongly wanted to be seen as a positive example. Such 
arguments are analyzed next. 
5.3.3 Leading by Example: Why Not Ratifying Is a Bad Thing  
The third theme of argumentation that was clearly identifiable from the debates was that the 
supporters of the ICC wanted the UK to set  an example to other states and the international 
community. Foreign Secretary Cook put it in straightforward terms: “The most powerful 
argument is always by example” (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 223); and Minister 
of State Battle maintained that it is important to “demonstrate leadership and stand up for the 
rule of law around the world”. (House of Commons 2001b, vol. 368, col. 347) Central here 
was the idea that if the UK endorses the ICC, others will be persuaded to follow and thus the 
UK needs to lead by example. It was maintained that if the UK would opt-out and thus show 
suspicion towards the Court, it would hurt both the UK’s image and affect negatively support 
for the ICC. These sorts of arguments were often used to answer the Opposition’s demands 
that the UK should opt-out from the ICC’s jurisdiction over war crimes. The supporters 
argued that if the ICC’s jurisdiction is going to apply to others it should also be accepted that 
it will apply to the UK. Should the UK opt-out, others could too and those others could 
include such the sort of states and people the ICC is set up for.  
Supporters of the Court argued vehemently that if the ICC is going to have jurisdiction over 
other  states,  it  also  should  have  jurisdiction  over  the  UK.  By distancing  the  UK from other  
states  as  an  actor  who  would  not  stoop  so  low  as  to  perpetrate  ICC  crimes,  the  Opposition  
(and the Government as well: this is discussed later) created a picture where the UK and other 
states were presented as counterparts to each other. The supporters of the ICC argued that 
similar  treatment  should  be  given  to  both  if  the  ICC  was  to  be  seen  as  a  worthwhile  and  
legitimate institution. This is well visible in MP Gapes’ statement, made during the last debate 
on May 10th, when he stated that if the ICC can act against “the armed forces of countries that 
perhaps do not maintain the scrupulous standards and have the generally exemplary record of 
our own armed forces”, why should it not be suitable for the UK army? (House of Commons 
2001b, vol. 368, col. 335) MP Corbyn drew the logical conclusion that opting out could well 
lead to unwanted results. For him, asking for an exemption for UK forces was “ridiculous” 
since “If we ask for that exemption, who are we to oppose anyone else’s exemption?” (House 
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of Commons 2001b vol. 368, col. 346) MP Browne put the issue in the following way: 
“Why should we in the UK have the arrogance to say that the court should practise on other 
countries' nationals while we watch to see whether the standard of justice is good enough for 
ours? What sort of message is that for a civilised country to send?” (House of Commons 
2001b, vol. 368, col. 338) 
These arguments aptly show the two parallel lines of argument in this theme: that equal 
treatment should be given both to other states and the UK; and what the UK does concerning 
the ICC is important for its image. Opting out would be counterproductive to the UK’s image 
as a civilized country and send the wrong message to others. The supporters argued strongly 
that in order for the ICC to gain as much support as possible and be effective, the major actors 
need to show a good example. Thus, MP MacKinlay noted that if countries such as the UK 
and France are not ready to put themselves under the ICC’s jurisdiction, “how on earth can we 
expect the baddies of this world to do so?” (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 249)  
MP Corbyn used East Timor to give his argument force and pointed that an opt-out by, for 
example  Indonesia,  “would  be  a  joke”,  for  “many  of  us  have  seen  what  they  [Indonesian  
armed forces] are capable of in East Timor and other places”. (House of Commons 2001b, vol. 
14, col. 346) In relation to an amendment put forward by the Opposition to give UK leaders 
discretion over the ICC, MP Worthington used the same technique when he pointed out that 
what  powers  the  UK  wants  for  itself,  it  has  to  give  to  “the  Government  of  Rwanda,  to  
Milosevic, to Saddam Hussein and so on”. (Standing Committee 2001c, 10.45 am) By 
invoking the image of generally regarded-as-such-perpetrators of international crimes, the aim 
is give force to the argument that opting out would lead to unwanted consequences.  
During  a  debate  over  an  Opposition  amendment  to  give  the  UK  Secretary  of  State  more  
discretion over situations where the ICC was able to claim jurisdiction over UK nationals, 
Minister of State Battle defended the ICC and pointed to the negative consequences when he 
stated that such discretion “would undermine the ICC even before it is established. That 
would send completely the wrong signal from the outset, when we are trying to build support”. 
(Standing Committee 2001c, 12.30 pm) He furthermore contended in the House of Commons 
that opting out would send “the most appalling signal” and hurt the efforts to encourage 
others to support the ICC. (House of Commons 2001b, vol. 368, col. 348) Foreign Secretary 
Cook emphasized his argument by pointing to a possible positive consequence of leading by 
example and contended that the best way to persuade the US to support the Court is “to show 
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our own confidence in the court by taking part in it”. (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, 
col. 223) 
Arguments within this theme were made with a variety of techniques. First were quasi-logical 
arguments which seek to persuade through establishing logical and mathematical relations in 
the  argument.  Of  these,  mostly  used  here  were  arguments  based  on  reciprocity,  maintaining  
that two elements that are counterparts need to be given equal treatment. (Hauser 1986, 183) 
This is illustrated by the arguments that contend that equal treatment should be given to the 
UK and other states. Second, the points made were further emphasized by using events and 
individuals as examples (arguments establishing the structure of reality) to point to the 
negative consequences there could be if the UK would opt-out from the ICC’s jurisdiction. In 
this, reference made for example to East Timor and Indonesia. Third, in addition to these two 
techniques, pragmatic arguments (arguments based on the structure of reality) were used to 
show  that  if  the  UK  wants  the  ICC  to  succeed,  it  needs  to  endorse  it  fully  and  accept  the  
ICC’s jurisdiction over its own nationals.  
Overall,  these  sorts  of  arguments  show  that  the  UK  believed  in  the  power  of  example.  All  
through the debate process it was maintained that to persuade others to support the court, the 
UK needs to set a positive example and show that it believes in the ICC. Not only would this 
prove to be beneficial in getting support for the ICC but it would also reinforce the image of 
the  UK  as  a  supporter  of  the  rule  of  law.  How  one  behaves  can  influence  the  behaviour  of  
others  and  establish  or  reinforce  a  structure  where  support  for  an  international  court  is  a  
positive thing. The fourth theme of argumentation drew force from the existing structure of 
international law and the context surrounds the ICC itself. These arguments are discussed next. 
5.3.4 Existing Law: The ICC as a Part of the Context 
The Opposition was worried that the ICC would affect negatively the military operations and 
armed forces of the UK. Mainly as an answer to this, the supporters contended that in practice, 
the ICC does not really change anything or bring in new law that would not already exist 
through some other measure. MPs pointed to existing law and conventions UK personnel are 
already subjected to and maintained that since there has not been problems previously, there 
will not be problems with the ICC. 
Overall, this theme of argumentation is premised on the structure of reality: the arguments 
drew their force from the structure that existing law forms and many are familiar with and 
accept as a well-established fact. By pointing out that the ICC does not bring in anything that 
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would be radically different from the rules that are already in place, the supporters aimed at 
persuading the Opposition to accept the ICC and its jurisdiction by connecting it to the 
already existing law. As Minister of State Battle contended about war crimes, “The crimes set 
out in that article are already crimes in international law. That message has not gone home.” 
(House of Commons 2001b, vol. 368, col. 347) During the last the stage of the debate in May 
2001, he made the connections and stated forcefully that: “Similarly, what we are doing is not 
new and is not a newly minted principle. We are continuing the proud and honourable role 
that the United Kingdom has played in the development and enforcement of international 
humanitarian law.” (House of Commons 2001b, vol. 368, col. 349) 
The most popular point of comparison for the ICC was the ICTY, which was used to highlight 
that UK personnel in Bosnia and elsewhere are subjected to the ICTY’s jurisdiction and this 
has not proved problematic. Minister of State Battle highlighted this in the House of 
Commons by pointing to subjecting the UK armed forces to the jurisdiction of the ICTY: “If 
that were right in the case of former Yugoslavia and the British personnel on active service in 
difficult circumstances there, it is equally valid in respect of the Bill and the International 
Criminal Court.” (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 223) In the May 10th debate, 
Foreign Secretary Cook asked whether the Shadow Foreign Secretary Maude could “cite a 
single case where the operational effectiveness of British personnel in the former Yugoslavia 
was impeded by the existence of that tribunal?” (House of Commons 2001b, vol. 368, col. 
333) The aim was to persuade the Opposition to agree that the ICC would not change the 
situation and thus there is no good reason the UK to stay outside its jurisdiction. 
The Geneva Conventions were similarly used as a point of comparison. In the same way as he 
referred to the ICTY, Minister of State Battle referred to the Geneva Conventions. (House of 
Commons 2001b, vol. 368, col. 347) MP MacLennan pointed out that through the Geneva 
Conventions, other states already have jurisdiction over UK nationals and if that is acceptable, 
why would jurisdiction by an international court not be. (Standing Committee 2001j, 3.15 pm) 
To Conservative MP Howarth’s fear of a sword hanging over the heads of future UK Prime 
Ministers should the ICC Bill be enacted (above p. 89), MP MacKinlay answered by noting 
pointedly that the logical conclusion of opposing the ICC would be that “we would not agree 
to  existing  Geneva  conventions  and  codes  of  war.  We  are,  after  all,  merely  building  on  an  
arrangement that already exists.” (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 248) So too did 
MP Gapes when he contradicted Conservative MP Lyell’s argument about ICC’s negative 
effects on UK personnel by suggesting that Lyell’s arguments “may be leading to the 
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conclusion that we should tear up our obligations under the Geneva conventions”. (House 
of Commons 2011a, vol. 366, col. 253) 
These comparisons were further emphasized by pointing out that the ICC in fact offers more 
protection to UK soldiers than do the ICTY and the Geneva Conventions. This is because, it 
was  argued,  the  ICC’s  jurisdiction  is  premised  on  complementarity,  which  gives  the  UK  
primary  power  to  prosecute  its  own nationals  should  they  have  committed  ICC crimes.  The  
ICTY’s  jurisdiction,  however,  supersedes  that  of  the  UK.  This  point  was  emphasized  
throughout the debate. MP Browne made this point in the House of Commons and Committee 
(House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 233; Standing Committee 2001c, 11.15 am). So too 
did Foreign Secretary Cook when he pointed to the complementarity principle and criticised 
the Conservatives in connection to the ICTY by arguing “Why is it wrong for us to act on the 
same principles on which they acted, when we have a cover that they did not provide for 
British troops”. (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 234)  
The supporter’s aimed to contradict the Opposition position by arguing that since the previous 
Conservative Governments have supported the ICTY and the Geneva Conventions, opposing 
the ICC now is inconsistent. Labour Co-operative MP Louise Ellman criticized Conservative 
MP Garnier for opposing “in a tortuous manner, something that he and his party supported 
previously. I cannot but wonder what is the reason behind that.” (Standing Committee 2001b, 
4.15 pm) Minister of State Battle referred to the whole structure created by international law 
when he pointedly asked MP Garnier: 
“The treaty [The Rome Statute] is built on internationally agreed legislation to which the 
previous Conservative Government signed up because they thought it was a good thing. Why 
does the hon. and learned Gentleman wish to debate it again now, if he has already agreed to 
it?” (Standing Committee 2001b, 4.00 pm) 
Foreign Secretary Cook reminded the Conservative Shadow Foreign Secretary Maude that it 
was the Conservative Government that set up the ICTY (House of Commons 2001b, vol. 368, 
col. 333); and Labour MP, Solicitor-General Ross Cranston did the same with a reference to 
the Geneva Conventions. (Standing Committee 2001j, 3.30 pm) Perhaps the most suitable 
example of this line of combined argumentation is a statement by Cook during the April 2001 
debate. It is thus useful to quote Cook in some length: 
“Provisions  […]  in  the  Bill  closely  parallel  the  provisions  in  the  statute  setting  up  the  war  
crimes tribunal for former Yugoslavia. The previous Government acceded to the war crimes 
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tribunal for former Yugoslavia in the full knowledge that there were several thousand 
British service men in the area.  […] Nor does the creation of an international criminal court  
change  the  law under  which  our  armed forces  operate.  The  definitions  of  war  crimes  in  the  
statute are already part of the well-established law of armed conflict. They are already binding 
on our armed forces and form part of the basic training of every British officer. Indeed, most 
of the wording on the crimes committed during combat is wording drawn from the Geneva 
Convention Acts 1957 and 1995, both of which were brought to Parliament by a Conservative 
Government.” (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 222-223) 
This  statement  combines  well  the  central  emphasis  of  this  theme  of  argumentation.  By  
drawing on existing law and law adopted by the Opposition’s party, the supporters aimed 
towards the conclusion that the ICC is in fact continuance in the existing structure , formed by 
the laws of war and international tribunals, which influences states by directing them towards 
what is considered to be appropriate behaviour. The argument is further emphasized by 
pointing to the inconsistencies in the Conservative’s position, created by the contradiction 
between their previous support and current resistance. 
The above arguments illustrate the type of argumentation mainly used within this theme. 
Argumentation was mainly quasi-logical and the most often used argument was a three-
pronged approach that combined comparisons to the situation created by the ICTY; 
comparisons between the ICC and the Geneva Conventions; and pointed to contradictions in 
the Opposition’s position by reminding that they themselves had adopted the ICTY and the 
Geneva Conventions; taken that the ICC will not bring in a radical change, supporting them 
but opposing the ICC is inconsistent. Arguments of comparison compare objects to each other 
in order to evaluate them; and arguments by contradiction aim to indicate inconsistencies in 
the other’s position and through that dismiss the validity of the other’s argument. (Hauser 
1986, 183) 
In relation to the ICTY, the Conservative’s in turn argued that the ICTY and the ICC are not 
comparable since the ICTY is premised on a jurisdiction limited in time and space. (House of 
Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 227) Thus, to further allay the Conservative’s fears about the 
ICC, the supporters relied on one more line of argumentation.  
5.3.5 The Difference between Us and Others: Dissociation of the UK and the ICC 
The fifth and last theme of argumentation that clearly arises from the debates is the distance 
the  supporters  attempted  to  create  between  the  UK  and  the  ICC.  The  point  all  through  the  
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debates was that although the idea of a UK national committing heinous crimes is 
unthinkable, should such a case arise through unfortunate circumstances, that person would 
never have to face the ICC because the case would be handled nationally. This point was 
emphasized fervently and came up very often, as it is connected to all the Opposition’s main 
concerns. Dissociation between the UK and the ICC can be seen as perhaps the main 
argument with which the supporter’s sought to persuade the Opposition to back the ICC and 
the ICC Bill. 
In the ICC debates, distance was created between the UK and the ICC concerning the issue 
that  UK  personnel  could  end  up  before  the  ICC.  The  separation  of  the  two  was  often  
emphasized by taking as example some past event, the Second World War or the Former 
Yugoslavia. Dissociated was done to emphasize that the ICC would not impede the UK’s 
military operations or endanger its personnel.  The supporters worked very hard to obscure the 
image of an UK soldier who, first, was guilty of ICC crimes and second, indicted by the Court. 
This was done to persuade the Opposition that the ICC could not ‘hurt’ the UK or its leaders 
and to allay the Opposition’s fears and minimize the power of their argumentation.  
As mentioned, the idea of UK nationals perpetrating ICC crimes was thought absurd. The 
viewpoint was that should the UK be guilty of acts that could be regarded as criminal in the 
eyes of the ICC, these would be the result of unfortunate and human mistakes. Thus, the first 
point  of  dissociation  was  separating  the  UK’s  and  its  personnel  from  acts  that  could  be  
considered  to  be  international  crimes.  This  was  not  done  only  by  supporters  but  by  the  
Opposition as well. In Committee, Conservative MP Garnier made a distinction between the 
UK and those who could commit crimes of aggression (article 5 crimes) when he stated that 
“It is highly unlikely that the present Government or a successor Conservative Government 
would be an aggressor in the sense that I envisage that term being defined under article 5. It is 
the totalitarian regimes who will be guilty […]. (Standing Committee 2001b, 2.30 pm) 
Shadow Foreign Secretary Maude made a similar point when he characterized a scenario “of 
events in war in which dutiful, decent officers and men obeyed orders that unintentionally led 
to the loss of civilian life” and should such a situation arise, as some have argued it did with 
the Kosovo bombing campaign, it “does not mean that it would be right to accuse the Foreign 
Secretary and the Prime Minister of being war criminals […] Nor, of course, does it mean that 
Lady Thatcher was a war criminal when she ordered the retaking of the Falklands”. Maude 
further painted the picture of UK personnel who could be “subjected to politically motivated 
prosecutions or threats of prosecution for carrying out their duties in distant foreign lands.” 
(House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 230) These well describe the idea that UK soldiers 
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carry out their necessary duties in service of their country, a duty which can in some 
instances lead to unfortunate but not intentional consequences. 
Similar dissociation was done by the supporters of the ICC. MP MacKinlay used the Dresden 
bombing during the Second World War and contemplated that  
“I  do  not  believe  that  the  head  of  Bomber  Command  or  Winston  Churchill  could  or  would  
have been brought before the international court, because it was obviously a grey area. We are 
talking about despots, who will use weapons of mass destruction—or genocide—without 
regard to what represents at least some semblance of justification in terms of the war 
objective.” (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 248) 
The distinction is clearly made between the justifiable actions of the UK that are “in the grey 
area” and the actions of others belonging to a different plain. So far removed did the idea of a 
UK leader being prosecuted by an international court seem to MP Gapes that when 
Conservative  MP Blunt  contemplated  the  idea  of  something  ‘going  wrong’  between the  UK 
and the ICC, he reproached: “Is he saying that there is a certainty or a great likelihood of this 
country being so out of line with the higher tenets of international behaviour that the rest of 
the world would gang up against us to put our Prime Minister on trial for an alleged war 
crime? […] What he says is simply absurd.” (Standing Committee 2001c, 10.30 am) 
A  statement  by  Solicitor-General  Cranston  also  portrays  well  the  distinction  that  was  made  
between UK acts and acts by others. In Committee, Cranston separated between “The 
unfortunate and avoidable mistakes that may occur in wartime” and people who 
“systematically shelled and blew up virtually every building in Vukovar, during the war in 
Croatia. The action was not for legitimate military reasons, but to allow people to vent their 
ethnic hatred”. (Standing Committee 2001j, 3.30 pm) This is not to say that the UK has or 
would intentionally commit international crimes or that the shelling in Vukovar could not be 
regarded as a crime. The point is that the actions of the UK, past and future, were dissociated 
from the concept of a crime by classifying them as ‘mistakes’ and then juxtaposing such 
mistakes with for example the bombing in Vukovar, which was emphasized not being about 
legitimate military objectives. This distances the UK from the ICC’s sphere of influence and 
works to construct an idea of a distinction between ‘us and legitimate actions’ and ‘them and 
criminal actions’.  
This line of argumentation was continued by dissociating the UK from the ICC’s jurisdiction. 
It was maintained that should a situation arise where the UK could be seen as being guilty of 
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an ICC crime, and it could, given the messiness of war, the matter would never go to the 
ICC because the UK would handle the prosecution in its national courts. Thus, in addition to 
the distinction between the UK and international crimes, it was necessary to dissociate the UK 
from the  ICC’s  jurisdiction.  This  was  mainly  done  by  distancing  the  UK and the  ICC from 
each other and by pointing to the complementarity principle and maintaining that the UK 
would without a doubt prosecute its nationals in its own courts should they commit 
international crimes and that is why a UK national will never go to the ICC.  
MPs attempted to disregard as nonsensical the idea that the ICC would someday try to indict 
and prosecute UK nationals. MP MacKinlay emphasized that if the UK courts martial system 
follows  appropriate  rules,  The  ICC  “will  not  come  banging  on  the  door  of  the  Foreign  
Secretary or the Secretary of State for Defence, saying, "We want this officer."” (House of 
Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 247) MP King argued similarly when she stressed that the 
ICC is  meant  for  states  that  won’t  prosecute,  not  for  states  like  the  UK.  By comparing  to  a  
police force, she argued that “The ICC will not be rifling through the files of the Ministry of 
Defence or demanding the indictment of Cabinet Ministers and senior officers. It is not an 
international FBI.” (House of Commons 1999, vol. 336, col. 931) In April 2001 she further 
maintained that the army “will be protected because their behaviour, on the whole, reaches 
the highest standards in the world. On  the  whole,  our  armed  forces  do  not  go  around  
perpetrating crimes against humanity.” (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 261) 
To further distance from the minds of Conservative MP’s an image of an UK national in the 
ICC’s dock, the issue of complementarity was brought up abundantly during the debates. The 
complementarity  principle  and  other  measures  were  characterized  as  safeguards  that  will  
shield the UK from malicious and politically motivated prosecutions. It was argued that the 
complementarity would shield UK nationals because the UK would prosecute if one of its 
nationals would commit an ICC crime and thus, the Oppositions arguments were without 
merit.  
In April 2001, Foreign Secretary Cook characterized complementarity as “a fundamental 
principle  of  the  Rome statute”  which  characterizes  the  belief  that  “the  best  place  to  try  any  
crime  is  at  the  national  level”  and  means  that  the  ICC  “has  no  authority  to  initiate  an  
investigation where the allegations have already been examined by the appropriate national 
authorities”. (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 222) Minister of State Vaz expressed 
his belief that the “Rome statute contains sufficient safeguards to protect service men, the 
most important of which is the complementarity principle”. (House of Commons 1999, vol. 
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336, col. 977) Solicitor-General Cranston made the point in Committee when he 
underlined that the language of Article 17 (the complementarity principle) is mandatory and 
thus provides an important protection. He further emphasized in strong terms that  
“Our courts can deal with relevant cases and if we prosecute, or decide not to, in accordance 
with the law, the ICC will not be able to trump our decisions. If we decide not to prosecute, 
our decision will not be trumped […] the ICC will not be in a position to trump us”. (Standing 
Committee 2001d, 6.19-6.30 pm) 
The supporters also emphasized additional safeguards that were put in place in the Rome 
Statute. Foreign Secretary Cook contended that the pre-trial screening stage of the ICC “will 
provide a safeguard against accusations brought in bad faith” (House of Commons 1998, vol. 
316, col. 804) and MP King reminded the House of the powers of the UNSC to impede a 
case’s progress to the ICC. (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 266) In Committee, 
Minister of State Battle pointed out that the prosecutor has to make a solemn case to open an 
investigation in the ICC, that the qualification of judges was an issue the UK delegation in 
Rome worked  tirelessly  towards,  brought  up  the  complementarity  principle  and  emphasized  
that “The ICC statute is full of safeguards against politically motivated prosecutions”. 
(Standing Committee 2001c, 12.30 pm) Cook attempted to further convince the MPs of the 
safeguards by a comparison to UK’s allies:  
“Yes, we are confident that our service men will be protected against malicious prosecution. 
If anyone is in any doubt about whether that confidence is well placed, I should say that none 
of  our  other  NATO allies  took  the  interpretation  of  the  United  States;  and,  like  us,  many of  
those other NATO allies have service men in foreign posts.” (House of Commons 1998, vol. 
316, col. 807) 
Strong assurances were needed. The Opposition’s obvious counterargument was a scenario 
where the ICC would take a different view and challenge the UK’s decision that a particular 
situation did not constitute a crime. Conservative MP Howarth characterized the 
complementarity principle as a “ghastly word that has been introduced specifically for this 
statute” and pointed out that no assurances can be given that a UK Prime Minister could never 
be indicted by the ICC. (House of Commons 2001b, vol. 368, col.342) In Committee, 
Conservative MP Blunt demanded that Minister of State John Battle must accept the fact that 
the ICC could interpret differently what it means to genuinely prosecute a case (Standing 
Committee 2001c, 12.30 pm) and MP Howarth  envisaged the possibility of a clash between 
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what  “the  ICC  perceives  as  willingness  to  proceed  and  what  we  believe  is  justified”.  
(Standing Committee 2001g, 11.am)  
As an answer, the supporters called for trust in that the ICC will work properly and in that the 
quality of the UK justice system is such that possible challenges made by the ICC would 
futile. To MP Blunt’s charge above, Minister of State Battle answered that “it is about having 
confidence in the court as an institution, not considering whether a particular personality with 
an axe to grind is the person making the decision” (Standing Committee 2001c, 12.30 pm); 
and to Howarth, above, the Solicitor-General disagreed on the grounds that “article 17 of the 
statute is clearly drawn. The ICC could not conceivably adopt an interpretation of the clause 
that would not recognize justice as it is done in this country”. (Standing Committee 2001g, 
11.am)  
Thus, many arguments referred to the quality of the UK justice system to disregard the ideas 
that the ICC could challenge the UK’s decisions and that the UK would not be willing to 
prosecute if need be. Minister of State Vaz contended that “we are confident that we could 
demonstrate that there was a remedy in British justice” (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 336, 
col. 947) and Foreign Secretary Cook deemed that “Members on both sides of the House 
should have a robust confidence that the British legal system […] can satisfactorily 
demonstrate to the International Criminal Court that such allegations have been properly 
investigated”. (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 222) For MP King, the issue was 
simply unthinkable: “I cannot envisage circumstances in which, for example, the British 
Government conducted their own investigation, the ICC felt that we were not able to prove 
that the investigation was sufficiently thorough or unbiased”. (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 
366, col. 261) 
Furthermore, it was unthinkable that the UK would for some reason be unwilling to prosecute 
its own nationals if a need for that would arise. Minister of States Battle assured that “We are 
unlikely to be unwilling or unable. […] the purpose of the court is to catch states whose 
judicial systems have collapsed and whose dictatorial regimes refuse to punish their own 
abusers of human rights. That is the idea. I do not believe we are in that bracket”. (Standing 
Committee 2001c, 12.30 pm) 
Solicitor-General Cranston argued similarly:   
“I assure the Committee that in no conceivable circumstances would we be unwilling to act. 
Article 17 of the statute defines unwillingness to act in terms of shielding a person or delaying 
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in  such  a  way  as  to  defeat  the  object  of  the  legal  process.  There  are  no  conceivable  
circumstances in which the United Kingdom would act in that way.” (Standing Committee 
2001g, 11.00 am) 
It was taken as granted that should a case arise, the UK would pursue it, and pursue it in 
earnest and prosecute the individuals responsible. So much confidence did the supporters have 
in the UK and the complementarity principle that arguments to persuade the Opposition of its 
point were often expressed in very categorical terms. Foreign Secretary Cook ensured in April 
2001  that  although  he  is  aware  that  some  in  the  armed  forces  have  concerns  over  the  ICC,  
“Those concerns are misplaced” and that UK personnel “will never be prosecuted” by the ICC 
because UK would handle prosecutions itself. (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 222) 
Later on he emphasized this point in even more forceful terms by characterizing his statement 
in the following way: “That is certainly unequivocal. No one could point to anything in that 
statement that lacks conviction; it is a comprehensive statement.” (House of Commons 2001a, 
vol. 366, col. 234) 
Similar  statements  of  conviction  were  heard  often  throughout  the  debates.  MP  King  also  
contended  that  UK  personnel  will  never  be  brought  before  the  ICC,  either  in  theory  of  
practice and inquired from Conservative MP Howarth “Does not the hon. Gentleman 
understand the concept of complementarity?” (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 260) 
Minister of State Battle attributed the Opposition’s insistence on the issue of the armed forces 
to a “fundamental misunderstanding”; the ICC will not affect the army’s rules of engagement 
in any way and thus “The Bill is no threat” to the UK. (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, 
col. 279) Battle repeated the point in the last debate in May 2001: “The ICC poses no threat to 
our armed forces”. (House of Commons 2001b, vol. 368, col. 348)  
The  principle  of  complementarity  was  one  of  the  most  often  used  arguments  to  assure  the  
Opposition that the ICC would not be able hurt the UK. So much did the issue come up that as 
the Committee’s work was drawing to a close, Minister of State Battle reminded MPs that UK 
personnel will never go to the ICC and that complementarity means that “the ICC will not get 
a look in. That point is sometimes neglected by the Opposition.” (Standing Committee 2001h, 
6.45 pm) In the last debate in the House of Commons, Foreign Secretary Cook demanded that 
“It is time the Opposition gave up arousing – in their own way, mischievous – fears about an 
outcome that will never happen”. (House of Common 2001b, vol. 368, col. 330) 
The argumentation technique used within this theme was argument by dissociation. Whereas 
the first four themes concentrated on links between the two and associated the UK and the 
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ICC, this last theme concentrates instead on breaking the links between the UK and its 
personnel and the ICC and its jurisdiction. Dissociation aims at a conclusion that does not 
recognize a hoped or accepted link between two elements. The goal is to show that a certain 
link does not exist, thus allowing one to disregard arguments based on the existence of that 
link as irrelevant. If one wishes to show that two elements are not compatible with each other, 
dissociation helps by remodelling the conception of reality to such where they are separate 
from each other. (Hauser 1986, 187)  
The  ideas  of  UK  committing  heinous  crimes,  of  UK  nationals  in  the  ICC  and  of  the  ICC  
challenging decisions made by the UK was distanced from reality by dissociation. Supporters 
disregarded it as unthinkable that the ICC could doubt the justice system and decisions made 
by the UK and thus constructed an image of the ICC that was as far removed from the UK as 
possible.  The  aim  was  to  separate  by  argument  the  UK  and  the  ICC:  to  show  that  the  
Opposition’s fears about the ICC impeding the actions of the UK were wrong and therefore, 
irrelevant. 
5.4 The Analysis and the Theoretical Framework 
This part deepens the analysis conducted thus far by integrating the themes of argumentation 
to the theoretical discussion. The debates in the House of Commons over the ICC and the ICC 
Bill  echo  many  of  the  theoretical  points  put  forth  in  Chapter  2.  The  viewpoints  and  issues  
discussed pertaining to the human rights and atrocities regimes, legalization and legalism, 
realism  and  idealism  and  constructivism  and  the  different  logics  of  action  emerge  from  the  
statements and arguments made both by the Opposition and the supporters of the Court. The 
UK Government’s foreign policy of the time also became visible in the debates.  
To a large extent, the Opposition’s arguments highlight a realist outlook on international 
relations and reveal the underlying concern that the ICC will ride roughshod over the UK’s 
sovereignty. In essence, it argued that the UK’s powerful role in international relations should 
be reflected in its relationship to the ICC. For example, the concerns of the minority 
controlling the majority resemble the realist idea that in international relations, powerful states 
inherently should and do have more of a say. Instructive is the following statement by Blunt 
that in the Rome Statute, “There is no recognition of the contribution that each nation makes 
to world security or of the balance of influence in the world”. (House of Commons 2001b, vol. 
368, col. 321) Furthermore, the Opposition’s arguments to a large extent follow the logic of 
consequences, discussed in Chapter 2. They reveal that primary importance was placed on the 
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UK’s national interest, which becomes clearly visible in the fear of the ICC impeding the 
military operations of the UK, especially should the UK be attacked and need to resort to self-
defense. This is not to say that the Opposition regarded the ICC as wholly a ‘bad thing’; rather, 
that the ICC could be useful when and if it would work and behave as the UK would like it to. 
This  highlights  the  ideas  of  the  logic  of  consequences,  that  norms  are  followed  when  they  
happen to coincide with the goal one is interested in achieving.  
5.4.1 Ethical Foreign Policy 
The Government’s foreign policy at the time provides context for the debates. As discussed, 
the Blair Government and especially Foreign Secretary Cook were advancing what they 
termed as an ethical foreign policy, the aim of which was to bring human rights at the centre 
of UK foreign policy. Support for the ICC was part of this policy and naturally the issue came 
up during the debates.  
Ethical foreign policy was referred to by both the Opposition and supporters of the Court. The 
Government’s actions concerning the ICC were evaluated against the promoted ethical 
foreign policy. Through this, the Opposition criticised the ICC Bill and the Government’s 
actions. Conservative MP Gillan saw that the ICC Bill was for the Government “one of their 
do-gooding poses”. (House of Commons 2001b, vol. 368, col. 309) Shadow Foreign 
Secretary Maude disparaged the Government’s actions with the ICC Bill and saw that the Bill 
“is now being bounced through on a strict guillotine so that the Foreign Secretary can try to 
add little lustre to his chipped and damaged ethical foreign policy”. (House of Commons 
2001b, vol. 368 col. 334) When the issue of universal jurisdiction was debated in Committee, 
Conservative MP Blunt tied the issue to foreign policy when he wanted to “see the colour of 
the Government's ethical money.” (Standing Committee 2001j, 3.45 pm) 
Quite to the contrary, the supporters saw the ICC as a good possibility to advance an ethical 
foreign policy. MP King pointed to the failures of the past when perpetrators of international 
crimes have not been brought to justice and saw that that can no longer be the case because “it 
does not square with an ethical foreign policy.” (House of Commons 1999, vol. 336, col. 931) 
Labour MP Tony Colman stated that he is “proud of the Government's ethical foreign policy” 
and that ratifying the ICC’s Rome Statute “is a key part” of it. (House of Commons 1999, vol. 
336, col. 937)  
The foreign policy context of the time is well visible in the debates. The ICC was a way for 
the Government to advance its ethical foreign policy. Especially the argumentation that the 
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UK should be among the first 60 states to ratify the ICC and that it should lead by 
example echo the Government’s wish that its actions concerning the ICC should be taken as a 
sign  of  success  of  its  ethical  foreign  policy  and  that  the  Government  is  serious  about  
promoting human rights worldwide. For that, the endorsement of the ICC worked as a good 
example: supporting the Court was one way to achieve this and enhance the UK’s positive 
image.  
5.4.2 The Two Regimes and Legalism 
Points  put  forth  in  the  discussion  of  the  human rights  and  atrocities  regimes  were  visible  in  
the debates. This was mostly seen in the first theme of argumentation, breaking the culture of 
impunity and the ICC’s role in it.  
As discussed in chapter 2, human rights have risen in importance since the Second World War 
and the need to protect them has become one of the central tasks of states. The human rights 
regime can be characterized through two different theoretical points, the security and 
legalistic theories of human rights. To some extent, both can be seen in the debates. The wish 
of the UK to build support for the ICC and to get as many states as possible to become parties 
can be taken as an aim to integrate states to the framework the ICC represents. For example 
Minister of State Vaz expressed the Government’s wish that they want many more countries 
to  sign  the  Rome  Statute  (the  number  was  at  89  at  the  time  in  October  1999)  and  told  the  
House that they have encouraged others to do so bi- and multilaterally. Being party to the ICC 
if  not  forces,  at  least  strongly  encourages  states  to  respect  human  rights;  and  as  per  the  
security theory, states that respect human rights are less likely to become aggressors and thus 
security increases. (Posner 2009, 183) The legalistic theory views human rights as having 
value in themselves and the concern for their protection should go beyond state borders and 
be institutionalized. (Posner 2009, 183-4) Those who do not respect human rights and 
perpetrate heinous crimes need to be brought to responsibility for their crimes. Within the 
culture  of  impunity  this,  however,  is  not  often  done  and  the  ICC was  seen  as  one  way with  
which to break that culture. Thus, the need for the ICC rises from the idea that human rights 
themselves are worthy of protection.  
The importance of human rights has to a large extent become epitomized in the atrocities 
regime, which in essence encompasses the idea of institutions that are established to bring to 
justice those individuals that perpetrate international crimes. In the atrocities regime, the ICC 
represents the latest and the highest development. Arguments in support of the ICC that 
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referred to it as an important institution for breaking the culture of impunity and 
advancing individual responsibility invoke clearly the idea of an atrocities regime.  
The atrocities regime is closely related to the idea of legalization and legalism and emphasizes 
that certain actions are not only unacceptable but unlawful. Belief in the effectiveness of 
legalization  and  legalism  clearly  underlies  the  arguments  put  forth  of  the  ICC.  Overall,  
support for the ICC stems from the idea of establishing institutions of law within international 
relations (legalization) and of the, in Gary Bass’s terms, principled belief that war criminals 
should be put on trial (legalism). (Bass 2000, 20) Through this, the supporters of the Court 
also moved forwards from the sort of idealism that puts faith in international law, institutions 
and legalism. Belief in the ICC’s ability to bring perpetrators to justice and belief in its 
deterrence power reflects well that belief in legalism that has gained popularity within the 
international community in the past few decades. 
The belief in legalism underlines to a large extent the overall supportive position taken by 
those arguing for the ICC and is also visible in the statements made by the MPs. During the 
April 2001 debate, Foreign Secretary Cook argued that the UK should ratify the Rome Statute 
because  the  ICC  gives  practical  expression  to  that  “those  who  commit  crime  should  not  go  
unpunished and that justice should be available to the victim through legal process. Those are 
strong principles, but they also have a powerful practical effect.” (House of Commons 2001a, 
vol. 366, col. 224) This argument points to a belief in the appropriateness of legalism as a 
solution to the problem posed by the culture of impunity. Solicitor-General Cranston 
expressed similar belief and argued that ending the culture of impunity is important to 
achieving peace: 
“[…] we would take the view as a point of principle that justice, generally speaking, provides 
the best foundation for long-term peace. We believe that identifying and bringing to justice 
those persons who have committed the most serious crimes possible is the best foundation for 
reconciliation in war-torn societies. (Standing Committee 2001g, 11.45 am) 
In addition to such legalistic arguments, also the more pragmatic legalism was visible in the 
statements. As discussed, pragmatic legalism refers to belief in the value of legalism, while at 
the same time acknowledging that politics and power influences the advancement of legalism 
and its institutions. This sort of pragmatism was present in arguments that although something 
had to be given up to reach agreement in Rome, it was worth the sacrifice because otherwise 
there would be no ICC at all. Foreign Secretary Cook argued that although the possibility to 
opt-out for a period of seven years was not preferred by the UK, “it was well worth agreeing 
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to in order to get abroad a number of countries that would not otherwise have supported 
it”. (House of Commons 1998, vol. 336, col. 812) MP Worthington conceded that the ICC is 
likely  to  the  partial  because  actions  of  the  powerful,  such  as  the  Russians  and  the  Chinese,  
will likely never be prosecuted but even though partiality is “a huge imperfection […] we gain 
more by establishing and International Criminal Court than by delaying”. (House of 
Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 240) In terms of argumentation techniques, these arguments 
were  quasi-logical  and  based  on  sacrifice,  where  reference  is  made  to  what  one  has  
surrendered to achieve the certain result. (Hauser 1986, 183) These arguments invoke the idea 
of pragmatic legalism, where justice tempered by consideration of politics and power is better 
than no justice at all. 
Key  points  put  forth  within  the  human  rights  and  atrocities  regimes  became  visible  in  the  
debates. Furthermore, what arises from the general tone of the support for the ICC is a belief 
in legalism but also an acknowledgement of the need of pragmatism. The framework set by 
the regimes and legalism as a way to solve some problems of international relations, mainly 
the culture of impunity, clearly surrounds the debates.  
Key ideas of realism highlight the Opposition’s overall position during the debates. This was 
also visible in connection to legalism. Whereas legalism has its basis in idealism, criticism of 
it is often very realist-inspired. As identified in chapter 2, realists question the emphasis that 
is given to legalism and doubt its effectiveness in a system where, realists argue, power and 
interests still prevail. This viewpoint underlined the Opposition’s arguments about the ICC 
and its functioning in international relations. Conservative MP Garnier’s statement captures 
well the realist-inspired critique of legalism:  
“We are talking about power, backed by military might. There can be no such thing as 
universal jurisdiction or a universal court unless it is backed by military power. In a civilian 
context, it is difficult to enforce the law without a police force, so it will be extremely difficult 
to enforce the law of the ICC without military might. […] Let us not pretend, in signing up to 
the ICC, that we can do so in any spirit other than one that confronts the nastiness of war, the 
need for military might and the political will to back up our policies.” (Standing Committee 
2001h, 5.02 pm) 
In  this  statement  the  realist  critique  that  international  law cannot  work  without  states  and  is  
influenced by the realities of power is well visible. The argumentation of the supporters of the 
ICC and of the Opposition mirror well both legalism and its realist critique. These differences 
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can  also  be  identified  with  the  concepts  of  the  different  logics  of  action  and  is  further  
discussed in that context below. 
5.4.3 The Argumentation and the Constructivist Framework 
To a large extent, the argumentation in the debates can be seen to highlight many of the 
constructivist points introduced in Chapter 2. Constructivism takes the view that structure that 
surrounds actors influences them and their behaviour; and in turn, those actors influence and 
shape the structure.  
Overall, the influence of the structure that surrounds the ICC became visible in the debates. 
When the MPs referred to the culture of impunity and failures in the past and when they 
sought support for their arguments from the existing body law they used argumentation 
influenced by the structure, formed by international criminal law and its institutions. This 
structure is also characterized by the human rights and atrocities regimes which are a part of it 
and  which  inform  states  of  what  is  considered  (at  least  by  a  majority  of  states)  to  be  
appropriate behaviour. Furthermore, the status that legalization and legalism have taken in 
international relations guide actors (that view legalism positively) to perceive international 
courts as an effective way to punish those that transgress what is considered to be ‘good’ 
behaviour. For this, the ICC functions as a way to identify and judge the breakers of the rules. 
By defining appropriate behaviour, the structure constrains actors by limiting the choices they 
can make, given that they want to act according to what is taken as proper and right behaviour. 
When MPs refer to existing law, they make visible the structure that surrounds the ICC. Such 
influence can be seen, for example, in the following statement by MP Browne: “The statute 
[of Rome] has been agreed by sovereign nations that discussed and negotiated a draft statute 
in a concentrated fashion against a set of international standards that they all accepted.” 
(House of Commons 2001b, vol. 368, col. 338) 
Browne’s reference to ‘standards that all accept’ points to the influence of what is considered 
by the majority to be appropriate behaviour on the ICC and its establishment. Browne went on 
to argue that  
“At  this  stage,  we  cannot  say,  in  effect,  to  the  ICC,  "Go  away  and  practise  on  all  the  wee  
countries and when you have got it right and are up to a standard that we think is appropriate, 
then we will let our people be subject to its jurisdiction." We cannot do that.” (House of 
Commons 2001b, vol. 368, col. 338)  
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Should the UK do so, Browne argued, the UK would in effect give up its leadership role. 
(House of Commons 2001b, vol. 368, col. 338) This represents the third theme of 
argumentation that the UK should lead by example and as with the arguments concerning 
existing law, this argumentation echoes to a large extent constructivist thinking. Arguments in 
support of the ICC that emphasize leading by example have at their basis the idea that one’s 
behaviour can affect others negatively or positively. Furthermore, that behaviour can also 
constitute the structure, in the same way as the structure can influence actor’s behaviour. By 
showing  a  good  example,  the  UK  can  influence  the  behaviour  of  others  and  reinforce  a  
structure in which international law and the rule of law are taken as positive and worthwhile 
issues. Not only was support for the ICC important for the Government’s ethical foreign 
policy,  it  was  also  important  for  the  way the  UK was  to  be  perceived  by  others  and  for  the  
way  its  actions  can  influence  the  behaviour  of  other  states.  This  became  clear  when  the  
supporters argued that the UK needs to set a good example and pointed to the possible dire 
consequences suspecting the ICC, and its behaviour once it started it work, could have not 
only  for  the  Court,  but  for  the  UK  and  its  image  as  well.  As  mentioned,  what  sort  of  a  
message is staying outside the ICC’s jurisdiction for a civilized country to send? This concern 
for image and influence was also noticed by the Opposition. MP Blunt criticized that 
“They [the Government] will not want to be seen to be outwith the general mood in the 
international community […] It can properly be argued that the Government are excessively 
sensitive to public opinion not only in the United Kingdom but in the global village, and that 
is why we are the only permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations 
likely to ratify the treaty without a reservation.” (Standing Committee 2001a, 11.15 am) 
Here Blunt refers aptly to the way in which the Government was seen to be concerned for its 
image  among  other  states;  and  at  the  same  time,  to  the  constructivist  view  that  states  are  
influenced by other states and by what is perceived as appropriate behaviour within the 
international community.  
Furthermore,  in  light  of  the  constructivist  framework,  it  can  be  seen  that  by  setting  an  
example,  the  UK  could  act  as  a  norm  promoter,  endorsing  norms  that  take  as  appropriate  
behaviour the protection of human rights and individual responsibility: that those who commit 
international crimes should be brought to justice. As defined by Finnemore, norms are shared 
expectations of what actors view as appropriate behaviour. (Finnemore 1996, 22) States 
promote norms and when enough powerful states endorse a norm, others are pushed to adopt 
it and the behaviour it purports through the process of socialization. In this, international 
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organizations can function as platforms for norm promotion. These institutions, once 
created, can then influence states; they are mutually constitutive. By endorsing the ICC and 
the behaviour that goes with it, the UK acts as a good example, influencing others to do the 
same. Once the ICC is established, norms purporting the protection of human rights and 
individual responsibility can be further promoted and eventually, the ICC will influence states 
and their behaviour. Of the ICC’s hoped influence, the clearest example is the belief that the 
ICC can function as a deterrent to possible future perpetrators. Thus envisaged Minister of 
State Battle: 
“[…]  the  Governments  ratifying  the  statute  […]  are  fully  aware  of  the  possibility  of  
prosecution. The key point is that the nationals of those countries know that it is possible that 
they will  be prosecuted if  they commit those crimes—they could be ``got''  by the ICC. That 
will act as a deterrent“. (Standing Committee 2001f, 3.00 pm) 
In this way, it is seen that once the ICC is established, it will in turn influence the behaviour 
of states by impeding them of inappropriate and in legalistic language, criminal behaviour.  
It was seen by the supporters of the Court that the UK’s behaviour concerning the ICC would 
affect other states and their behaviour. The central argument was that the UK should have a 
positive, not a negative influence. MP Worthington noted that “We must set up the 
International Criminal Court and thus establish a framework for the compliance of countries 
such as America and China, which are not currently involved in it”. (House of Commons vol. 
366, col. 349) In even more a constructivist spirit MP Corbyn argued that the ICC will 
“ensure that any country that signs up to the treaty [the Rome Statute] will—yes—expose 
itself to possible prosecutions under it but, in doing so, it will set an example, a standard and 
a norm.” (House of Commons 2001b, vol. 366, col. 345)  
By endorsing the ICC, the UK will set an example; influence the behaviour of others; and 
reinforce in a positive way the structure that encompasses the protection of human rights 
through international legal institutions. On the other hand, this structure also influences the 
behaviour of the UK by setting the standards of what is deemed appropriate behaviour. The 
discussion is continued in the framework of the different logics of action. 
5.4.4 The Argumentation and the Different Logics of Action 
Point put forth both in the logics of consequences and appropriateness were discernible from 
the debates. This is not surprising given that often involved are parts from both logics of 
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action.  As  discussed,  within  the  frame  of  the  logic  of  consequences,  actors  pursue  their  
interests and norms and rules are followed if they coalesce with those interests. The logic of 
appropriateness, on the other hand, is driven by social structure and actors look to norms and 
rules to determine what type of action is available. Behaviour is directed by considerations of 
what is good, desirable and appropriate. (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 912-3)  
As mentioned, whereas the Opposition’s argumentation highlights more the points of realism 
and the logic of consequences, the supporter’s arguments resonate more with an idealist 
outlook  that  mirrors  the  logic  of  appropriateness.  For  example,  when  under  debate  was  an  
Opposition amendment to allow more discretionary powers to the UK Secretary of State over 
the ICC, Conservative MP Stephen Day called the amendment “a dose of reality that goes 
beyond the pure moral question” (Standing Committee 2001c, 11.15 am), criticizing the 
supporter’s position as one based too much on considerations of morality, not reality. 
Overall, the emphasis in the support for the ICC was that establishing the Court is something 
that is right and morally desirable. This is most clearly visible in arguments for the ICC’s role 
as an institution that can help break the culture of impunity. Moreover, arguments about the 
UK  need  to  ratify  the  Rome  Statute  as  soon  as  possible  and  of  the  importance  of  the  UK  
setting an example to others put forth the idea that endorsing the ICC is a morally good thing 
to do. The UK was to lead by example and provide moral leadership. MP King noted in the 
1999 debate that “The international community requires moral leadership on the issue, and I 
expect our Labour Government to show it.” (House of Commons 1999, vol. 336, col. 932) 
Similarly  did  MP  Ellman,  who  noted  that  by  endorsing  the  ICC,  the  UK  can  “set  a  moral  
lead”. (House of Commons 2001. vol. 366, col. 256) 
Endorsing the ICC as appropriate behaviour became visible in the argumentation. Solicitor-
General Cranston referred to this when he defended the inclusion of the crime of aggression in 
the Rome Statute as justified “in terms not only of a dry, legal analysis but of the horrors that 
are still occurring throughout the world. It is a moral argument.” (Standing Committee 2001j, 
3.30 pm) MP Browne saw that the best defence for the ICC arises from particular principles 
and argued also against a more realist logic of consequences that emphasizes power: 
“The contribution of sovereign nations to international justice must not be judged according 
to the number of citizens that they have or according to the size of their standing armies. Their 
contribution must be judged according to principles of decency, law and justice. Britain has 
given many of those principles to the world. Arguments about the ICC should be tested 
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against those principles, not against some pretended self-interest.” (House of Commons 
2001b, vol. 368, col. 339) 
Minister of State Battle took to his aid just war theory, Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle when 
he argued against a purely realist viewpoint: 
“He [Thomas Aquinas] tried to argue the role of reason against the use of force. He 
suggested that reason could overcome force and that we should not accept the view that might 
is always right. He implied that human beings together could in a reasonable way transcend 
violence. That is what the Bill is about.” (Standing Committee 2001h, 6.15 pm) 
In light of these statements, the supporter’s position is represented as following to a larger 
extent behaviour characterized by ideas of the logic of appropriateness. However, as 
mentioned, both logics are often visible in particular action. Argumentation in support of the 
ICC also highlights, to some extent, the logic of consequences. When universal jurisdiction, 
which the Government did not adopt to the ICC Bill, was discussed, Conservative MP Garnier 
noted pointedly: 
“I find it puzzling that the Government's fondness for morality, which underscored their 
arguments in favour of the ICC, seems to be crumbling somewhat. The hideous expression 
“practicality” is, perhaps, entering the argument. Can the Government assure me that they are 
not moving away from the so-called moral stance that they advanced when they introduced 
the Bill to the House of Commons?” (Standing Committee 2001j, 4.45 pm) 
Indeed, it seemed that practicality did enter the Government’s case. This was mostly visible in 
the argumentation that the UK should ratify the ICC as soon as possible. As discussed, 
reasons given for the haste were often practical in nature, referring either to the positive 
consequences of being a part of the ICC process from the start or to the negative 
consequences of staying out of it. In connection to this was raised the argument that joining 
the ICC corresponds with the UK’s national interest. Foreign Secretary Cook made the point 
clearly when he argued that “it is plainly in our own national interest to be there when the 
crucial decisions are taken”. (House of Commons 2001a, vol. 366, col. 217) MP MacLennan 
combined the two logics when he wondered why endorsing the ICC would somehow be 
contrary to the UK’s interest when in fact, it corresponds with them perfectly: 
“I find it unattractive that the Conservatives constantly presume an opposition between 
national interests and the interests of implementing the treaty. I perceive no such opposition. 
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To my mind, the treaty's implementation is precisely in the interests of this country, which 
has, like others, suffered the sort of international crimes that it is part of the statute of Rome's 
purpose to deter by the very existence of a mechanism for dealing with them.“ (Standing 
Committee 2001d, 5.45 pm) 
Thus, support for the ICC to a large extent was premised on endorsing that the ICC and the 
norms and rules it represents are to be seen as morally good and appropriate. It was seen that 
not only is supporting the ICC beneficial and in some way, morally ‘right’, the UK could and 
should take a moral lead and encourage others to adhere to the appropriate behaviour that is 
defined by those norms and rules that have led to the ICC’s establishment and which the 
Court will in turn represent and reinforce. In addition, the argumentation to an extent also 
echoed point of the logic of consequences, visible when the support for the ICC’s was tied 
with the UK’s national interest. Given that the two logics are often present at the same time, 
this should not however be viewed as voiding the effect of considerations of the appropriate. 
As MP MacLennan argued, there is no reason why endorsing the ICC could not at the same 
time be appropriate and morally right and correspond to the UK’s national interests.  
In addition to the logics of consequences and appropriateness, overall the logic of arguing 
provides an apt context for the analysis. As discussed in Chapter 2, the logic of arguing 
purports that through collective communication actors test their assumptions of how and if the 
norms of appropriate behaviour can be justified and which norms apply. When actors argue, 
they challenge the validity claims put forth by other actors. (Risse 2001, 6-7) 
In the debates over the ICC, different norms can be seen to underlie the positions of the 
Opposition and the Government. As mentioned, it is disagreement over the truth or 
appropriateness of the other’s statements that leads to argumentation. In the ICC debates, on 
the whole, the disagreement can be characterized as a conflict between the norms of 
sovereignty and human rights and their protection. This can in turn be characterized through 
the theoretical framework, where the emphasis of sovereignty if framed by realism, critique of 
legalism and the logic of consequences; and emphasis on human rights by idealism, legalism 
and the logic of appropriateness.  
The Opposition, in a more realist fashion, was concerned over how the ICC could affect the 
UK’s sovereignty and its ability to decide on one of its central part, the punishment of its own 
nationals.  As  mentioned,  when  a  state  joins  the  ICC,  it  in  a  way  concedes  a  part  of  its  
sovereignty and thus joining can incur so-called sovereignty costs. This clashed with the 
position held by the supporters of the Court, that human rights and their protection should 
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prevail over sovereignty should a state’s national commit international crimes. In this way, 
the debates over the ICC become contextualized by the wider debate within international 
relations: the effect of human rights and their protection on one of the most fundamental 
principles in international relations, that of sovereignty. As Dacyl notes, the 1990’s marked a 
start of major changes in international relations and “probably the most significant of these 
changes concerns the role of the sovereignty principle and human rights in international 
politics. It seems that these two concepts once again have been placed on a collision course 
with each other”. (Dacyl 1996, 136) Here, on the one side is realism, emphasizing the 
importance of power, states, and state sovereignty; and on the other, there is idealism-inspired 
legalism that believes in the ability of law to solve problem and in the power of morality and 
norms. In constructivist language, sovereignty can be seen as a highly internalized norm and 
thus it is no wonder that debates concerning it are often heated. The sovereignty – human 
rights conflict is most visible in relation to the fifth theme of argumentation, dissociation 
between the UK and the ICC.  
The dissociation in a way is perhaps the most intriguing and surprising argumentation that 
emerges from the debates. It does not represent a similar, positive argumentation about the 
ICC as do the other themes where the focus is more on the UK supporting the ICC because of 
the ICC’s perceived positive value. The dissociation of the UK and from the Court rises from 
more a negative perception of the ICC where through dissociation the image of the Court as a 
threat needs to be diminished as much as possible in order to convince opponents to support it. 
Although otherwise viewed in a positive light, the supporter’s had to heed to the clash 
between sovereignty and human rights as the Opposition constantly brought up the issue 
when  they  framed  their  criticism  of  the  ICC  Bill  in  terms  of  the  ICC  as  a  threat  to  UK  
sovereignty. This can also be seen to perhaps reveal something from the ultimate position of 
the  supporters,  that  they  did  not  see  it  as  a  possibility  to  argue,  for  example,  that  if  a  UK  
national would commit an international crime, the case perhaps should be handled by an 
international  court  because  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  if  the  national  in  question  would  be  a  
high-ranking official, he or she would be prosecuted nationally either genuinely or at all. As 
mentioned  in  a  statement  by  MP  Worthington,  the  ICC  will  likely  be  partial  and  never  
prosecute those that are most powerful (above p. 113). He of course had China and Russia in 
mind, not the UK. Even if the first instance would not be to hand a case over to an 
international court, then at least the possibility of it could be left open; now, it was to a large 
extent wholly deleted as a possibility when the UK was vehemently dissociated from the 
ICC’s jurisdiction.  
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Thus, in a way, at the foundation of the arguments that sought to dissociate first the UK 
from international crimes and second, from the ICC’s jurisdiction, can be seen to be exactly 
what the supporter’s themselves argued against; that the ICC in reality is meant for others, not 
for  us.  It  is  useful  to  remember  Foreign  Secretary  Cook’s  statement  in  the  2000  BBC  
Newsnight: “If I may say so, this is not a court set up to bring to book prime ministers of the 
United Kingdom or presidents of the United States”. (Griffiths 2012b) To an extent, this 
echoes a rather realist view; that those who are influential and powerful enough do not have to 
worry about such things as international courts. What keeps UK nationals safe from the ICC’s 
jurisdiction is, in the end, its status as a powerful state and UNSC member. This corresponds 
well with the criticisms of selectivity of international justice and trials and the way in which 
the ICC has been perceived as a tool for the powerful (as discussed in Chapter 3). This is not 
to say that most of the support given to the ICC during the debates was not very likely 
genuinely premised on the ideas of what is good and appropriate, but to point to the influence 
of realpolitik. Where the supporters were concerned that the UK would seem arrogant if it 
opted out from the ICC’s jurisdiction (quote by MP Browne on p. 96), it is the position that 
UK personnel will never have to face the ICC that easily invites criticism of arrogance. 
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6. Conclusion 
This thesis has focused on the UK’s support for the ICC and the UK’s ICC Bill from 1998 to 
2001 by analyzing argumentation in the House of Commons debates. Rhetorical analysis was 
conducted to answer the research question of how the UK Government representatives and 
other Members of Parliament argued in support of the ICC. Five main themes of 
argumentation with which the ICC was supported and UK joining it justified were identified 
from the debates. Overall, supporters were enthusiastic about the ICC and saw it as a way to 
break the prevalent culture of impunity. Furthermore, it was contended that the UK should 
take  a  positive  role  concerning  the  ICC  and  on  its  part  aim  to  set  a  positive  example  and  
encourage others to endorse the ICC. The argumentation during the debates echoed many of 
the points put forth in the theoretical discussion. The issue of the ICC and the UK’s ICC Bill 
were contextualized by the human rights and atrocities regimes and belief in legalism and 
legalization that has spread in international relations in the past few decades. Belief in 
legalism also represents the more liberal and idealist theories of international relations. 
Support for the ICC was contended to represent ‘good behaviour’. However, especially 
argumentation that sought to create distance between the UK and the ICC echoed more realist 
points of view and highlighted the importance of state sovereignty and a states right to decide 
and judge over its nationals. This connects the debates over the ICC to the wider issue of 
sovereignty versus human rights. 
Much has happened after these debates were held in the House of Commons. In many ways 
the UK has remained a supporter of the Court and events echo the arguments put forth in the 
debates. The UK did ratify the ICC’s Rome Statute and became a State Party in 2001. (The 
ICC 2012b) Changes in Government has not meant major changes to UK’s policies 
concerning the ICC and relationship to the Court has remained rather similar under the 
Labour Government of Gordon Brown and even the Conservative Government of David 
Cameron. (Dodds and Elden 2008; Honeyman 2012) Clearest practical support by the UK has 
perhaps been the two UNSC referrals, by which the cases of Darfur and Libya were referred 
to the ICC. (ICC 2012a) On both occasions, the UK voted in favour of the referral resolution. 
In the meeting concerning Resolution 1593 by which the Darfur case was referred to the ICC, 
the UK’s representative Sir Emyr Jones Parry stated the UK’s support for the ICC “which is 
for us the most efficient and effective means available to deal with impunity and to ensure 
justice for the people of Darfur. (The UNSC 2005, 7; The UNSC 2011) 
However, the relationship can not be viewed in a wholly a positive light. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the UK has been criticised for its actions regarding the Article 98 agreements 
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(BIAs) and due to financial reasons. Furthermore, the 2003 Iraq war has damaged the 
UK’s  image  as  a  promoter  of  human rights  and  supporter  of  international  law.  Both  the  US 
and UK sought to interpret justifications for the Iraq invasion from a resolution (Res 1441) 
that, in the end, did not authorize the use of force in Iraq. The decision to invade without clear 
UN authorization has damaged the image of the UN and undermined its authority. For White, 
the 2003 Iraq war represents the culmination point of US and UK bullying tactics to change 
the principles on the use of force. (White 2009, 243-267) Furthermore, the war in Iraq and the 
following ‘war on terror’ and anti-terrorism measures from the use of torture to extraordinary 
renditions have had severe consequences for the image of the UK as an advancer of human 
rights and international law worldwide. Firm backing of Bush’s policies and strategies by PM 
Blair and the Blair Government’s failure to criticize questionable measures taken mostly by 
the US has severely undermined the UK’s credibility concerning human rights in general and 
makes  it  difficult  for  the  UK  to  comment  on  the  human  rights  records  of  others.  (Mepham  
2007 60-63) All this stands as a clear paradox with the idea of an ethical foreign policy.  
Events connected to the 2003 Iraq war have highlighted the way in which the UK was 
dissociated from the ICC in the debates.  The UK has done what the MPs maintained during 
the debates and has prosecuted UK nationals for war crimes in the case of Corporal Payne and 
others, as mentioned in Chapter 3. (Rasiah 2009) To some extent, the Opposition’s fears have 
materialized in the calls of bringing to justice Prime Minister Blair for the Iraq war. However, 
it  remains  highly  unlikely  that  those  calls  would  be  answered  either  by  the  ICC  or  the  UK  
itself. 
Other  instances  cause  suspicion  about  the  UK’s  unequivocal  support  for  the  ICC.  One  
example of this a conversation, made public by Wikileaks, held between UK, US and France 
in August 2008. The meeting concerned the ICC’s indictment of Sudan’s President Al-Bashir 
and the possibility of the UNSC deferring such an indictment under Article 16 of the Rome 
Statute for political purposes. The leaked document recites the UK’s opinion that an Article 
16 deferral could have potential leverage for achieving progress in Darfur and in the 
implementation of Sudan’s peace agreement. At the same time, the UK emphasized that it 
does not want to be seen to be ‘making deals’ or ‘politicizing’ the ICC’s work. (The 
Telegraph 2011) Another example is a September 2012 article which revealed that Sudan and 
Congo have received close to £2, 4 million from the UK for training and support of military 
and defence personnel. Both the situations are also cases open in the ICC. (The Guardian 
2012) It seems justified to agree with Waugaman that the UK’s ICC policy is one of 
“principled yet pragmatic support” and it has been “challenged continuously by the task of 
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balancing its principled support for international justice with practical policy decisions.” 
(Waugaman 2006, 3) 
In light of recent events, other interesting avenues for research can be identified. Analysing 
UK argumentation in relation to the two cases referred to the ICC by the UNSC, Darfur and 
Libya, could give interesting insight to UK’s current views concerning the ICC and of the 
UK’s foreign policy overall. Comparing these to UK argumentation in 1998-2001 could 
provide deeper understanding of possible changes in views and policy. Another interesting 
subject would be to study argumentation in connection to the case of Corporal Payne and 
Others to analyse, for example, how the matter was presented by the UK Government and/or 
discussed in UK mainstream media. Furthermore, arguments by other states could form an 
interesting area of further study. For example, France has supported the ICC but only 
conditionally by opting out from war crimes. Focus on France’s argumentation concerning the 
opt-out could give interesting insight on France’s views on the ICC and could also be 
compared to the views of the UK.  
Current events, criticism towards the UK concerning its practices, the 2003 the Iraq war and 
the ICC and the fact that the cases open in the ICC all concern less powerful African states 
reinforces the criticism that international justice remains selective and is used as a tool by the 
powerful states. To a large extent, key realist points of the importance of states, their power 
and standing in international relations continues to hold true when it comes to international 
criminal law. Despite good, idealistic goals of ending the culture of impunity, of belief in 
legalism and of bringing those responsible for international crimes to justice - from wherever 
they might come from -, international criminal law and its institutions remain to be influenced 
by power and realpolitik.  
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Appendix 
Appendix I. Sources used in analysis 
Where When What stage 
House of Commons July 20th 1998 Results of the Rome 
Conference introduced 
House of Commons October 27th 1999 Foreign Policy Debate 
House of Commons April 3rd 2001 Second Reading 
Standing Committee April 10th 2001 (morning) Debate in Committee 
Standing Committee April 10th 2001 (afternoon Debate in Committee 
Standing Committee April 24th (morning) Debate in Committee 
Standing Committee April 24th 2001 (afternoon) Debate in Committee 
Standing Committee April 26th 2001 (morning) Debate in Committee 
Standing Committee April 26th 2001 (afternoon) Debate in Committee 
Standing Committee May 1st 2001 (morning) Debate in Committee 
Standing Committee May 1st 2001 (afternoon) Debate in Committee 
Standing Committee May 3rd 2001 (morning) Debate in Committee 
Standing Committee May 3rd 2001 (afternoon) Debate in Committee 
House of Commons May 10th 2001 Third Reading and Report 
Source: http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/commons/ 
 
